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Introduction
This Guide was prepared as a reference source for legal opinions and court cases
related to the Subdivision Law. It has been designed in loose-leaf format so that as
new opinions and court cases emerge, they can be inserted in a logical sequence. This
Guide contains 7 sections as follows:
1. Subject guide to legal opinions and court cases. This is a subject guide to topics 
discussed in the opinions and court cases which fo llow. It is expected that this 
Guide w ill be periodically updated as new cases and opinions are added.
2 . Attorney General's Opinions. Th is section contains opinions, informal and otherwise, 
issued by the Attorney General's O ffic e , that appear to be relevant to the inter­
pretation and administration of the Subdivision Law. Excluded from this collection 
are statements from the Attorney General's Office which decline to answer specific 
inquiries.
3. Maine Municipal Association Opinions. This section has been reproduced from the 
legal opinions section of the Maine Townsman. Editorial notes have been added 
where clarification was deemed appropriate.
4 . SPO Memorandums. This section contains memorandums issued by the State Planning 
Office relative to the Subdivision Law.
5 . Maine Supreme Court Cases. Th is section includes Maine Supreme Court cases which 
appear to be relevant to the Subdivision Law. Marginal notes have been editorially  
added to highlight certain paragraphs.
6 . Superior Court Cases. Th is section has been included for Superior Court opinions, 
although a search of courthouse records has not been made to uncover cases which 
may exist. A t the present time, only 1 case has been included in this section.
7. Subdivision Law. This section contains the existing Subdivision Law, as well as 
previous versions of the Law, which are often helpful in researching whether a sub­
division was created at a particular point in time.
Credits: The Penobscot Valley Regional Planning Commission assembled opinions from 
the Attorney General's O ffice and the Maine Municipal Association. The State Planning 
Office assembled the court cases, and arranged and edited this Guide.
Subject Guide to Legal Opinions and Court Cases
Subject Guide to Legal Opinions and Court Cases
This Guide was prepared as a summary of topics contained in the opinions and court 
cases which fo llow . Each topic contains one or more abbreviated references which are 
explained below:
A G -1 , A G -2, A G -3 , e tc ., refers to opinions issued by the Attorney General's 
O ffic e . These are numbered chronologically by date, so that new ones can 
be added according to a logical sequence as time goes by. Individual pages 
are also numbered in some of the longer opinions. Several opinions relative 
to the Site Location Act are also included because they contain discussion 
that would be relevant for the Subdivision Law.
M M A -1, M M A -2 , M M A -3, e tc ., refers to opinions prepared by the Maine M uni- 
cipal Association. These opinions are numbered chronologically as they appear­
ed in various issues of the Maine Townsmen. As new opinions appear, they can 
be added to this sequence.
SPO -1, SPO -2 , e tc .,re fe rs to memorandums issued by the State Planning O ffic e . 
These are also numbered in chronological order according to date of issuance.
M SC -1, MSC-2 (page 54), MSC-3 (page 750), e tc ., refers to Maine Court cases 
which are arranged chronologically according to date. Since these opinions 
were copied directly from the Atlantic Reporter, page numbers from that source 
are also included, are used for reference purposes. Several cases related to the 
Site Location Act are included because they contain general discussions that 
would be relevant to the Subdivision Law.
sc-1, etc. This section is designed to include court case opinions from Superior Court.
A t this point, only the Phippsburg case has been included.
Subject Guide to Legal Opinions and Court Cases
Abuttor
Transfer of an interest in land to an abuttor is not a subdivision. See discussion in 
A G -8 (pp 2-3) and M M A -6.
Adoption of Regulations
For procedure to fo llow , see M M A -1 .
Appeal Procedure
Appeal to decisions made under the Subdivision Law may be taken to Superior Court 
in accordance with Rule 80-B , Maine Rules of C iv il Procedures. See AG-1 (p. 4).
See sc-1 for a copy of Rule 80-B .
Applicants for Subdivision Approval
Applicants for subdivision approval must have tit le , rig h t, or interest in a parcel of 
land for which subdivision approval is sought in order to have "standing" (the right 
to apply) before the municipal reviewing authority. This principle was established 
in an opinion which dealt w ith the Site Location Act. The opinion further stated 
that mere oral representation regarding the existence of an option or contract is in ­
suffic ient to establish standing. See A G -4.
Specific requirements for establishing t it le , right or interest, and particular problems 
relating to standing, are discussed in A G -5.
Approval of Plat
For a discussion of who should sign, see SPO -1 .
Comprehensive Plan
It is not a requirement that a comprehensive plan be adopted prior to the adoption of 
subdivision control regulations. See A G -2 .
Conditions
City Planning Board, in passing on p lat, acts in an administrative capacity, and is 
without authority to impose conditions beyond compliance with municipal ordinance 
and general reasonableness. See MSC-2 (pp 53-54).
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Constitutional tty o f Law
One recent court case concerning the Site Location Act contains an excellent dis­
cussion of Constitutional questions and the basis for police power regulations. The 
basic principles which are discussed apply to the Subdivision Law as w e ll. See 
M SC -3. (see especially pp. 746-748).
Contiguous Parcels
Adjacent parcels of land are considered as one parcel of land for purposes of the 
Subdivision Law. See M M A -4.
Defin ition of What Constitutes a Subdivision
A subdivision is created when land is divided in a functional manner. Thus, cluster 
housing, shopping centers, mobile home parks, and apartment, condominium, or 
cooperative housing with multiple building units are subdivisions. See AG-1 (esp. 
p. 3).
For a discussion of high rise condominiums, see A G -3.
For a discussion of subdivision under the Site Location Act, see A G -7 .
A municipality may, by ordinance, but not by regulation adopted by the municipal 
reviewing authority, define subdivision more restrictively or all inclusive than it  is 
defined in State Law. See A G -9 .
The sale of land to a water company is not exempt as a lo t. See M M A -8.
In determining whether a subdivision was created at a particular point in time, the 
determination must be based on the law at that point in time. See AG-1 (p. 4), 
and M SC -1.
DEP Jurisdiction
The fact that a particular subdivision is subject to review under the Site Location Act 
does not eliminate the requirement for local review and approval. This principle is 
discussed in an opinion to the DEP relative to the Site Location Act. See A G -6 .
Enforcement
The Attorney General's O ffice regards enforcement of the Subdivision Law as a local 
responsibility except under extraordinary circumstances. See AG-1 (page 4).
G ifts
G ifts  are exempt as a lo t. See M M A -3.
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Grandfathering
A previously approved subdivision is not exempt from the requirements of a sub­
sequently enacted zoning ordinance. A proposed use does not constitute a non- 
conforming use. See M M A -9.
A municipality is not required to take steps to protect unwary buyers who purchase 
undersized lots which should have been combined with adjoining land, but such 
action would avoid many problems and appeals. See M M A -9.
Interpretation o f the Law
The legislative intent is of prime importance in the construction or interpretation 
of Statutes. Th is is a genera! principle of Law which was discussed in a recent 
court case. See M SC-3 (page 741).
Judicial Procedure
In one recent court case, the Maine Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of primary 
jurisd iction, which is essentially a judicial policy stating that the court w ill generally 
not decide an issue concerning which an administrative agency has decision making 
capacity until after the agency has considered the issue. This is similar to the con­
cept of exhaustion ofn^e^PremeSfes^ by which a court can refuse to decide on a 
case on the basis that an administrative action has not yet been deemed complete. 
W hile  the case dealt w ith the Board of Environmental Protection, these doctrines 
would probably apply in action involving the decisions of a municipal reviewing 
authority. See M SC-4 (p. 207).
Justification for Subdivision Regulation
One recent court case contains a good discussion of the need for subdivision regulation. 
Even though the discussion refers to the Site Location Act, the language is suffic iently  
broad so as to apply to the Subdivision Law. See M SC-3 (page 750).
L ia b ility
A Planning Board member may not be held individually liable to individual suits as 
a result of decisions made in the discharge of the Planning Board's duties. See sc-2 
(pages 8-10).
Municipal Regulation
Prior to 1971, the Subdivision Law was simply an enabling act, and did not require 
local review and approval. See M SC-4 (page 203).
Numerical Standards
The Spring Valley case discussed a rationale for determining and setting a specific 
numerical standard. See M SC-3 (page 752),
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Parcel Retained by Subdivider
Land retained by the subdivider for his own use as a single family dwelling is not 
counted as a lot under certain conditions. See M M A -7.
Plantation Review Powers
A Plantation does not have the authority to review and approve subdivisions. See
M M A -5.
Police Power
Subdivision regulation is a valid exercise of the police power. There is a general 
discussion of this principle in the Spring Valley case. See M SC-3 (page 746).
Request for Legal Interpretations or Opinions
The procedure for local Planning Boards to follow in requesting legal interpretations 
of the Subdivision Law was outlined in an opinion from the Attorney General's O ffice . 
See A G -3 .
Retroactive Application of the Subdivision Law
For a general discussion of th is, see AG-1 (page 4). See also M SC -1.
Review Considerations
Costs. It is public policy that the cost of development shall include those measures 
necessary to the protection of the environment of this State and this has already been 
determined by our Courts to be w ith in proper limits of the police power. See sc-2 
(page 6).
Discretion . The Legislature intended that there be room for discretion on the part 
of Planning Boards. See M SC -2, and sc-2 (pages 5-7) .
Planning Board status. Planning Board status may affect subdivision review powers. 
See SPO -3.
Reasonableness. Actions and deliberations of Planning Boards must meet a general 
reasonableness test. Not everything w ill be spelled out by statute or ordinance, 
and it  is expected that Planning Boards w ill exercise a general reasonableness. See 
MSC-2 (pp. 56-57), and sc-2 (page 7).
Tentative Approval does not compel final approval. The Planning Board does not have 
authority to make a prior commitment to approving a subdivision. See MSC-2 
(pp. 54 and 56).
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(Review Considerations) continued
Two-step approval. The basis for requiring preliminary and final plat approval 
must rest w ith specific statutes or regulations authorized thereunder. See MSC-2 
(pp. 55-56).
Water Supply. For procedures to fo llow , see SPO -2.
Shore land Zoning
Lot s ize , frontage, and setback requirements would apply to a previously approved 
subdivision, even i f  it  means that unsold lots have to be combined. See M M A -9.
Signing of Plat
For a discussion of who should sign, see SPO-1 .
Soils
The requirement that development not be bu ilt on soil types which are unsuitable 
to the nature of the undertaking is a reasonable one. While discussion of this 
point is contained in a case involving the Site Location A ct, the language is broad 
enough to apply to the Subdivision Law. See MSC-3 (page 750).
Street Acceptance
A road shown on a plat prior to creation of the Planning Board is not subject to the 
Planning Board's jurisd iction. See M M A -2.
Tentative Approval of Plat
The Planning Board does not have authority to give tentative approval of a plat, or 
commit itse lf in advance to approving a particular subdivision proposal. See MSC-2 
(page 54).
Transfer to an Abuttor
Transfer of land to an abuttor is exempt as a lo t. See A G -8 .
Water Supply
For a discussion of review considerations, see SPO -2.
Attorney General's Opinions
Reproduced from a joint opinion issued by the Attorney General's O ffice and the Maine 
Municipal Association. March 2 , 1972
TO: ALL CONCERNED MUNICIPALITIES 
FROM: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT AND THE MAINE 
MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION
RE: SUBDIVISION STATUTE - TITLE 30 MAINE REVISED
STATUTES, SECTION 4956 AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 454 
OF THE PUBLIC LAWS OF 1971
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the passage of the above act, both the Attorney 
General and the Maine Municipal Association have had numerous 
requests for guidance in the interpretation of the above 
law. Municipal officers and planning boards have requested 
official "Opinions" of the Attorney General regarding numer- 
our provisions of the statute.
The Law prohibits the Attorney General from rendering 
opinions for other than State agencies or officials on matters 
dealing with State Law (as opposed to municipal ordinances or 
the legal relationships between private parties). In this 
case, however, it was decided that this unique statute required 
an advisory memorandum from the Attorney General. Though the 
cited statute is administered by municipalities, it may, 
according to its own terms, be enforced by the Attorney Gen­
eral. There is, therefore, a substantial connection with a 
State agency which would support an advisory memorandum. 
Moreover, because of the nature of the act, both the Attor­
ney General and the Maine Municipal Association believe it 
is desirable to establish some uniform guidelines for the 
interpretation of the subdivision Law. Developers and muni­
cipal officers have an interest in uniform enforcement. If 
the Attorney General is to enforce the law, it is obvious 
that he must establish guidelines for his own use. There­
fore, the Attorney General has determined that it is in the 
public interest to issue this memorandum. It must be empha­
sized that this memorandum is not an "Opinion" in the tra­
ditional sense, but rather only an informal interpretation 
of the referenced law. This has been prepared by the Depart­
ment of the Attorney General after extensive consultation 
and discussion with the Maine Municipal Association. We 
strongly advise all planning boards and municipalities to 
consult their own counsel on any issue discussed herein or 
which may otherwise arise
II. SUBDIVISION
The most frequently asked category of questions usually 
requests further interpretation of the definition of "sub­
division". It is obvious that an infinite variety of situations 
may arise under this law. It would be impossible to deal
AG - 1
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with every conceivable fact situation. Therefore, in further 
defining "subdivision” we have attempted to establish a con­
ceptual framework and to apply such framework to a variety 
of fact situations.
The term "subdivision", as contained in the statute, is 
defined as:
"The division of a tract or parcel of land 
into 3 or more lots for the purpose of 
sale, development or building."
Based on this definition, it is apparent that there are 
two elements to the definition: (1) The division of land, 
and (2) the purpose for which the division occurs. Of these 
two elements, the first is probably the more important and 
also more complicated. If we determine that there has been 
a division of land, it is a relatively simple matter to 
identify the purpose for which the division takes place 
(e.g., plainly a shopping center constitutes a "development." 
Query whether it is a division of land.)
It is also important to keep in mind the public policy 
implicit in this statute and the harm which it was designed 
to prevent. This statute enables municipalities to protect 
themselves against unplanned growth. The twelve criteria 
in § 4956(3) set forth the specific items with which the 
Legislature and municipalities were concerned. It should be 
apparent that these questions can be applied to a variety of 
developments, and are not just limited to residential sub­
divisions .
As we have noted above, the critical question is to 
determine whether in each case there has been a "division" 
of land into "lots". The term "lot" may be defined in two 
ways: either (1) according to its legal characteristics
(e.g., a parcel of land identified on a plat or set out by 
metes and bounds), or (2) according to its character and 
function (e.g., a piece of land measured and set apart for 
private use and occupancy). See Words and Phrases and 
Black’s Law Dictionary for further examples of "lot". Of 
the two definitions, the latter is the more helpful since 
it describes a more functional approach; that is, it is 
concerned not with legal form but rather with actual use.
It is this functional approach which we have chosen to uti­
lize in interpreting "subdivision", since we believe it 
is consistent with the purpose of the law. Having thus 
attempted to establish the conceptual framework of our ana­




The subdivision of land is usually accomplished by 
marking such divisions on a plat, a plan or by simply con­
veying the parcels. Clearly an outright sale of a portion 
of a parcel of land is a division. However, a "division” 
under this act may also be accomplished by other than sell­
ing lots. If the language of the statute only permitted 
division to be achieved by sale, then clearly dividing a 
parcel by leasing lots would not be a "division" as envi­
sioned by the act. But the statute speaks of division for 
the purpose of sale and also for "development or building". 
Such development or building could occur withput a sale of 
lots. Note also the language in § 4956(4) which prohibits 
"conveyances". A conveyance is a transfer of an estate or 
interest in real property, including a sale, gift, lease 
or mortgage. We conclude, therefore, that a division may 
occur when an interest in land is sold, leased or otherwise 
conveyed.
It is also conceivable that developments other than 
residential ones may be "subdivisions". Though the conclu­
sion in any case depends on the particular facts, it is our 
opinion that cluster housing, shopping centers, mobile home 
parks, and apartment, condominium or cooperative housing 
with multiple building units may be deemed "subdivisions".
The test again is the actual substance and not the legal 
form of the "development". It is obvious that if a developer 
built commercial units on adjacent parcels of land, and sold 
such units, there would be a subdivision. A different legal 
situation but similar practical effect is created when a 
developer connects the units (e.g., a shopping center). If 
the buildings are connected and the premises merely leased, 
we again have a situation which is similar in substance to 
the first example. The only real difference in each case is 
the legal relationship between the developer and the tenants 
of the units. _ We conclude that using our functional defini­
tion of "lots" (parcels of land identified and set aside for 
private use and occupancy) and keeping in mind the harm to 
be regulated, there is a subdivision. This same analysis 
may also be applied to various kinds of housing developments. 
Multiple unit housing would be a subdivision, but a highrise 
apartment, condominium or similar housing structure probably 
would not since there is no division of the land in the man­
ner discussed above.
In general, we believe the above method of analysis can 
be applied to most situations. Though the list of examples 
is not exhaustive, it should aid municipalities and developers 





The second category of questions concerns the retro­
active effect of the law and its application to divisions 
which occurred before the effective date of the law. The 
prohibition language of the statute refers to sales or con­
veyances. Clearly such prohibition could not be retroactive 
in effect since that would make sales in unapproved subdivi­
sions, whenever made, illegal. Such a result would be 
extremely onerous and would be in effect making illegal 
those transactions which were at the time legal. Retro­
active application of statutes is generally not approved. 
Furthermore, such an interpretation would make the statute 
apply ex post facto and such application is clearly prohi­
bited. See &2 C.J.S., Statutes, § § 412-419. Sales or 
conveyances which occurred prior to the enactment of this 
law and which were in compliance with existing statutes are 
thus not affected by the passage of this act. The law 
applies only to sales occurring since its effective date. 
However, sales of lots after the effective date of this act, 
whether in a subdivision which was approved under prior law 
or not, are subject to this act. If the lots have not been 
sold and they are within a subdivision, those remaining 
unsold lots are subject to municipal approval. As a prac­
tical matter, this may mean that municipalities will give 
rather cursory review to a previously approved subdivision. 
Nevertheless, such review is required.
IV. APPEAL AND ENFORCEMENT
Finally, there have been questions as to appeal pro­
cedure and enforcement. Though the statute is silent on the 
right to appeal, such appeals may be taken pursuant to Rule 
80B, Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. Enforcement will be 
the responsibility of the municipality. It would be an 
onerous burden on the Attorney General and a virtual impos­
sibility to enforce the law on behalf of every city and town 
in the entire State. Municipalities have the power to en­
force the law and the responsibility must rest with them.
If they lack sufficient interest to do so, it seems incon­
sistent that they should demand action from the State. The 
Attorney General will act to enforce the law only under 
extraordinary circumstances, and then, when possible, in 
conjunction with the municipality.
Casual sales by landowners, that is, selling of a lot 
or two every few years as opposed to planned and conscious 
development, is likely to be a major enforcement problem. 
Such persons are likely to be ignorant of the law or use 
such casual sales as a means of side-stepping the require­
ment of municipal review. Municipalities thus may wish to 




































































discovered a landowner who has or is about to come within the 
purview of the law. Such a procedure could include a notice 
to the landowner of the alleged violation and an opportunity 
for a hearing to determine whether the landowner is or has 
created a subdivision. The results of such hearing would 
then provide the basis for further legal proceedings by 
the planning board or municipal officers.
V. GENERAL
Questions regarding the form and substance of proposed 
municipal regulations and procedure should be referred to 
local counsel. Guidance is also available from the Maine 
Municipal Association.
AG - 1
cxcerpr rrom: mTormai Mirorney oenerqi s upmion concerning rne manaarory onoreiana 
Zoning Act.
Editor's Note: The following excerpts deals primarily with municipal requirements for the 
Mandatory Shore land Zoning A ct, but does contain a statement to the effect that the Sub­




Inter-Departmental Memorandum September 7, 1972
Dept.. Environmental Protection
From B.' Stephen Murray, Assistant Dept. Attorney General
Subiect Mandatory Zoning and Subdivision Control, 12 M.R.S.A. § 4811-4814 
(P.L. 1971, c. 535)
You have asked for my opinion as to the following five 
issues all involving P.L. 1971, c. 535.
1. Must communities which adopt zoning and subdivision 
ordinances pursuant to the requirements of this lav/ base such 
ordinances on a comprehensive plan?
My informal opinions are as follows:
1. Yes. While the first sentence of 12 M.R.S.A. § 4812 is 
merely a declaration of the law, i.e., that "municipal units of 
government pursuant to presently existing enabling legislation 
are authorized to plan, zone and control the subdivision of land", 
its inclusion in 12 M.R.S.A. § 4812 must be read as a directive to 
municipal units of government to zone shoreland areas pursuant to 
this "presently existing enabling legislation". To read the 
sentence otherwise would be to reduce it to mere surplusage, 
and when construing a statute, effect should be given to every 
word, phrase and clause contained in the statute. Camp Walden v. 
Johnson, 156 Me. 160, 163 A.2d 356 (1960). "presently existing 
Enabling legislation" is set forth in 30 M.R.S.A. §§ 4961-4964.
30 M.R.S.A. § 4962 provides that any zoning ordinance "or pro­
vision thereof" shall be "pursuant to and consistent with a 
comprehensive plan". Thus, in order to adopt zoning for 
shoreland areas, a municipal unit of government must first 
develop a comprehensive plan. it should be noted, however, 
that municipal units of government may adopt subdivision 
control ordinances for shoreland areas without first having 
developed a comprehensive plan for the reason that 30 M.R.S.A.
§ 4956 permits the adoption of subdivision control regulations 
(ordinances) without the necessity of a comprehensive plan.
AG - 2
Lu iru r 5 nure: «ni5 is a rurrner rennemerir or rne oepremDer, i y/z  opinion.
To Fourtin Powell
STATE OF MAINE
Interdepartmental Memorandum r w  January 2, 1974 
___  Dgbt. State Planning_____________
From J ° h n M.R. Paterson TP Dept. Attorney General
Subject Municipal Subdivision Statute, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956
Your memorandum of October 31, 1973 commenting on the above 
statute and the informal memorandum issued by this office in 1972 was 
forwarded to me. I apologize for not having responded earlier to 
your comments, but, as I am sure you can appreciate, we have had 
a number of urgent matters to which we have been required to respond.
In any event, I appreciate your comments and suggestions.
In general, I agree with your remarks regarding the interpretation 
of the definition of the term "subdivision" as found in §4956, I 
don't believe it was the intent of our Advisory Memorandum to exclude 
high-rise condominiums from the definition of subdivision,, I am sure 
you can appreciate, however,that the interpretation given to that 
statute by this office is a rather broad interpretation and there is, 
of course, no guarantee that we are right. Indeed, there is a sub­
stantial segment of the Bar in Maine that disagrees with the views of 
this office. We have considered your suggestion of updating and 
revising our 1972 Advisory Memorandum and I would anticipate that at 
some time in the future we will do just that. In the meantime, we 
have tried to establish a procedure for answering the numerous inquiries 
which are directed to this office regarding interpretation of that sta­
tute. We have nearly finalized an agreement with the Maine Municipal 
Association along the following lines. Any inquiry from a land owner 
or an attorney requesting an interpretation of the subdivision statute 
would first be referred to the local planning board. The purpose of 
this step is to insure that the local planning board is aware that a 
question exists regarding some development in their community and to 
insure that the answer which we render is based on all the facts, in­
cluding those thaf. the developer chooses to advise us of and those of 
which the planning board is aware but which would otherwise not come 
to our attention,, In the event that the planning board is unable to 
answer the question from the developer or attorney, the planning board 
may refer that question to the Maine Municipal Association. This second 
step is taken out of recognition of the fact that the Maine Municipal 
Association provides legal assistance to all 495 communities in the 
State and that the Attorney General is not the attorney for each muni­
cipality in the State. In addition, the Attorney General’s office and 
Maine Municipal Association have worked closely in the past in formu­
lating interpretation to the subdivision statute and we think it is 
only sensible that they continue to play a significant role in the 
future. In the event that a question arises which the Maine Municipal 
Association deems significant enough to refer to our office, the MMA 
would direct the question to us for an answer. We would,in turn, answer 
the question for the Maine Municipal Association. Once the details of 
this arrangement have been finalized it is our intention to advise all 
the municipalities of this agreement and the State and County Bar 
Associations, In addition, we would hope that the Maine Municipal
Art _ 7
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Association would keep all municipalities in the State aware of the 
interpretation issued in regard to the subdivision statute.
While this may seem like a rather cumbersome structure, it has 
the advantage of replacing what has, to date, been no system at all 
and has resulted in substantial state-wide confusion regarding inter­
pretation of the subdivision statute and how a citizen goes about 
obtaining an answer to his question. Using the system outlined above, 
all parties conceivably interested in a particular question will be 
advised of the State's position.
I hope this answers your memorandum of the 31st. We would cer­
tainly appreciate receiving any other suggestions which you might 
have regarding this problem.
Thanks again for your interest.
AG - 3
To
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Editor's Note: The following opinion does not deal directly w ith the Subdivision Law. How­
ever, it  would appear to have a direct bearing on the administration of the Subdivision Law 
because it  deals w ith the question of when an applicant has standing before a Planning Board. 
On the basis of this opinion, and the recent court case cited (Walsh v. C ity of Brewer, M e .), 
Planning Boards should be advised to require than an applicant demonstrate proof of t it le ,  
righ t, or interest in a parcel of land for which subdivision approval is sought.
Interdepartmental Memorandum Date__*'iarch 26, 1974
William R. Adams, Jr., Commissioner _ Environmental Protection ____________________________ Dept.____________________________
Jon A. Lund, Attorney General Dept., Attorney General
Subject Pittston Company
SYLLABUS:
A person applying to the Board of Environmental Protection 
for a permit to build a development under the Site Location Act,
38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488, must demonstrate to the Board sufficient 
“title, right or interest" in the land for which the development 
is proposed to entitle him to status as an applicant before, the 
Board.
FACTS r
The pittston Company has applied to the Board of Environmental 
Protection for a permit to build an oil refinery and marine terminal 
in Eastport, Maine, pursuant to 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488. At a late 
stage in the hearings before the Board at which such application 
was under consideration, a question was raised regarding Pittston's 
legal interest in the land proposed to be developed. According to' 
your memorandum of March 18, 1974: “The record is clear that several 
significant parcels, including land necessary for the VLCC pier, are 
not under applicant's [pittston's] control. . . . ”
QUESTION:
May the Board act upon the application of The Pittston 
Company and either approve or disapprove the proposal? !
ANSWER: _ *
In order for the Board to have jurisdiction in this or any 
other case under the Site Law, it must find as a matter of fact that 
the applicantr has sufficient "title, right or interest" in the 
property proposed for development.
REASONING:
We base our conclusion on the recent decision of Walsh v. • 
City of Brewer, Me., — A.2d— (Law Docket No. 73-3, February 5,
1974). In that case, Mr. Walsh applied to the Brewer Planning 
Board pursuant to a mobile home ordinance to use a parcel of 
land, owned by his wife and mother, as a mobile home park.
As a result of the actions of the Brewer City Council and 
inaction of the Brewer Planning Board, Mr. Walsh filed suit 
for Declaratory Judgment. On appeal from a decision of the
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Superior Court in favor of Walsh, the Law Court inquired into 
Walsh's relationship to the land in question to determine whether 
he had standing before the Brewer Planning Board as an applicant 
for a mobile home park. The Court questioned Walsh's standing 
despite the fact that the land was owned jointly by his wife and 
mother and that Mr. Walsh and the City of Brewer had stipulated 
in the Superior Court that
"At all times the Plaintiff [Mr. Walsh]. . . had
authority from . . . [the legal owners] to propose 
and develop and operate a mobile home park on that 
site, with all related utilities and appurtenances."
The Law Court said that in order to have "standing" before the * 
Planning Board the applicant would have to demonstrate that his •; 
relationship to the site of the proposed project was germane to 
the scope of the law regulating the use of such land. The Court 
concluded that the factual record was insufficient to establish ■ 
Walsh's "standing" to be an applicant before the Brewer Planning 
Board and remanded the case to the Superior Court for further 
factual findings. The jurisdictional requirement of "standing" 
recognized by the Court was deemed by the Court to be:i
"reasonable and highly desirable, policy-wise, 
to ensure that, absent clear and unquestionable 
legislative expression manifesting a different 
legislative attitude, governmental officials 
and agencies should not be required to dissipate 
their time and energies in dealing with persons 
who are 'strangers' to the particular governmental 
regulation and control being undertaken."
The law and facts at issue in Walsh are substantially similar 
to those involved in the instant question. The Brewer mobile home 
park ordinance Vas not a zoning ordinance, but a general land use 
ordinance, similar in form and purpose to the Site Law. As in the 
Brewer ordinance, we find in the Site Law no evidence of any 
"clear and unquestionable legislative attitudethat "title, 
right or interest" is not a prerequisite to standing as an 
"applicant" before the Board. The public policy on which the 
Walsh decision’was premised is equally applicable to the Site 
Law. Indeed we can anticipate a variety of problems which might 
arise under the Site Lav/ absent a requirement that an applicant have 
"title, right or interest" in the land for which a development i; 
proposed. We can cite several examples. First, or kore
applicants could apply to develop the same sit», making it 
impossible for the Board to determine to whom approval ought 
to be given. Second, absent some Indication that an applicant 
could implement a project, consideration of such application 
would require the Board members to "dissipate their time and 
energies" in dealing with hypothetical projects. Third, just
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as a landowner should not find his property rezoned at the 
behest of a stranger, so a landowner should not find his land 
approved for an oil refinery at the request of a stranger. In 
short, we believe that all the public policy reasons underlying 
the Walsh decision apply with equal force to the question we 
confront here. We believe that "title, right or interest" is a 
necessary jurisdictional prerequisite to any decision by the 
Board in this or any other case.
The Court in Walsh did not clearly establish the type or 
extent of a "title, right or interest" which an applicant must 
demonstrate. However, based on our understanding of the rationale 
in Walsh and the cases cited by the Court therein, we can estab­
lish some general criteria for the Board to use. In order to 
establish such interest, an applicant must demonstrate to the * 
finder of fact that it has control over the site and that the 
site can be developed by the applicant as proposed within a 
reasonable period of time. Sufficient control would include not 
only ownership in fee, but also some lesser interest, including 
a contract or option to purchase or other contractual agreement 
to acquire a right to develop the land, which right is enforce­
able by way of specific performance. Since contracts or options 
to purchase land may vary widely, the details of such contract, 
option or agreement are of critical importance. There are an 
infinite variety of such contracts and the applicant must demon­
strate that the contract or option empowers it tp develop the 
site within a reasonable period of time. A mere oral representa­
tion regarding the exixtence of an option or contract is.insuffi­
cient to establish standing. Tripp v. Zoning Board of Review,
123 A.2d 144 (R.I., 1956), Rathkopf, The Law of Planning and 
Zoning, § 55.5(1956). A willingness to negotiate for or seek 
sufficient interest in the future is no substitute for this 
requirement.
Final disposition of this case depends on factual findings 
to be made by the Board based on the record of any hearings.
Since we are not the finder of fact, we have no way of knowing 
whether the ;applicant has carried his burden of proof regarding 
these jurisdictional facts. If the Board determines on the basis 
of the record that the applicant has not demonstrated sufficient 
"title, right or interest," it can either (1) dismiss the applica­
tion for lack of jurisdiction, if satisfied that applicant has had 
sufficient opportunity to so demonstrate, or (2) reopen the record 
to permit the applicant an opportunity to establish the necessary 
jurisdictional facts. If the Board determines on the basis of the 
record that the applicant has demonstrated sufficient "title, right 
or interest," it must consider and rule on the proposal on its 
merits. If at some point the Board determines that it has juris­
diction over part of the proposal, it must then decide whether that 
partial development, standing alone, constitutes a development 
which can satisfy all the requirements of § 484 of the Site Law.
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V7e would note in conclusion that the Board may not make 
decision on the merits regarding any portion of the developmen 
over which it has no jurisdiction. We believe it would be in 
excess of the Board's authority and improper for the Board to 
make any informal ruling or issue an "advisory opinion" on an
application over which it has no jurisdiction.
JAL/ec




Editor's Note: The following opinion is a clarification of the preceding opinion, by deal­
ing at greater length w ith the specific documents needed to establish t it le , right, or interest, 
and by dealing w ith specific problems relating to standing before the Board of Environmental 
Protection. The points made may be relevant for the Municipal Reviewing Authority under 
the Subdivision Law.
Inter-Departmental Memorandum Date__April 11, 1974
To William R. Adams, Commissioner Dept. Environmental Protection
prom Donald G. Alexander, Assistant Debt. Attorney General___________
Subject ‘Questions*, of Title, Right and interest___________________________ _
Following is the response to the questions stated in your memo 
of April 4, 1974, relating to application of the "Title, Right and 
Interest" requirement and related matters. "Title, Right and Interest" 
is hereinafter referred to as "TRI."
Question 1. What must an applicant show to prove title, 
right or interest? w
Answer: An applicant should be required to provide proof of
TRI by submitting copies of his deed or deeds to the property, or an 
enforcible option to purchase the property, or a lease or some other 
contractual agreement for use of the property. Where a lease or other 
contractual agreement is presented to show TRI, it should be prima facie 
deemed sufficient to show TRI only if it is for a duration of 99 years.
A lesser term should be allowed only where the applicant can demonstrate 
that the lease or other contractual agreement for the shorter time period 
is sufficient to cover the duration of the proposed development on the 
property.
However, the actual documents need not be presented if, by other 
means of proof, the applicant can demonstrate the nature and scope, 
duration and enforcibility of his TRI with sufficient precision to give 
standing. This proof must be more than an oral or written statement 
by the applicant.
Discussion: In Walsh v. City of Brewer, Me., 315 A.2d 200 (1974)
the court refused to accept, as sufficient evidence of TRI, a stipulation 
that the owners of the property - the wife and mother of the applicant - 
would allow the applicant to use the property for desired purposes.
The Court held this stipulation as to TRI inadequate because it did not 
show the "nature and source" of the authority or that it had "sufficient 
duration" or "legal enforcibility" (pp. 2 07-2 08). Other courts have 
also held that a simple statement of the existence of a purchase option 
is insufficient, Tripp v. Zoning Board of Review of City of Pawtucket,
123 A.2d 144 (R.I. 1956) and that proof of the "precise nature" of the 
agreement is required, Packham v. Zoning Bd. of Review of City of 
Cranston, 238 A.2d 387 (R.I. 1968). However, where proof has been pre­
sented, the Courts have accepted, as showing sufficient standing, *ses 
Ralston Purina Co. v. Zoning Board, 12 A.2d 219 (R.I. ) and contracts
to purchase the property, Slamowitz v, Jelleme, 130 A. 883 (N.J. ),
Shulman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 226 A.2d 380 (Conn. ).
Also an owner can apply, even though he has contracted to sell the 
property, contingent on a use permit being obtained. City of Baltimore 
v. Cohn, 105 A.2d 482, 204 Md. 523.
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I was unable to find any case which absolutely required submission 
of the actual documents which formed the basis of TRI and excluded other 
methods of proof. Walsh v. City of Brewer and Tripp and Packham, supra, 
all indicated simply that more proof of TRI was needed, without actually 
specifying what that proof should be. Thus the conclusion that some 
proof other than actual documents is adequate to show TRI, if that proof, 
which must be more than a statement by the applicant, can demonstrate the 
"nature and source," "sufficient duration," "legal enforcibility" and 
"precise nature" of the TRI. For example, the Department might accept 
written certification from a person expert in examining interests in 
property which (a) states that such person has examined the applicants 
claim of TRI, and (b) sets forth the facts upon which the judgment as to 
TRI is based in sufficient detail to show the precise nature of the 
applicant's TRI. The Department may, however, as a matter of policy 
determine that it does not choose to rely on such a written statement 
of TRI in lieu of the actual documents. Other means of proof, meeting 
the above standards, can also be allowed.
However, a requirement of submission of actual deeds, contracts or 
other agreements to prove TRI may be the only way that the Department 
can gain the necessary proof of jurisdiction in all cases without dis­
criminating among applicants. As the Opinion of the Attorney General 
in the Pittston Case indicates: "Since contracts or options to purchase 
land may vary widely, the details of such contract, option or agreement 
«re of critical importance. There are an infinite variety of such 
contracts . . . ." To allow summaries of what an applicant's basis for 
TRI is raises the possibility of inaccuracy in such statements which, 
when discovered later, could render the whole proceeding on the applica­
tion null and void. To require actual copies of documents in some 
instances and allow alternate proof of TRI in others raises the 
possibility of charges of discrimination in application of the law. 
Whether the Department will accept such written summary statements is, 
however, a matter of policy not a matter of law.
Leases and other contractual agreements which allow major capital 
improvements on a property while not transferring title are rare in 
Maine in cases o^ -her than those involving rights-of-way. It is common 
legal practice to make leases, easements or other contractual agreements 
permitting use of property for capital improvements for terms of at 
least 99 years. Therefore, this term is specified for the prima facie 
case as to adequacy of TRI where leases or other contractual agreements 
are presented to show TRI.
Question 2. Does a public agency with eminent domain powers have 
to prove title, right or interest?
Answer: The Department may take jurisdiction of applications from
public agencies possessing eminent domain powers without requiring 
proof of TRI. Public agencies which do not have complete TRI in an 
involved property at the time of application may demonstrate TRI by a 
statement that such public agency is prepared to exercise its eminent
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domain powers, if it is unable to acquire the property by other means.
Discussion: The Walsh v. City of Brewer decision was based
principally on the question of standing and interpreted the question 
of standing by analogy to the issue of justiciability before the courts 
(p. 206). The Court listed several tests for determining if a matter 
was justiciable; whether the matter was a case or controversy or an 
"improper" advisory opinion, was the issue "ripe" for decision, are the 
parties the proper parties to be presenting the case, are there other 
policy reasons for exercising "judicial restraint" (p. 206). in a 
footnote the Court stated that absent a clear legislative mandate 
"governmental officials and agencies should not be required to dissipate 
their time and energies in dealing with persons who are 'strangers' to 
the particular governmental regulation and control being undertaken."
(p. 207, note 4)
Because of the existence of eminent domain powers, the policy 
reasons the Court set out for refusing to consider a private applicant 
without adequate TRI do not apply to public agencies. A public agency 
without TRI would not present an application as a "stranger" but as 
an applicant fully capable of implementing any project approved by the. 
Department.
It should be noted, however, that if anywhere in the record of an 
application a public agency indicates that it will not use eminent 
domain powers to acquire all or part of the property which is the subject 
of the application, then the status of that public agency, for the pur­
poses of establishing standing, becomes the same as that of a private 
applicant. The policy reasons for making the distinction no longer apply
Question 7. Does an application for a permit to operate a facility 
(e.g. air emission and waste discharge license, oil terminal permits, 
etc.) require a showing of title, right or interest?
Answer: There is no basis in the decided cases for a distinction
between applications for permits to construct and applications for permit 
to operate on the issue of necessary proof of TRI. However, the Depart­
ment may wish to make a policy distinction in terms of the degree of 
proof required.
Discussion: The four criteria that must be met to achieve standing,
demonstrating the "nature and source," "sufficient duration," "legal 
enforcibility" and "precise nature" of the TRI are simpler to meet for 
one seeking to operate an existing facility for a relatively limited and 
specified time period. Further, applicants for operating permits 
generally are in possession of the facilities which are the subject 
of the application and: "Possession shows a prima facie title,"
Brookings v. Woodin, 74 Me. 222 (1882). Thus there is a policy basis
for requiring an applicant in possession and merely seeking permission 
to operate to provide different proof, if the Department choses, than is 
required of an applicant for actual construction and alteration of land.
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But the four criteria of adequate proof of TRI still must be 
met. The distinction between construction and operation is not always 
apparent. The question in the Walsh case was over an application for 
a license to maintain and operate a mobile home park (p. 202), and Walsh 
was in possession of the property but failed to qualify as an applicant.
Question 4. Can the Department process applications where there 
is a dispute as to title, right or interest?
Answer: The Department can only process applications where the
applicant has TRI. Making a finding to that effect would be possible, 
but difficult, in a case where TRI is contested.
Discussion; Maine courts have held that they have both the power 
an 1 the duty to examine jurisdictional questions in any case, Niles v. 
Marine Colloids, Inc., Me. 249 A.2d 277 (1969), Look v. State, Me. 267
A.2d 907 (1970). In other states this same duty to examine jurisdictional 
issues has been extended to administrative agencies; Hearn v. Cross,
80 A.2d 285 (D.C. 1951), 2 Am. Jur.2d., Administrative Law, § 332.
However, I was able to find no decision stating that once an agency had 
considered the jurisdictional question and determined that it had 
jurisdiction it could not proceed further simply because its jurisdiction 
was contested. Such a decision to proceed could, however, be contested 
in court, and any agency which did proceed would risk having a court 
later declare its proceedings null and void because of lack of juris­
diction, 2 Am. Jur.2d, Administrative Law, §§ 489-491. To protect 
itself from wasted proceedings, therefore, the Department may wish to 
adopt a policy that it will not act on matters where TRI is questioned 
until the question has been judicially resolved or the question is 
deemed frivolous. The Department could defer nonfrivolous questions 
of this kind as the burden of proof of jurisdiction is on the applicant, 
and a serious question as to TRI would make the bureen difficult to 
sustain.
Q\;estion 5. is an application and an approval void if a dispute 
as to title, right and interest is discovered after Board approval?
Answer: An approval is not automatically void if a dispute as to
jurisdiction develops after the approval. The approval would only be 
void if the jurisdictional issue were decided against jurisdiction.
Discussion: The Walsh case is clear that "lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is always open at any stage of the proceedings" (p. 210). 
Thus, presumably the Department's duty to examine its jurisdiction is 
a continuing one, but simply raising a question as to jurisdiction is 
not identical in effect to a negative answer. Once the question is 
raised, the’Department's options are to make a factual determination 
as to TRI, as was ordered in Walsh, and proceed accordingly or to 
refuse to act pending court determination of the issue. As in #4, 
the Department's refusal to act in this case would be based on the 
burden of going forward and the assumption that in a valid dispute,
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the burden of going forward had not been sustained until the issue is 
finally determined in Court.
Question 6. Do tax liens or other liens or claims against the 
property affect an applicant’s title, right or interest?
Answer: Yes, but where such clouds on title are discovered, the 
applicant still may demonstrate that he has sufficient TRI to pursue 
the application.
Discussion; 74 C.J.S., Quieting Title, § 14 lists numerous claims
against property which constitute clouds on title and which thus can 
compromise TRI. These include attachments or liens placed on property 
by court order, taxes and other assessments against the property, ease­
ments, leases or other contracts affecting the property, contracts or 
options to purchase the property, conflicting deeds, and mortgages.
The impact of each of these on TRI can vary greatly from case to case.
Walsh v. City of Brewer did not rule that any compromise of TRI 
would deprive an applicant of standing. It simply ruled that the 
applicant, on the facts presented, had not demonstrated "sufficient"
TRI (p. 211). As the Attorney General's opinion in the Pittston Case 
noted, the sufficiency of TRI is a matter of fact for the Board to 
decide. Thus, where a cloud on title exists, the Board would have to 
determine if the applicant retains sufficient TRI to have standing.
The Department of Attorney General is continuing to examine the 
issues raised by questions 7 and 8; an answer on these points will be 
provided shortly.
. DONALD G. ALEXANDER*"




Editor's Note; While this opinion is directed to the administration of the Site Location Act, 
i t  also states that i f  a particular subdivision is subject to both State and local review, both 
must be obtained.
Inter-Departmental Memorandum Date_J j * 1974
William It. Adams, J r . ,  Commissioner Environmental Protection
Donald G. Alexander, Assistant n Attorney General
Relationship of Department of Environmental Protection Approvals 
to LocaT Approvals of~"€He~ Same Activity
Your memorandum of April 4, 1974, contained two questions 
regarding the relationship of DEP considerations to local land 
use regulations.
QUESTION:
Can the Board consider applications involving property which 
has not yet been zoned for its proposed use or which has not yet 




I could find no case holding that the state agency would not 
have jurisdiction of a matter simply because local approvals 
relating to that matter had not been received. In addition, 
adverse local zoning or other land use regulations do not 
compromise an owner's title, right or interest in a property 
as that term is defined in Walsh v0 City of Brewer, Me., 315
A.2d 200 (1974), since zoning or other land use regulations in 
no way compromise a person's capacity to convey the affected 
property. There are a number of cases which have held that both 
a city and a state may regulate a particular activity as long as 
the regulations .are not inconsistent. Vela v . People, Colo.,
484 P.2d 1204. (1971); Town of Cicero v. Weilander, 111., 183 
N.E.2d 40 (1962); Stary v. City of Brooklyn, Ohio, 114 N.E°2d .
633 (1953);.McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 26.23 (a) .
The facts in' some of these cases indicate that local and state 
approvals may have been considered concurrently. Where there 
is inconsistency, the local regulations will be preempted by 
state action. Rinzler v. Carson, Fla., 262 So.2d 661 (1972); 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 15.21.
QUESTION:
Conversely, can the Board adopt a policy that it will not l®
consider applications until required local zoning and subdivision 
approval has been received?
ANSWER:
The Board may, by regulation, adopt such a policy, and such 
a policy would be most appropriately applied in cases where an 
actual change in a zoning ordinance is required before a project
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Section 483 itself states that persons applying for a 
Site Location permit must submit the notice that they are 
applying for the permit: "together v/ith such information as the 
Commission may, by regulation, require." Thus, the Board can 
require that an applicant provide adequate information before 
it starts to consider an application, and the time limit on 
consideration of the application need not begin running until 
the Department determines that such information has been pro­
vided.
It is important here to distinguish between an "incomplete" 
application and an application which is complete, but does not 
disclose sufficient information to warrant approval. The latter 
application must be considered. The distinction between the two 
situations is not exact and must be determined on a case by case 
basis. As a partial guide one might distinguish the two by 
determining if no information is provided on a matter required to 
be addressed, thus rendering the application incomplete, or if 
information is provided but it is insufficient to justify affirmative 
action, thus rendering the application complete, but unsatisfactory.
However, where actions suggested to justify delay are a 
result of the Department's own actions, such as seeking and 
receiving comments from other departments, the same basis for 
delaying consideration of an application does not exist. For 
example, if the applicant were required to provide the comments of 
the other department with his proposed application, then the 30-day 
period would not have to begin running until such comments were 
received, but if the Department itself seeks such comment after it 
has received the application, this does not effect the running of 
the 30-day period. As already noted, however, there exists an 
opinion of the Attorney General relating to the advisory as opposed 
to mandatory effect" of the 30~day requirement.




Editor's Note: The 10-acre provision of the definition of subdivision under the Site Location 
Act has changed since the issuance of this opinion.
Inter-Departmental Memorandum n,.v- May . S ' 1974
Henry Warren, Jack Bader, Vapt. Environmental Protection
From
Hollis McGlauflin
Donald G- Alexander, Assistant Dap r. Attorney General
S'.ibjdct _Interpretation of "subdivision" under the Site Location Law38 M.R.S.A. § 482(5)
Recently several questions have arisen as to what constitutes 
a "subdivision” so as to subject a housing development to approval . 
or enforcement procedures under the site location law. The law is 
quite specific. It states that a development is subject to the law 
if it meets the following criteria: .
1. Division of a "parcel" into 5 or more lots. .
2. Any lot being less than 10 acres in size.
3. If the lots total more than 20 acres, and
4. Are to be offered for sale or lease within a
5-year period. * :..-
Some confusion seems to have arisen because of the' word "parcel." 
A "parcel" should be considered to be the block of land a developer 
owns, regardless of size. The lav/, by assuming that lots larger than 
10 acres may be included in a subdivision,^ clearly contemplates that 
where part of a large parcel is divided into small lots and the . *
remainder is left as one undivided lot, that large, undivided lot is 
part of the subdivision for purposes of application of the site 
location law.
Another point of confusion is over the term "to be offered for 
sale." The language*of this phrase clearly implies an element of 
intent, as all proposals the Department considers are,.at the very 
least, statements of intent. However, to have a violation of the 
law, more than just a plan on paper, must be shown; there needs 
to be some overt act in furtherance of the intent, such as the 
beginning o f  construction (disturbing the soil) or an actual 
offering for sale through solicitation or otherwise without a 
permit.
A third point of confusion is the proper differentiation of 
individuals and corporations when property is being transferred. 
Generally individuals and corporations are regarded as separate and 
distinct entities. However, this may not be the case where an 
individual controls or owns a significant interest in a corporation. 
Where there is a transfer between an individual and a corporation in 
which such individual has a significant interest, and the apparent 
result of the transfer is to exempt from the law activities which, 
if done by the individual or the corporation alone, would be subject 
to the lav/, then the law may well apply regardless of the transfer. 
Each such case should be evaluated on its own in consultation with 
the Department of Attorney General.
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A final note; persons contemplating subdivisions of less than.
2 0 £icres should be aware that if the sale or offering for sale of 
lots on their parcel of land exceeds 20 acres within 5 years they 
will be in violation of the Site Location Law as to all lots, not 
merely those which exceed 20 acres. The first 20 acres are not free. 
A person is subject to the Site Law when he takes the first action 
in furtherance of an intent to develop or offer for sale more than 20
acres





Ed ito rs  Note: The firs t pdrt of this Informal opinion, dedllng with the question of whether a muni­
cipality may define subdivision more restrictively than State law, has been superceded by an opinion 
dated July 21, 1976, which follows. The portion which deals with transfer of interest in land to 
an abuttor would s till appear to be valid.
STATE OF MAINE
Inter-Departmental Memorandum June 1 1 , 1974
j 0____Rich Rothe, Fourtin Powell QepL State planning Office______
prom Edward Lee Rogers, Assistant p ebL Assistant Attorney General
Subject _ ___________ ________________________________________________________
In your letter of April 9, 1974, you ask the following 
questions:
(1.) Where State law defines subdivision for the purpose 
of required municipal review, can a municipality, by 
ordinance or by planning board regulation, define 
subdivision more stringently, or establish controls 
for the regulation cf land divisions which are exempt from 
the law's definition of subdivision (i.e., define subdivision 
as two lots instead of three, and include the land retained 
by the subdivider)?
(2.) If the answer to #1 is negative, will the recently
enacted changes in the Law apply only to ordinances and 
regulations adopted pursuant to its enactment, or will 
the new amendments nullify provisions in existing 
ordinances or planning board regulations?
(3.) The recent amendment of § 4956, sub-sect. 1, added a 
new sentence at the end to read as follows:
"For the purposes of this section, a lot shall 
not includes transfer of an interest in land to 
an abutting landowner, however accomplished."
Since this follows, rather than precedes, the provision 
dealing with 40 acre lots, does the clause, n. . . except 
where, the intent of such sale or lease is to avoid the 
objectives of this statute.", apply to this new amendment?
(If it does not, then the new subdivision law amendment 
exempting from review transfer of land to an abutting 
owner appears to create the possibility of unlimited 
subdivision without municipal review since such land is 
by definition a non-lot. In other words, if A sells 20,000 
square foot separate parcels to abuttor B, can B then 
build on these parcels and sell them without review?)
In our opinion, the answer to question (1) is yes, and we 
therefore do not reach the second question,, In our opinion, the 




H  With regard to (1), 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956 expressly authorizes 
the municipalities to "adopt additional reasonable regulations 
governing subdivisions" in subsection 2B. This authorization is 
reiterated in 12 M.R.S.A. § 4812-A. Since 30 M.R.S.A. § 1917 
grants municipalities the right to act unless prohibited from doing 
so by the State, the question is whether promulgation of a definition 
of subdivision by the State is a prohibition of the municipalities' right 
to adopt a more restrictive definition.
The State could have expressly denied the municipality the right 
to redefine subdivision. Instead it granted municipalities the 
unrestricted right to adopt additional regulations and ordinances.
It is evident, therefore, the State was merely setting minimum 
standards, while leaving municipalities the freedom to adopt regula­
tions consistent with the State law. Municipalities have in fact 
assumed that by passing a state minimum lot size law, the State 
did not preempt the right to define "lots" more restrictely and 
have acted accordingly. Given the expressed authorization in 30 
M.R.S.A. § 4956, it is even more reasonable to assume municipalities are free to define subdivision more restrictively.
The definition may be made by regulation or ordinance. Anderson 
19.20, Yokley 12.3, Villa-Laken Corp. v. Planning Board, 138 N.Y.S.2d 
362 (1954). However, in view of the provision in subsection 2B a
definition by ordinance would be more secure.
A warning should be added. Subsection 2B requires that 
additional regulations be "reasonable." It may, therefore, be unwise 
for a town to alter the "reasonable" provision in the State definition 
without having particular justification therefor. For example, the 
State law says no sale or lease of a lot 40 acres of larger shall be 
considered part of a subdivision. Unless a town was attanpting to 
preserve an agricultural or natural area where 40 acre lots would 
not be sufficient to retain the character desired, it would seem of 
dubious validity for the town to attempt to impose a stricter 
definition than provided by this statute.
Turning to question (3), the new amendment to subsection 1 
cannot be qualified by a clause preceding it in a separate sentence.
Thus, literally construed, the clause in subsection 1, "except where 
the intent of such sale or lease is to avoid the objectives of the 
statute" does not apply to transfers to abutting landowners.
You express further concern about this point in your letter 
because the amendment states (somewhat ungrammatically) that "a lot 
shall not include a transfer * * * to an abutting landowner." 
(Underscoring supplied.) Further, the new amendment to subsection 5 
(Section 2 of Chapter 700, P.L. 1973) provides that:
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"The owner of a lot which, at the time of its
creation, was not part of a subdivision, shall
not be required to secure the approval of the
municipal reviewing authority for such lot in
the event that the subsequent actions of a prior
owner, or his successor in interest, of the lot
creates a subdivis ion of which the lots is a part,
however, the municipal reviewing authority shall
consider the existence of such a previously created
lot in passing upon the application of any prior owner, or
his successor in interest, of the lot for approval of a
proposed subdivision."
Considering these tvo amendments together, your concern is that the 
lot or lots transferred to an abutting landowner will be exempt from 
the law even if a subdivision is thus created by sequence of transfers 
from owner A to abutting owner B.
While the statute is not as clear as it ought to be, we believe 
that such a misuse of the law could be successfully challenged. 
Subsection 5 was amended solely to afford adequate title protection to 
a landowner when the prior owner subsequently creates 3 subdivision.
An intentional avoidance of the law by transfers of lots to an 
abutting landowner would constitute a subterfuge. The courts ought 
to consider such conveyances dependent steps in an overall trans­
action designed to achieve a subdivision in violation of the law 
(the so-called "step transaction" doctrine).
The matter is not altogether free from doubt, however, and the 
statute ought to be amended to clarify it with regard to these matters, 
as well as several others. In particular, the assumption that we 
should look to "intent" in administering a statute is a dubious one 
because matters of intent or motive are difficult to prove as such.
It would be preferable if the statute were rephrased in terms of 
the effect of certain conveyances resulting in evasion of the 
objectives or purposes of the law. We therefore suggest for your 
consideration the following changes:
1. Subsection 1 of § 4956 would be amended to read as follows:
1. Defined. A subdivision is the division of a tract 
or parcel of land into 3 or more lots within any 5-year 
period, whether accomplished by sale, lease, develop­ment, building or otherwise, except when the division 
is accomplished by inheritance, order of court or gift 
to a relative^-unless-the-intente-ef-sueh-gi-ft-is-te 
aveid-the-©te'jeetives-©f-th4s-eeeti©nT— Fes?-the-purposes 
©f-this-see ti©n7-a--let-sha-14-Het--ine-lHde
A transfer of interest in land to an abutting 
landowner7-hewever~aeeemp4ished-r shall not be considered part of a division of land for the 
purposes of this statute.
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In determining whether a parcel of land is divided 
into 3 or more lots, land retained by the subdivider 
for his own use as a single family residence for a 
period of at least 5 years shall not be included.
No sale or lease of any lot or parcel shall be con­
sidered as being a part of a subdivis ion if such a 
lot or parcel is 40 acres or more in size^y-exeept 
where-the-iRfeent-ef-sueh-sale-er-iease-is-te-avoid
fche-efe^eetivee-ef-this-statufeeT
The grantee, including a lessee, or his successors in 
interest of a lot which at the time of its creation and 
transfer to such grantee is not part of a subdivision 
may, at his or their option, elect (1) to have the lot 
not considered a part of a subdivision, or (2) as against 
the grantor, including a lessor, or his successor m  
interest who engaged in the actions hereinafter described, 
rescind the transfer and recover the purchase price, 
with interest, together with damages and costs in 
addition to any other remedies provided by law, if, 
solely by reason of the subsequent actions of the 
grantor of such lot or his successor in interest with 
regard to nearby lands, a subdivision is created of 
which the lot is a part. Such lot, however, shall be 
deemed a part of such a subdivision for the purpose of 
considering an application of such grantor of such lot 
or his successor in interest for approval of such proposed 
subdivision or for the purpose of determining whether there 
has been a violation of this statute by such grantor or his 
successor in interest.
The exceptions to the definition of a division or sub­
division provided in this section shall not apply to a 
gift to a relative, to a lot 40 acres or more m  size, 
or to a transfer to an abutting landowner if, the 
effect of such transaction or transactions would result 
in avoiding the objectives of this statute.
The present amendment of subsection 5 provided by Chap. 700 of 




Editor's Note: This opinion indicates that municipalities may, by ordinance, but not by regulation 
adopted by the municipal reviewing authority, define a subdivision in ways more restrictive or all 
inclusive than it  is defined in the Subdivision Law. This opinion modifies the preceding opinion, 
dated June 1 1 ,1 9 7 4 .
STATE OF MAINE
Inter-Departmental Memorandum Date__ July 21, 1976
To Rich Rothe___________________  Dept.____ State Planning_________
From Cabanne Howard. Assistant__ Dept.____ Attorney.. General_______
Subject Municipal Regulation of Subdivisions_____________________________
SYLLABUS: Under its Home Rule powers, a municipality may by
ordinance regulate a subdivision of land regardless of the provi­
sions of the Municipal Subidivision Law, 30 M.R.S.' §4956. A 
municipal planning board, however, (or municipal officers acting 
in place of a planning board) may not, when discharging their 
responsibilities under the Municipal Subdivision Law, alter, by 
regulation or otherwise, the statutory definition of a subdivision.
FACTS: On June 11, 1974, this office rendered ah opinion at
the request of you and Fourtin Powell answering various questions 
regarding the interpretation of the Municipal Subdivision Law, 30 
M.R.S. §4956. One of those questions was whether a municipality 
may by ordinance or planning board regulation, define and therefore 
regulate a subdivision in a manner more restrictive than the 
statute. In the opinion we answered this question in the affirmative. 
Id at 2. On April 22,and April 27, 1976, however, we received 
letters from two lawyers in the state who deal frequently with 
questions of this type, Mr. David Plimpton of Portland and Mr.
Atherton Fuller of Ellsworth, indicating that they have been taking 
a contrary position with their clients and asking whether we would 
reconsider our position. Because of the state-wide importance of 
the question, we have determined to do so.
The relevant portion of the 1974 opinion is as follows:
"With regard to (1), 30 M.R.S.A. §4956 
expressly authorizes the municipalities to 
'adopt additional reasonable regulations 
governing subdivisions' in subsection 2B.
This authorization is reiterated in 12 
M.R.S.A. §4812-A. Since 30 M.R.S.A. §1917 
grants municipalities the right to act unless 
prohibited from doing so by the State, the 
question is whether promulgation of a 
definition of subdivision by the State is a 
prohibition of the municipalities' right to 
$dopt a more restrictive definition.
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The State could have expressly denied 
the municipality the right to redefine 
subdivision. Instead it granted munici­
palities the unrestricted right to adopt 
additional regulations and ordinances. It 
is evident, therefore, the State was merely 
setting minimum standards, while leaving 
municipalities the freedom to adopt regula­
tions consistent with the State law.
Municipalities have in fact assumed that 
by passing a state minimum lot size law, 
the State did not preempt the right to 
define 'lots' more restrictly and have 
acted accordingly. Given the expressed 
authorization in 30 M.R.S.A. §4956, it is 
even more reasonable to assume municipalities 
are free to define subdivision more restric- 
tively.
The definition may be made by regulation 
or ordinance. Anderson 19.20, Yokley 12.3 
Villa-Laken Corp. v. Planning Board, 138 
N.Y.S.2d 362 (1954). However, in view of 
the provision in subsection 2B a definition 
by ordinance would be more secure.
A warning should be added. Subsection 2B 
requires that additional regulations be 
'reasonable'. It may, therefore, be unwise 
for a town to alter the 'reasonable provision 
in the State definition without having 
particular justification therefor. For 
example, the State law says no sale or lease 
of a lot 40 acres or larger shall be considered 
part of a subdivision. Unless a town was 
attempting to preserve an agricultural or 
natural area where 40 acre lots would not be 
sufficient to retain the character desired, it 
would seem of dubious validity for the town to 
attempt to impose a stricter definition than 
provided by this statute."
QUESTION: May a municipality by ordinance, or a municipal
reviewing authority under the Subdivision Law by regulation, define 
a subdivision more restrictively than contemplated by the 
Subdivision Law?
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ANSWER: A municipality may make such a definition by ordinance,
but a municipal reviewing authority may not alter the statutory 
definition by regulation.
REASONING: The 1974 opinion that municipalities may regulate
in a manner more restrictive than the statute was based on two 
grounds: (1) the existence, since 1969, of municipal "home rule"
powers, MAINE CONSTITUTION, art. VIII, pt. 2, §1; 30 M.R.S. §1917, 
by which the municipalities may exercise any power inhering in 
government generally which is not prohibited to them, expressly or 
by clear implication, by the Legislature; and (2) the authority 
conferred by subsection 2(B) of the Subdivision Law which permits 
municipalities to adopt "additional reasonable regulations governing 
subdivisions. "
In basing its result on the second of these two reasons, it 
appears the opinion was in error. In granting the authority to 
municipal reviewing authorities to adopt "regulations governing 
subdivisions" under the Subdivision Law, the Legislature clearly 
could not have been using the word "subdivision" in any sense 
other than the definition of that word explicitly provided in 
subsection 1 of the law. Thus, while a municipality might be able 
to adopt a regulation clarifying any ambiguity in the statutory 
definition of subdivision, it could not adopt a regulation defining 
a subdivision which is flatly contradictory to the statute. For 
example, a municipality might adopt a regulation defining with 
more precision the word "lease" in the statutory definition (so as 
to exclude, for example, motels - whose tenants might be thought 
to have one day "leases" - from the purview of the law), but a 
municipality cannot by regulation define a subdivision as 
consisting of only two lots, rather than the three required by the 
statute.
This is not to say, however, that a municipality cannot, through 
the exercize of its "home rule" powers, pass an ordinance regulating 
subdivisions in any way at all, so long as it does not violate the 
State or Federal Constitutions. To the extent the 1974 opinion rests 
on this basis, it is correct. A municipality could be prevented from 
so regulating only if it can be shown that the Legislature "expressly 
or by clear implication" has denied it the power to do so. Such a 
prohibition cannot be found in the Subdivision Law. That statute 
merely requires that the municipalities of the state regulate 
subdivisions to the degree set forth therein. Nowhere does it 
prohibit - or even imply - that they may not go further. In the 
absence of such a prohibition or implication, therefore, the munici­
palities must be judged to have the power (since 1969) to pass 
general subdivision regulatory ordinances defining subdivisions 
therein in any constitutional manner they choose.
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November 30/ 1977
To: Allen Pease, Director, State Planning Office
From: Joseph E. Brennan, Attorney General
Subject: Attorney General's Role in Enforcing the Subdivision
Law (30 M.R.S.A. §4956)
This opinion is in response to your question concerning 
the Subdivision Law. The question posed was "If a town 
consistently disregards the standards contained in the Subdivision 
Law (30 M.R.S.A. §4956), and further, if these deviations are 
considered to be significant, does the Attorney General have the 
legal authority to require towns that consistently and substantially 
disregard the standards set out in 30 M.R.S.A. §4956 to conform 
to the law in their review of subdivisions.
The Attorney General in Maine inherited common law power 
from England. Withee v. Land & Libby Fisheries Co., 120 Me. 121 
(Me. 1921). As the chief law enforcement officer of the State he 
has wide authority to protect the interests of the State and 
its citizens:
". . . .as the chief law officer of the
State, he may, in the absence of some express 
restriction to the contrary, exercise all 
such power and authority as public interest 
may from time to time require, and may 
institute, conduct, and maintain all such 
suits and proceedings as he deems necessary 
for the enforcement of the laws of the 
State, the preservation of order, and the 
protection of public rights. Withee,p. 23.
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The Court in Withee called the Attorney General's powers "numerous" 
and "varied," Id. at 23.
In Lund Ex Rel Wilbur v. Pratt, 308 A.2d. 554 (Me. 1973), the 
Law Court expressly recognized that the Attorney General is 
a constitutional officer deriving this status from Article IV,
Section 11. The Court, stressed that he has the power, absent an 
express statutory prohibition to the contrary, to maintain actions 
and proceedings to preserve order and protect the public's right.
The Attorney General has the power to protect the entire community 
when an injury is shared by all equally. Von Tiling v. City of 
Portland, 268 A.2d. 888 (Me. 1970). In fact, he is the only 
person authorized to bring such suits. He has this authority 
because he is the representative of the people. A 1975 Massachusetts 
case, Secretary of Administration and Finance v. Attorney General,
326 N.E. 3d. 334 (Mass. 1975), stressed this basis for his power.
"The Attorney General represents the 
commonwealth as well as the Secretary 
. . . who requests his appearance. He 
also has a common law duty to represent 
the public interest. Id at 338.
The Maine courts concur:
"The chief law officer represents the whole 
body politic, or all the citizens and every 
member of the State. Only a few of the 
duties of the Attorney General are specified 
by statute; that official is, however, 
clothed with common law powers. It is for 
him, in instances like these to protect and 
defend the interests of the public."
In Re Maine Central Railroad Co. et al., 134 
Me. 217 (Me. 1936).
I. Attorney General's Power to Bring Mandamus Action.
One of the common law powers of the Attorney General is the 
power to proceed against public officials in order to protect the 
best interests of the State. The cases in Maine and elsewhere have 
recognized that the Attorney General has the power to institute 
mandamus proceedings. The mandamus action is a proceeding to 
require the official or officials to do something they are required 
by law to do. Rogers v. Brown, 134 Me. 88 (Me. 1935).
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It is generally conceded that a mandamus action by the 
Attorney General is authorized by his common law powers. Although 
Maine has abolished the writ of mandamus (a procedural device) 
the substantive cause of action remains and may be brought pursuant 
to Rule 80B Me. R. Civ.P. In determining whether mandamus must 
be had however, recourse must be made to the common law. Young v. 
Johnson, 161 Me. 64, 69 (1965).
In Kelley v. Curtis, 287 A.2d. 427 (Me. 1972), the Law Court 
had before it a mandamus action brought under Rule 8OB, Me. R. Civ.
P. The Plaintiff, a petition sponsor, sought to require the 
Governor of Maine to issue a proclamation of special election 
within a reasonable time after presentation to the Legislature of a 
petition seeking a ballot reform. The Legislature, before it adjourned, 
determined the reform measure was validly initiated. The Governor 
had not issued an order for six months following the adjournment, 
and suit was filed. By law, the Governor was required to call 
a special election "within a reasonably short time" after adjournment. 
The Court apparently had no problem with the 80B process. Both 
the Superior Court and the Law Court entertained the proceeding 
initiated under 8OB. The Court did express some concern over the 
standing of the petitioner to proceed, but since it did not need to 
reach the standing issue, it was not discussed. In Farris, ex rel 
Dorsky v. Goss, 143 Me. 227 (1948), the Court allowed a private 
group to use the Attorney General's unique position of standing to 
bring a mandamus action to compel the Secretary of State to place 
an "initiated measure" as well as the enacted measure on the ballot 
so the voters could decide which they preferred. The Court had no 
problem with allowing the Attorney General to bring such an action.V
The power of the Attorney General to bring mandamus actions has 
been recognized in other jurisdictions. In Attorney General v.
Trustees of Boston Elevated Railroad, 67 N.E. 2d. 676,685 (Mass. 1946), 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized the Attorney 
General's power to proceed against public officers by manadamus.
A Texas Court, in Yolt v. Cook, 281 S.W. 837,843 (Tex. 1926), 
recognized that the "ancient and modern rules of common law," allowed 
the State and Attorney General the power to use mandamus proceedings 
in supervising municipalities.
jV In McCaffrey v. Gartley, 377 A.2d.1367 (Me. 1977), a similar 
action was brought without invoking the Attorney General's powers.
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The mandamus action serves a very specific purpose. Its 
use is restricted to cases in which it is clearly shown that an 
official has neglected or refused to do something required by 
law. In Littlefield v. Newell, 85 Me. 246 (Me. 1893), the Maine 
Attorney General filed a mandamus action against the mayor and 
aldermen of Lewiston to force them to comply with the town's 
charter and ordinances.
"It is a well-settled rule that mandamus 
extends to all cases of neglect to perform 
an official duty clearly imposed by law when 
there is no other adequate remedy. If the 
officers are required to act in a judicial 
or deliberative capacity, the court cannot 
it is true, control their official discretion, 
but may by its mandate compel them to exercise 
it. It cannot direct them in what manner to 
decide, but may set them in motion and require 
them to act in obedience to law. p. 111.
See also,Rogers v. Brown, supra and Mitchell v. Boardman, 10 A. 542 
(Me. 1887), on protecting public rights.
II. Attorney General's Power to Appeal Local Administrative 
Decision.
The Subdivision Law (30 M.R.S.A. §4956 subsection 5) permits 
the Attornev General to enforce the law although it is generally 
envisioned that the Attorney General will only do so under 
extraordinary circumstances and hopefully with the aid of the 
municipality. In a joint memorandum filed by the Attorney General 
and the Maine Municipal Association, dated March 2, 1972, this 
office felt an 8OB appeal under the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure 
would be available to those affected by decisions of the 
municipal authority. It seems clear that nothing prohibits the 
Attorney General from enforcing the law by requiring the municipality 
to abide by its requirements. The Attorney General's principal 
function is to protect the public interest and to maintain all 
suits and proceedings to enforce the laws of the State. Withee v. 
Libby Fisheries Company, supra at p. 123. Should he not carry 
out these functions, he would be violating his responsibilities
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to the public. If a decision by the municipal authority in 
a subdivision case was so contrary to the dictates of the 
statute, the Attorney General might appeal from such a 
determination. Apparently, the exact question has not been 
ruled upon in Maine, although it is presently in front of the 
Law Court in Central Maine Power Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission, (Law Ct. Docket No. Ken 73-43).
Other states have recognized that the Attorney General 
has the power to appeal from the decisions of agencies when 
the public interest is involved. In a Nebraska case, In Re 
Equalization of Assessment of Natural Gas Pipe Lines v. State 
ex re Soreman, 242 N.W. 609 (Neb. 1932), the power of the 
Attorney General to petition for a writ of error in the Supreme 
Court from a tax board's decision was recognized. And in a 
New Jersey case, Attorney General v. Delaware & B. B. R. Co.,
27 NJEq. 631, the court held:
"In equity, as in the Law Court, the 
Attorney General has the right, in cases 
where the property of the sovereign or 
the interests of the public are directly 
concerned, to institute suit by what may 
be called 'civil information' for their 
protections. The state is not left 
without redress in its own courts, because 
no private citizen chooses to encounter 
the difficulty of defending it, but has 
appointed this high public officer on 
whom it has cast the responsibility, and 
to whom, therefore, it has given the 
right of appearing in its behalf and 
enriching the judgment of the Court on such 
questions of public moment. Id. p. 610.
Other cases in accord, Petition of Public Service Coordinated 
Transport et al., 74 A. 2d. 580, 586 (N. J~. 19 50) and State ex ~rel 
Olsen v. Public Service Commissioner, 283 P.2d. 594 (Mont. 1955).
There seems little question that the Attorney General can 
bring suit against a recalcitrant town to require it in the 
future to apply the Municipal Subdivision Law or challenge sub­
sequent decisions which substantially deviate from it. We would 
note that the Attorney General retains discretion with regard to 
bringing any particular action, and the decision on bringing an 
action would relate to the seriousness of the violation of law 
and the availability of resource of the Department to properly 
prosecute the action.
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Maine Municipal Association Opinions
Excerpts from the Maine Townsman 
Legal Opinions
1 . Procedure for adoption of Regulations (Feb., 1972)
Question: Our planning board would like to adopt a subdivision regulation following 
the new guidelines set forth by statute under Public Laws enacted by the 105th Legisla­
ture, Chapter 454, Section 4956, Land Subdivisions, par. 3, A through L .  What pro­
cedure is necessary —  such as how many days of public notice, and is a public hearing 
necessary before final adoption?
Answer: I believe that 7 days' public notice should be given and that a public hear­
ing is necessary before final adoption.
Editor's note: The requirement for a public hearing prior to adoption of regulations by 
the municipal reviewing authority is now required by subsection 2. b. of Section 4956 
of the Subdivision Law.
2 . Street Acceptance (O c t., 1972)
Question: Can the planning board be bypassed in ruling on the acceptance of a road 
in a subdivision by a petition being presented to the selectmen? I should mention that 
this subdivision was deemed to be in existence prior to the planning board. There has 
always been considerable doubt in the minds of the planning board as to what authority 
can be exerted over such subdivisions in this particular category. Perhaps I should further 
clarify to say the intent is to have this petition presented at either a special, preferably, 
or regular town meeting.
Answer: If the subdivision was in existence prior to the new law of last September, then 
I do not believe that the planning board would have a right to control the acceptance 
of the street. I assume this was a street which appeared on the original plan which must 
have been approved earlie r, and I assume that lots have been sold o ff prior to the new 
law.
3. G ifts  (Jan., 1973)
Question: This is to inquire i f  a certain division of land in the town fa lls w ith in  the 
meaning of M .R .S .A ,T it le  30, Sec. 4956, amended, and thus should come before the 
planning board for subdivision approval. Five lots ranging in area from 23 to 30 acres 
have been divided from a farm and conveyed as gifts to children of the owner. Is there 
anything that would exempt them from the subdivision approval requirement, particularly 
the fact that they are gifts rather than arms-length transactions?
Answer: It seems to me that under M .R . S. A .Section 4956 of T it le  30 and also under 
your own regulations that the transfers would be legally proper since they constituted 
gifts and did not constitute either sales, developing or building of property. In other 
words, I don't believe the intent of the new statute is to apply to mere g ifts , w ills  or 
inheritances.
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4 . Contiguous Parcels (Feb., 1974)
Question: Two problems have arisen in our town with respect to the definition of a 
"parcel of land" for subdivision purposes. The two situations are as follows:
(1) An acreage was purchased prior to subdivision regulations and later this was 
followed by the same individual buying an adjacent piece of acreage from another 
person. Through the years the tracts were consolidated for fax purposes, but two 
separate deeds remain. Can these be treated as separate tracts for subdivision?
(2) A single deeded parcel separated by a public road is faxed as two separate parcels. 
Is this considered two parcels for the purpose of meeting subdivision minimums, 
thus allowing six lots to be sold instead of three without a formal plan?
Answer: It is my opinion (1) that a contiguous parcel of land held by one person is 
treated as one parcel under the subdivision law, T .  30, M .R .S .A .  § 4956, although 
acquired under fwo deeds, and (2) that a parcel of land divided by a town way is also 
treated as one parcel for the purposes of the subdivision law, unless the town owns the 
way in fee.
Editor's Note: The Subdivision Law now states that lands located on opposite sides of 
a public or private road shall be considered each a separate tract or parcel of land un­
less such road was established by the owner of land on both sides thereof. This pro­
vision of the Statute did not exist at the time this opinion was rendered.
5 . Plantation Review Powers (O c t., 1974)
Question: Can you explain the duties of the plantation offic ials with respect to sub­
division in our plantation?
Answer: The definition of the term municipality provided by 1, M .R .S .A . ,  § 72 (13), 
and 30, M .R .S .A . ,  s 1901 (6), includes only cities and towns when used in most parts 
of T it le  30.
I therefore conclude that a plantation cannot exercise any home rule powers as granted 
to municipalities by 30, M .R .S .A . ,  1 1911-1920, nor any of the subdivision review 
functions charged to municipalities by 30, M .R .S .A . ,  ! 4956.
6 . Sale to abutter (N ov., 1974)
Question: A man in town owned several acres of land on which he has maintained his 
residence for several years. In 1972 he sold a one-acre lot and in 1973 he sold another 
one-acre lo t. He s till lives on the remainder. He now wishes to sell a small strip of 
land to the abutter who purchased a lot in 1973. W ill this create a subdivision?
Illustration:
Lot A’s 1 Lot








Small strip of land which A 
wishes to sell to abutter. M M A-3 to MM A -6
Answer: The State Subdivision Law (30, M .R .S .A . ,  l 4956) now provides that 
tranfers of property from one landowner to an abutting landowner shall not be 
counted as a lot for purposes of this law. Therefore, even though a person has 
divided his land in such a way that the transfer of one more lot might create a sub­
division, he may s t ill transfer land owned by himself to an abutter without having 
to file  a subdivision plan.
Parcels retained by subdivider (Dec., 1974)
Question: Does the law say you can sell two pieces of land and live on one tract and 
not have a subdivision? Does the law say you can sell two tracts of land and reserve 
one tract for future use?
Answer: It is my opinion that a person does not have a subdivision w ith in the scope 
of 30, M .R .S .A . ,  Sec. 4956 i f  he owns a tract of land, sells two parcels and keeps 
the remaining land for his residence.
However, a lot reserved for future use generally counts as one lot for the purposes 
of this law i f  the subdivider does not use it as a residence. The following illustrations 
may help.
A sold to B 
in 1972
A lives on 
this parcelA sold to B 
in 1973
No subdivision until A sells one more lo t, or until A moves from remaining parcel ( if  




A :;<>U1 in  i i  
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A is retaining 
this parcel for 
‘ future use.”
Subdivision exists in my opinion because there has been a division into three lots w ith­
in a five year period.
Editor's note: The Subdivision Law is now more precise about whether the property 
retained by the Subdivider is counted as a lo t. The Law now stipulates that a lot re­
tained by the subdivider is exempt only i f  two dividings of a tract or parcel are 
accomplished by a subdivider who shall have retained one of such lots for his own use 
as a single family residence at least 5 years prior to such second subdividing. Portions 
of this opinion also appeared in the Ja n ., 1975 edition of the Townsman.
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8. Sale of lof to a water company not exempt (Feb., 1975)
Question: We have in our town a problem maintaining water pressure in a remote 
elevated area. The water company feels this can be eliminated by the installation 
of an intermediate pumping station. They have approached a property owner in a 
location ideally situated for just such an insta llation, and obtained a tentative agree­
ment for the purchase of the needed land.
The owner, however, wishes to be certain that this sale w ill not be considered a 
division from the standpoint of T it le  30, Section 4956, Land Subdivisions. He intends 
to sell house lots from the same parcel.
Can this sale to the water d istric t be treated differently from private sales or must it  
be counted for the purpose of the law?
Answer: In my opinion, such a sale is not entitled to special treatment and must be 
treated as the sale of one lot for subdivision purposes.
9 . Granfathering of subdivisions (Ja n ., 1976)
Question: We are seeking your opinion and advice on the following:
1 . Are operators of subdivisions which were approved prior to the State Shoreland 
Zoning Ordinance effective date but lying w ithin the land area covered by this 
ordinance, required to alter their plot plans so that they comply with the minimum 
frontage, area, and setback provisions of the ordinance?
2. Is the Town obligated to, and is it  recommended that the Town shall , notify such 
subdivision operators of the need to comply with the provisions of the Shoreland 
Ordinance where i t  is known that the plot plan approved originally would not com­
ply in some parts?
3. What would be the proper method and best wording of such a notification?
4 . What assistance can the Town receive in the enforcement of this ordinance from the 
Office of the Attorney General?
Answer: 1 . In my opinion, the shoreland zoning ordinance demands that subdivision plats 
not now in conformance with the new and stricter environmental standards be revised by the 
landowner and resubmitted to the planning board for approval.
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The law is well settled that, absent a statutory provision to the contrary, the 
approval and recording of a subdivision plat does not vest rights in the landowner.
And the mere filing  of a subdivision plan vests no rights. (York Township Zoning 
Board of Adjustment v. Brown, 182 A2d 707 (Pa. 1962)). Nor does o ffic ia l approval 
under existing law "freeze" the applicability —  and the developer's rights there­
under — of the laws as regards the proposal. (State ex. re l. M a r-W e ll, Inc. v.
Dodge, 177 NE2d 515 (Ohio, I960); State ex. re l. Bugden Development Co. v. 
Kiefaber, 179 NE2d 360 (Ohio, 1960). See, Anderson, American Law of Zoning 
at sec. 19.23).
Where a zoning provision is changed before there is an actual use o f the land 
in the subdivision, the developer must take heed of the new regulations.
The Ohio court said in the recent case;
Before an application for use of the premises is file d , (e.g. a building permit) 
the zoning requirements may be changed by the authority having the power to 
do so; and except w ith in the lim its fixed by the law, such changes are valid as 
to lands not then in use. The fact that an allotment plat is approved and re­
corded does not irrevocably fix  the rights of the parties. Valid changes may 
thereafter be made with respect to such things as lot size and minimum lot area 
and the allotter must conform thereto. (State ex. re l. M ar-W e ll, Inc. v . Dodge, 
177 NE2d 515 (Ohio, I960)).
S im ila rly , a Connecticut court said:
The filing  of a map showing lots in a proposed development cannot create a 
nonconforming use. If  it  could, a property owner, by the process of map filing  
could completely foreclose a zoning authority from ever taking any action with 
respect to the land included in the map, regardless of how urgent the need for 
regulation might be (Corsimo v. Grover, 170 A2d 267 (Conn., 1961)).
Proposed use does not constitute an existing nonconforming use; the use must be 
actual. Even where actual, as where part of the subdivision has been developed, the 
remainder of the subdivision may be subject to the new regulations. That the developer 
planned on completing his original plat is not suffic ient to allow him exemption from 
the new requirements. His potential profits are not protected by the law. Only the 
most extreme hardship — such as prevention of any economic use of the property at all - 
would allow him to complete his original plan (State ex. re. Bugden Development C o .). 
Some re lie f, such as partial re lie f, might be given a developer whose improvements 
were so related to existing zoning regulations and so substantial as to be tantamount 
to a commencement of use, as to qualify him as a nonconforming user (Wood v . North 
Salt Lake, 390 P2d 858 (Utah, 1964). Where the remainder of the subdivision has not 
been at all developed, however, he would be held to the new laws.
You might anticipate the argument by developers, or on their behalf, that filed  
subdivisions are grandfathered by a "general savings clause" in the statutes, 1 M .R .S .A .  
§ 302 which states that:
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The repeal of an act or resolve passed after the 4th day of March, 1870, does 
not revive any statute in force before the act or resolve took effect. The re­
peal of an act does not effect any punishment, penalty, or forfeiture incurred 
before the repeal takes effect, or any action or proceeding pending at the time 
of the repeal, for an offense committed or for recovery of a penalty or fo r­
feiture incurred under the act repealed. Actions and proceedings pending at 
the time of the passage or repeal of an act are not affected thereby.
Where the subdivision statute was amended by the Legislature to include stricter 
standards, those plats recorded under prior subdivision statutes were grandfathered by 
this savings clause. However, the grandfathering does not apply where a completely 
new environmental law is enacted, rather than a mere amendment to one already 
existing.
2 . Although it  is nowhere specified in the law as a duty of the planning board or 
town o ffic ia ls, i t  would be in the interests of the town to take some preventive enforce­
ment action, to avoid future controversy and litigation when sales and application for 
building permits are submitted. Such action would, in my opinion, make sure that 
landowners do not sell lots to buyers who are not aware of the restrictions which 
would prohibit their building. A lso, i t  w ill avoid the political and personal problems 
where those unwary landowners, after being denied a building permit because of the 
shoreland zoning restrictions, come to the board of appeals for a variance. (Their 
only legal recourse is against the subdivider who sold them the land in a costly c iv il 
action along the lines of fraudulent sales). Any action the town takes now to assure 
that landowners w ill revise their subdivisions selling and/or developing w ill be in the 
interest of future "consumers".
However, I repeat, I do not feel that the town is obligated to take such steps. The 
burden is on the landowner to inform himself of land use ordinances and state statute 
which are applicable to his land ownership, development and real estate sales.
3. Should the town wish to take such action, I believe a simple letter should 
notify the landowners of the new zoning ordinance and either enclosing a copy or 
giving information where it  can be found. The letter might also state that, according 
to legal advice you have obtained, the development cannot be undertaken without 
violating state law and local ordinances.
4 . I cannot answer with certainty what help is available from the Attorney General 
office. I suggest a letter to the Environmental D ivision of the Attorney General’s 
office asking for their advice, should the landowners not comply.
Local o ffic ia ls might, of course, handle some problems administratively on the 
local level through refusal of necessary building permits. Where a developer or other 
landowner applies for a building permit, and the proposed building would be in violation 
of the shoreland ordinance, it  should not be issued by the building inspector or code 
enforcement o fficer. (b y E .E .G .)
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10. Boundary Disputes (Feb., 1977)
Question: What must a subdivider produce as reasonable evidence of his boundaries?
Answer: The answer to this question is that, generally, a planning board should not be 
concerned with pinpointing exact boundary lines; and no evidence of boundary lines 
specifically need be sought. Instead, the planning board should be concerned basically 
with the developer's right to come before the planning board; that is , his standing to seek 
the jurisdiction of the planning board. Therefore, the planning board should mainly be 
concerned with the developer's ownership rights as to the property as a whole which he 
seeks to subdivide, and not its specific boundaries.
Thus, a planning board would be well w ith in its jurisdiction to require the developer to 
produce the deed under which he owns the property, which deed should contain a reason­
able description of the property, or require the developer to produce an option to purchase 
or other such conditional agreement under which he would have standing to come before 
them, which second type of document, i f  the developer fa lls into this conditional owner­
ship category, should either contain a reasonable description of the property as a whole 
or which document should be accompanied by a deed or survey or other w riting which 
reasonably describes the property in general to which the developer has conditional owner­
ship rights.
It should be emphasized that the above-mentioned documents which may be required from 
the developer are not so required to prove the truth of the actual boundaries -  for that 
would be a question for a judge or jury -  but rather simply to allow the planning board to 
determine whether the developer has standing to come before them and, thereby, cause 
them to exercise their duties and responsibilities and expend time and effort in the review 
of the developer's subdivision application.
Question: How involved should the planning board become in a boundary dispute between 
the developer and an abutter?
Answer: Generally, the planning board should not get involved in such disputes. It is not 
the duty of the planning board to look behind the documents presented to them and to 
determine the truth behind such documents; substantiating actual boundary lines and deter­
mining boundary disputes is the duty for a judge or a ju ry .
However, i f  a boundary dispute is currently pending in the courts, i t  is my opinion that, 
in order to avoid the possibility of compounding the damages that might be suffered by one 
of the parties involved in the dispute, i t  would be adviseable for a planning board to post­
pone its determination as to the subdivision until either the courts have fina lly  determined 
the actual boundaries, or until the planning board has conferred with the presiding judge, 
in w riting , as to his opinion in regards to whether or not the planning board should follow  
through with its review of the subdivision in question. (By PMB)
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11. Second Dividing of Parcel (June, 1977)
Question: A person has jived on a parcel of land for more than five years. W ith in  the 
last five years he has conveyed away two lots from the parcel and has retained the third 
lot as a single family residence. The person now wants to sell his single family residence 
to another party. Must,the person obtain subdivision approval before the sale or offer to 
sell ?
Answer: Although T it le  30, Section 4956(1), second paragraph, is quite ambiguous in its 
wording, i t  must be interpreted i f  possible, in a manner consistent w ith what is perceived 
to be its purpose and intent.
The second paragraph reads as follows:
"In  determining whether a tract or parcel of land is divided into three or more 
lots, the firs t dividing of such tract or parcel, unless otherwise exempted herein, 
shall be considered to create the firs t two lots and the next dividing of either of 
said firs t two lots, by whomever accomplished, unless otherwise exempted herein, 
shall be considered to create a 3rd lo t, unless both such dividings are accomplished 
by a subdivider who shall have retained one of such lots for his own use as a single 
family residence for a period of at least five years prior to such 2nd dividing. Lots 
of 40 or more acres shall not be counted as lo ts ."
The language after "3rd lo t" creates the problem. If  the wording " . . .o n e  of such lo t s . . . "  
refers to the two lots created by the firs t dividing, then subdivision approval would be 
required before the sale of the residence because the subdivider has not retained one of 
the lots for his own use as a single family residence for 5 years prior to the second divid­
ing. Stated d ifferently, when the firs t lot in the parcel is sold the subdivider must retain 
the balance of the parcel for a 5-year period or obtain subdivision approval before sale.
I f ,  however, the wording " . . .o n e  of such lo t s . . . "  refers to the three lots created by the 
second dividing, then subdivision approval would not have to be obtained because the 
subdivider retained a lot for his own single family purposes for the required 5-year period.
In my opinion, the second interpretation is the better one. F irs t, the language lends i t ­
self to such an interpretation. It says:
" . . . t h e  next dividing of either the said firs t 2 lots . . .  shall be considered to create 
a third lo t, unless both such dividings are accomplished by a subdivider who shall 
have retained one of such lo ts . . .  "
In other words the second dividing creates three lots unless one is retained and meets the 
crite ria . Second, the retention language is obviously intended to treat a qualified home­
stead parcel (my wording) different from a parcel of raw land. However, under the firs t 
interpretation above they would be treated the same. For example, a person can sell only 
one lot from a parcel of raw land w ith in  a five-year period without creating a subdivision. 
Sim ila rly , under the firs t interpretation a person could sell only one lot because he would 
have to hold the remainder o f the pracel for five years from the date of the sale of the 
f irs t parcel. F ina lly , the wording of the paragraph has recently been changed from " . . .  
for a period of at least 5 years.. . "  to its current version " . .  .fo r a period of at least 5
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years p r io r . . . "  This change would again indicate an intent to treat homestead parcels 
differently. Legislative intent must be respected i f  discernible. State v. Tu llo , 366 
A2d 843 (1976) and, therefore, I feel the second interpretation to be the better one (G HH).
12. Exemption to Subdivision Law (O c t., 1977)
Question: One of the exemptions to the subdivision law is for subdivisions "in  actual 
existence on September 23, 1971 that did not require approval under prior law ", 30 M .R .S .A .  
§ 4956(5). When is a subdivision considered to be "in  actual existence" to qualify for 
the exemption? A lso, once grandfathered, can the property then be subdivided in any 
manner without further approval?
Answer: The mere fact that a developer has a plot plan that was drawn up prior to Septem­
ber 23, 1971 is not enough to claim the exemption.
In order to prove that a subdivision was in actual existence, there must be shown not only 
the existence of such a plan but also that the land was actually surveyed and lots marked 
on the surface of the earth by steel pins or regular markers and numbered in accordance 
with the plan, prior to September 23, 1971 . State Ex Rel Brennan v. R .D . Realty C orp.,
M e ., 349 A .2d 301 (1975).
To put i t  a litt le  more clearly in order to claim that the subdivision was in actual existence 
prior to September 23, 1971, the subdivider must show at a minimum, not only
1) the existence of the plot plan, but also,
2) that the land was surveyed and marked on the surface of the earth with w ith steel 
pins or regular markers and numbered, in accordance with the plan, and,
3) that such was accomplished before September 23, 1971, the critical date under the 
statute.
Should the subdivider meet the above criteria in regard to the entire plan, then the 
plan may be considered "grandfathered" and exempt from further approval under 30 M .R .S .A .
§ 4956. Should the subdivider meet the above criteria but only in regard to a portion of 
the entire plan, then only that'portion shown to be in actual existence would be considered 
exempted.
Further, only that specific plan, or specific portion thereof, that is shown to be in 
actual existence prior to September 23, 1971 may be considered exempt from subdivision 
approval.
Therefore, in order to develop unproven portions, or to develop the land in a manner 
that does not conform to the proven plan, the subdivider would firs t have to secure prior 
approval from the planning board. To reiterate, once a particular plan has been proven to 
be in actual existence, i t  is only that particular scheme that is considered exempt, and 
the subdivider may not develop the land in a manner which deviates in any respect from 
that particular scheme without firs t obtaining planning board approval, since such deviations 
would be considered amendments to the "grandfathered" plan.
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F ina lly , even i f  i f  is determined that a particular subdivision was in actual existence 
prior to September 23, 1971, i f  i f  is further determined that the subdivider, subsequent 
to that date, had conveyed, leased, or developed any portion in a manner not in con­
formance with the proven plan, in my opinion i f  would be clear that the subdivider 
would be deemed to have waived or given up any right to claim an exemption under
30 M .R .S .A .  §,4956(5).
However, the determination of whether or not the plan was "in  actual existence" is not 
applicable i f  the plan was recorded prior to the critical date since 30 M .R .S .A .  § 4956(5) 
also provides an exemption for subdivisions "a plan of which has been legally recorded 
in the proper registry of deeds prior to September 23, 1971." (C .M .J .)
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A ll Regional Planning Commissions
Fourtin Powell, Regional Planner, State Planning O ffice  
Approval of Subdivision Plans
It has been brought to the attention of this office by John A ttig  of the 
Androscoggin Valley Regional Planning Commission that the enabling legislation 
fo r Subdivision Control Regulations, M .R .S .A .  T it le  30, §4956, does not specify 
who shall sign the plan of a subdivision to indicate approval or approval with terms 
and conditions when the selectmen or planning board act on a proposed subdivision.
In order to assure the legality of such signing, the O ffice of the Attorney 
General has informally suggested the following procedures:
1. When a subdivision plat or plan is signed by the selectmen in  
the absence of a planning board, i t  is preferable that all three 
selectmen sign the plat or plan. Th is would mean that, even i f  
one signature were later declared invalid due to a conflict of 
interest or other reason, a majority of the selectmen would s t il l  
have approved the subdivision.
2. When a subdivision plat or plan is signed by the planning board, 
i t  is preferable that a majority of the planning board members 
sign the plat or plan. Where approval is unanimous, i t  v/ould
be appropriate for a ll members present at the vote to sign the plat 
or plan. In cases where only the chairman of the planning board 
signs the plan, the clerk of the planning board should indicate 
on the plat or plan by affidavit that the chairman’s signature 
reflects the vote of the majority of the planning board. Thus, in 
each case, there can be no question as to whether or not the 
approval of the subdivision reflects the w ill of the majority o f the 
planning hoard.
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M EM O RA N DUM
April 2 , 1974
TO :
FRO M :
A ll Regional Planning Commissions, Cooperative Extension Service 
Fourtin Powell, Regional Planner, State Planning Office
SUBJEC T: Subdivision Review Procedures -  Water Supply
The State Subdivision Review law, T it le  30, Section 4956, contains various features 
related to environmental protection and features primarily related to consumer protection. 
Those portions dealing with water supply contain strong elements of consumer protection.
Subsection 2 reads, in part, as follows:
"The municipal reviewing authority shall . . . issue an order denying or 
granting approval of the proposed subdivision or granting approval upon 
such terms and conditions as it may deem advisable to satisfy the criteria  
listed in subsection 3 and to satisfy any other regulations adopted by the 
reviewing authority, and to protect and preserve the public's health, safety 
and general welfare. In all instances the burden of proof shall be upon the 
persons proposing the subdivisions. In issuing its decision, the reviewing 
authority shall make findings of fact establishing that the proposed subdivision 
does or does not meet the foregoing c rite ria ."
The criteria in Subsection 3, which must be met to the satisfaction of the municipal 
reviewing authority in order for them to approve a subdivision, include the following:
"3 . Guidelines. When promulgating any subdivision regulations and when 
reviewing any subdivision for approval, the planning board, agency or 
office, or the municipal officers, shall consider the following criteria and 
before granting approval shall determine that the proposed subdivision:
B. Has sufficient water available for the reasonably foreseeable needs 
of the subdivision;
C . W ill not cause an unreasonable burden on an existing water supply, 
i f  one is to be utilized; . . .- "
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2Part C, above, applies to already installed public or private water supply systems.
This criterion would be used where the subdivision was to be served by a common 
system. The average water usage of a single family dwelling, as used in the Minimum 
Lot Size law, T it le  12, Section 4807-A, is 300 gallons per day. Therefore, where the 
average yield of an established ground or surface water supply is known, calculation of 
the additional water needs of the proposed subdivison and a determination of whether or 
not the necessary capacity is available is a relatively simple matter.
Part B, above, is the more general criterion which applies equally to any subdivison, 
whether supplied from a public or private (common) water source or from on-site, individual 
water sources. The most common individual water source is the w e ll.
Since the municipal reviewing authority, " . . .  shall determine that the proposed 
subdivision. . . has suffic ient water available for the reasonably foreseeable needs of the 
subdivision . . .  " ,  that reviewing authority must be supplied with information which 
w ill enable it to make that determination. This information shall be furnished by the persons 
proposing the subdivision.
It is not possible to determine the presence of a given quantity and quality of under­
ground water supply without d rilling  and pumping a w e ll. Due to the expense of d rillin g , 
it  is not possible in most instances for the subdivider to d rill wells for each of his proposed 
lots or even for a sampling of the lots, particularly as there is no assurance that the 
subdivision w ill be approved. In any case, the presence of an adequate supply of potable 
water from one well does not guarantee that a nearby well w ill have a sufficient yield.
The Subdivision Review law was not intended to burden the subdivider with the 
expense of d rilling  wells which may not be used for a water supply, but it was intended to 
protect the potential buyer of a lot in a subdivision. The availability of sufficient ground 
water for single family residential purposes in many areas of Maine may be almost assured. 
However, where known ground water sources are limited and uncertain, the municipal 
reviewing authority may wish to use the following procedure:
1) Require the applicant to submit written d rilling  reports for wells in the v ic in ity  
of the proposed subdivision. These reports would not have to be actual "logs" of 
the w ells, as these are the property of the well d rille rs, but the reports should be 
based on logs of these w e lls. No specific distance from the proposed subdivision is 
required, but a radius of one mile should provide a reasonable indication of ground- 
water availability and quality. Where records of nearby wells vary greatly, it may 
be advisable for the subdivider to hire a ground water hydrologist to provide expert 
testimony regarding the available information.
2) Require disclosure of the written d rilling  reports on which the municipal reviewing 
authority based its decision to the purchaser of any lot in the subdivision. This 
disclosure would be one of the conditions for approval of the subdivision and would
be recorded with the proper registry of deeds.
This procedure would appear to provide three benefits: (1) The municipal reviewing
authority would record the bases for its decision to approve the subdivision, (2) the 
potential buyer would be provided with information which would assist him in assessing 
the risks of purchasing a given piece of land, and (3) the presence or absence of water on
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3a given lot remains a private matter; the municipal reviewing authority would not 
"guarantee" the purchaser that suffic ient potable water w ill be available on his lo t.
Any comments, suggestions and alternatives to the above procedure would be 
welcome.
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M EM O RAN DUM
TO : Regional Planning Commissions
FRO M : Rich Rothe
RE: Planning Board status and review of subdivisions
Dec. 30, 1976
In a shore land zoning newsletter dated March 13, 1974, we stated that there were several 
different types of Planning Boards, and that the way a Planning Board was created could affect 
its subdivision review powers. We stated that most Planning Boards were created in one of 3 
ways:
1 . Prior to September 23, 1971, specific State Statutes governed the creation of planning 
boards. These permissive laws were repealed by the 105th Legislature in 1971 when 
the principle of Home Rule was recognized by an amendment to the State Constitution, 
and in T it le  30, M . R . S . A . ,  Sec. 1917, which states that:
Any municipality may, by the adoption, amendment or repeal of ordinances 
or bylaws, exercise any power or function which the Legislature has power 
to confer upon i t ,  which is not denied either expressly or by clear implication, 
and exercise any power or function granted to the municipality by the Consti­
tution, general law or charter. No change in the composition, mode of 
election or terms of office of the legislative body, the mayor or the manager 
of any municipality may be accomplished by bylaw or ordinance.
The legal authority for the continuation of these "pre-1971" planning boards, and hence, 
their ab ility  to function as the "municipal reviewing authority" for the purposes of the 
Subdivision Law, rests with the "savings provision of T itle  30, M . R . S . A . ,  which states 
that:
§ 4964. Savings provisions
Any planning board or d istrict established and any ordinance, comprehensive 
plan or map adopted under a prior and repealed statute shall remain in effect 
until abolished, amended or repealed. Any property or use existing in violation 
of such an ordinance is a nuisance. Planning boards established pursuant to pro­
visions of repealed section 4952, subsection 1 shall continue to be governed by 
those provisions until they are superseded by municipal ordinance and the muni­
cipal officers may pay board members a set amount, not to exceed $10, for each 
meeting attended.
2 . A fter September 23, 1971, a number of planning boards were created by ordinance, in 
accordance with the Home Rule Provision. In so doing, many municipalities utilized  
MMA's "Establishment of Municipal Planning Board" model ordinance, found in the 
appendix of SPO 's "Guidelines for Local Planning Boards". This model includes pro­
visions for composition, appointment (by selectmen), organization and rules, duties,
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and powers. Planning boards created by this method would also have the authority 
to serve as the municipal reviewing authority for the purposes of the subdivision law.
3. A fter September 23, 1971, a number of Planning Boards were created informally by 
appointment of the Selectmen and without approval at a Town Meeting. Most of 
these informal Planning Boards were created in smaller towns that had never had a 
Planning Board for the purpose of preparing a shoreland zoning ordinance. In effect, 
these informal Planning Boards were created without the specific authorization con­
tained in the now repealed Statute T itle  30, M . R . S . A . ,  Section 4952, and without 
specific authorization contained in a locally enacted municipal ordinance. Based on 
several discussions with attorneys at the Maine Municipal Association and the Attorney 
General's O ffic e , i f  is our conclusion that such planning boards clearly had the 
authority to prepare the necessary ordinances in order to comply with the Mandatory 
Shoreland Zoning A ct, but that such Planning Boards should not exercise the sub­
division review powers given to Planning Boards under the Subdivsion Law. Instead, 
such informally created Planning Boards should probably serve in an advisory capacity 
to the Selectmen, who in turn should make the final decisions to approve or disapprove 
a particular subdivision application. State law does not specifically prohibit an in­
formally created Planning Board from exercising the function of municipal reviewing 
authority, but the municipality would probably be on firmer legal ground i f  this function 
were performed by a Planning Board created by method 1^ or ^2, or in the absence of 
either of these, by the Selectmen.
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Maine Supreme Court Cases
Excerpt from: Dickinson v. Maine Public Service Company, M e . ,  244 A .2d 549 
(1968) at 551.
Editor's note: The following language is taken from a case involving the Public 
U tilit ie s  Commission. W hile the case itse lf does not pertain to the Subdivision Law, 
or subdivision review, the excerpt does suggest that a decision must be limited to the 
law as of the date of the proceedings. This may have a direct impact on the admini­
stration of the subdivision law. For instance, in attempting to evaluate whether a 
subdivision has been created, it  may be necessary to research the status of the Sub­
division Law at a gij/en point in time in order to determine whether the sale, lease,
or development of a particular lot or parcel 
time.
[2-6] The Commission was of course 
cognizant of the fact that the Legislature 
had enacted amendments to become effec­
tive on a date subsequent to the Commis­
sion decree. In this connection the Com­
mission stated: ‘‘We take judicial notice 
of the fact that the Maine Legislature has 
changed the existing law by Chapter 3S2 
of the Public Laws of Maine, 1967, AX 
ACT to Grant Public Utilities Commission 
Control over Cooperatives. This law, how­
ever, does not become effective a? such un­
til ninety-one days after the adjournment 
of the Legislature which will be October 8, 
1967. We are bound by the law that is in 
existence at the time of our decision.” 
The Commission accordingly based its de­
cision primarily on its determination as to 
whether or not it was economically feasible 
for Maine Public to render the requested 
service. Heath v. Maine Public Service 
Co. (1965), 161 Me. 217, 210 A.2d 701. 
This was the applicable test under the law 
as it existed on October 3, 1967, the date 
of the decree. As a quasi-judicial body the 
Commission had a duty to render decisions 
on petitions which had been pending more 
than two years and was under no obliga­
tion to defer its decision because of a 
change in the law effective in fu tu re>. 
Moreover, the same Legislature enacted P. 
L.1967, Ch. 10 which amended 1 M.R.S.A.
created a subdivision at that point in
Sec. 302 to read: “Actions an d  p roceed­
in g s pending at the time of the passage or 
repeal of an Act are not affected thereby.” 
(Italicized words added by amendment). 
The petitions were “proceedings” pending 
before the Commission, Dickinson, supra, 
and as such would by force of the amend­
ment be governed by the law as it existed 
before the enactment of P.L.1967, Ch. 3S2. 
P.L.1967, Ch. 10 became effective on Octo­
ber 7, 1967, whereas as we have seen P.L. 
1967, Ch. 3S2 by express legislative fiat be­
came effective one day later. Decision 
does not rest, however, on this difference. 
Even if the amendments had become oper­
ative on the same date, the result would 
have been the same. P.L.1967, Ch. 10 and 
Ch. 382 are not conflicting, mutually incon­
sistent or irreconcilable. Each can be giv­
en its full force and effect without dimin­
ishing the effect of the other, “and both 
must stand as statutes of the State.” 
Stuart v. Chapman (1908), 104 Me. 17, 24, 
70 A. 1069, 1072. So construed, the stat­
utes provided prospectively new criteria 
for determination by the Commission of 
petitions filed by customers of a coopera­
tive seeking service from another utility 
serving the same area—but these new cri­
teria are not applicable to petitions al­
ready pending on October 8, 1967. It is 
apparent, therefore, that the appellant was 
not prejudiced by the fact that the order of 
the Commission was promulgated a few 
days before the amendments became opera­
tive.
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BOUTET v. PLANNING BOARD OF CITY OF SACO
C ite  a s , Me., 253 A..2d 53
Me. 53
Ronald B O U TET et al. 
v.
PLANNING BOARD OF the C IT Y  OF SACO.
Supremo Judicial Court of Maine.
May 1, I960.
Proceeding on appeal from a judg­
ment of the Superior Court, York County, 
denying appeal from city planning board’s 
refusal to approve subdivision plat. The 
Supreme Judicial Court, Williamson, C. J., 
held that city planning board, which was 
not authorized by ordinance or regulation 
to grant conditional approval of plat giv­
ing to developer settled rights to approval 
on compliance, had no authority to give 
conditional approval to subdivision plat 
with buffer area, and thus board’s tenta­
tive approval of plat gave no rights to 
landowner to compel final approval on 
compliance with the conditions. The Court 
further held that exclusion of buffer zones 
in subdivision plats was not unreasonable.
Appeal denied.
I. Municipal Corporations 0=43
City planning board, in passing on 
subdivision plat, acts in administrative ca­
pacity and is without authority to impose 
conditions beyond compliance with munici­
pal ordinances and general reasonableness. 
30 M.R.S.A. § 4956.












2. Municipal Corporations G=43
Two-step process of tentative and fi­
nal subdivision plat approval rests on stat­
utes or regulations authorized thereunder.
3. Municipal Corporations 0 4 3
City planning board, which was not 
authorized by ordinance or regulation to 
grant conditional approval of plat giving to 
developer settled rights to approval on 
compliance, had no authority to give con­
ditional approval to subdivision plat with 
buffer area, and thus board’s tentative ap­
proval of plat gave no rights to landowner 
to compel final approval on compliance 
with the conditions.
had no bearing on review of board’s refus­
al to approve another buffer strip, and is­
sue of whether second buffer strip lawfully 
could have been approved was not present­
ed for review.
Charles W. Smith, Roger S. Elliott, 
Saco, for plaintiff.
Ronald E. Ayotte, Sr., Biddeford, for de­
fendant.
Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and 
WEBBER, DUFRESNE and WEATHER- 
BEE, JJ.
4. Estoppel 062(5)
Landowner, who, between time subdi­
vision plat with buffer strip was tentative­
ly approved and date board reviewed plat 
and advised it would approve plat with ex­
clusion of buffer strip, did no more than 
take down a barn, obtain variance of zon­
ing ordinance with reference to lot sizes, 
which would have been required apart 
from issue of the buffer strip, and spend 
$30 or $40 in obtaining a new plat did not 
acquire right to approval of the subdivision 
plat with the buffer strip by estoppel.
5. Municipal Corporations <3=43
Legislature, in enacting statute relat­
ing to land subdivisions, intended that 
there should be room for exercise of dis­
cretion by planning board. 30 M.R.S.A. § 
4956.
6. Municipal Corporations C=>43
Exclusion of buffer zones in subdivi­
sion plats, which buffer zones resulted in 
street with taxable land on only one side 
and with problem of maintenance, was not 
unreasonable even though subdivision plat 
with buffer zone had been tentatively ap­
proved prior to public hearing on and ap­
proval of policy against buffer strips. 30 
M.R.S.A. § 4956.
7. Municipal Corporations C=43
Fact that city planning board had ap­
proved second buffer strip in subdivision
WILLIAMSON, Chief Justice.
The Planning Board of Saco refused to 
approve a subdivision plan for development 
of house lots submitted under 30 M.R.S.A. 
§ 4956. The appeal before us is from the 
denial of appeal in the Superior Court.
The controversy centers about a buffer 
strip zone two feet in width and running 
between the side of a proposed street or 
way and neighboring land, which the ap­
pellant insists he is entitled to have ap­
proved in the plat by the Board.
The proceedings before the Planning 
Board and the appeal to the Superior 
Court were in the name of Ronald Boutet. 
In the Superior Court it first appeared 
that title to the land in the proposed subdi­
vision was, in fact, in Barbara Boutet, the 
wife of Ronald Boutet. The motion of the 
wife to join as a party plaintiff was grant­
ed in the Superior Court over the objection 
of the Planning Board. It is apparent 
from the record that Ronald Boutet acted 
at all times with the full knowledge and 
consent of his wife and we may well con­
sider him to have been her agent. We 
find neither defect in procedure nor lack 
of jurisdiction. The facts, in substance, are 
as follows:
Mr. Boutet sought to develop the area 
with an access road from a city street to 
the rear of the land for the purpose of
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opening a housing development. A plan of 
the proposed subdivision was submitted to 
the Planning Board in September, 1965. A 
month later, by agreement, certain lots of 
which the title was in dispute were re­
moved from the plan. The proposed plan 
called for the buffer strip as indicated for 
a distance of approximately S00 feet.
On October 19, 1965 (reaffirmed on Oc­
tober 20) the Planning Board voted unani­
mously that: “We notify Mr. Boutet that 
if he will present a revised plan that ful­
fills the seven points outlined as per at­
tached letter—the Board will approve his 
plan.” Under point 6 of the letter the 
Planning Board required that the buffer 
strip in question and also another buffer 
strip, with which we are not concerned, 
should be clearly labeled as belonging to 
“Boutet”.
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C. Approval of a subdivision is based 
on its compliance with municipal ordi­
nances and its general reasonableness.”
[1J The Board in passing upon a subdi­
vision plat acts in an administrative capaci­
ty. It is without authority to impose con­
ditions beyond “compliance with municipal 
ordinances and its general reasonableness.”
“In exercising its function of approving 
or disapproving a subdivision plan, the 
planning board acts in an administrative 
capacity. In passing upon a plan, its ac­
tion is controlled by the regulations 
adopted for its guidance. It has no dis­
cretion or choice but to approve a subdi­
vision which conforms to the regula­
tions.” Langbein v. Planning Board of 
City of Stamford, 145 Conn. 674, 146 A. 
2d 412, 414, (1958).
Planning Board must 
approve i f  an appli­
cation conforms to all 
regulations.
On December 15th the Planning Board 
adopted, after public hearing, land subdivi­
sion regulations, including Article VII—
“ G en era l R eq u irem en ts f o r  the S u b d iv i-
sion  o f  L a n d  *  * *
B. The subdivider shall observe the fol­
lowing: * * *
10. Buffer zones shall not be allowed.”
In April, 1966 Mr. Boutet first submitted 
a revised plan or plat in which he met all 
of the conditions for approval stated in the 
seven point letter of October. The Plan­
ning Board in May again reviewed the 
plat, and advised Mr. Boutet that the plat, 
with the exclusion of the buffer strip “will 
be approved forthwith upon its receipt by 
the Board. Such approval, however, as this 
letter of intent implies, will not be extend­
ed beyond October 30, 1966.” It is from 
this decision that Mr. Boutet has appealed.
The statute reads in part as follows:
“30 M.R.S.A. § 4956: L a n d  S u b d iv i­
sions.
1. R egu la tio n . A municipality may reg­
ulate the subdivision of land. * * *
Me.Rep. 243-256 A.2d— 14
See also Forest Construction Co. v. 
Planning 8c Zoning Com’n, 155 Conn. 669, 
236 A.2d 917 (1967).
We turn later to consideration of the 
regulation adopted by the Planning Board.
Mr. Boutet vigorously contends that the 
Board conditionally approved the plat with 
the buffer strip in October, 1965 and that 
therefore on compliance with the condi­
tions in April, 1966 he was entitled as a 
matter of law to approval by the Board. 
There is nothing, however, in the record 
to establish that either by ordinance or 
regulation the Planning Board in October, 
1965 was authorized to grant a conditional 
approval of a plat giving to the developer 
settled rights to approval on compliance.
By statute or regulation provision is 
sometimes made for what has been called a 
two-step process of subdivision plat ap­
proval involving tentative approval to be 
followed by final approval.
In Pennyton Homes, Inc. v. Planning 
Bd. of Stanhope, 41 N.J. 578, 197 A.2d 870, 
S72 (1964) the court in commenting on the 
original planning act said:
“There was no provision for the current
two-step process of tentative and final
2-step review process 
must be authorized by 
law or regulation.
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plat approval. ‘Approval’ was a single 
act, final in nature, (except perhaps in 
one limited situation, see R.S. 40:5o—19) 
and there was no problem of protection 
to a developer by reason of any prelimi­
nary or tentative approval.”
In Levin v. Livingston Tp., 35 X.J. 500, 
173 A.2d 391, 397 (1961) the court said:
“So the general revision of the planning 
act in 1953 introduced for the first time 
a two-step approval procedure, permit­
ting municipalities to provide for ‘tenta­
tive approval’ of plats, X.J.S.A. 40:55-1.- 
18, by which these basic matters may be 
settled. From what has been said, it is 
obvious that tentative approval is the 
most importatnt phase of the subdivision 
regulation process.”
See also Hilton Acres v. Klein, 35 X'.J. 
570, 174 A.2d 465, 470 (1961); 3 American 
Law of Zoning (Anderson), (1968) § 19.13 
“Preliminary and final plats: tentative ap­
proval”; § 19.19 “Subdivision regulations”; 
2 Zoning Law and Practice (Yokley) 
(1965) § 12-7.
[2] The two-step process, useful as it 
doubtless is to developer and Planning 
Board, in our view rests on the statutes or 
regulations authorized thereunder. Here 
we find no foundation for a conditional 
approval in October, 1965.
[3] The action of the Board in Octo­
ber, 1965 thus gave no rights whatsoever 
to the landowner to compel final approval 
on compliance with the conditions. In 
reaching this conclusion we do not accept 
the argument of the defendant that the 
Board did not, in fact, give a tentative ap­
proval. We think the intention of the 
Board in October was clear. We are saying 
that the Board simply did not have author­
ity to make such a commitment.
[4] The landowner gains nothing in 
this instance on the basis of an estoppel 
against the Planning Board and City. As­
suming that under certain circumstances a 
landowner may acquire rights by estoppel
he has not done so on the facts of this 
case. At most between October, 1965 and 
April or May, 1966 the landowner did no 
more than take down a barn, which was an 
action not directly attributable to the loca­
tion of the buffer strip, obtain a variance 
of the zoning ordinance with reference to 
lot sizes which would have been required 
apart from the issue of the buffer strip, 
and spend some $30 or $40 in obtaining a 
new plan. This is not sufficient change in 
his situation to claim that justice requires 
that the Planning Board and City are to be 
bound by the tentative approval in October, 
1966. See Levin v. Livingston Tp., supra, 
173 A. at p. 402; Tremarco Corp. v. Gar- 
zio, 32 N.J. 448, 161 A.2d 241, 245 (1960); 
Municipal Law (Rhyne) p. 893 (1957).
The question then becomes whether the 
subdivision plat submitted in April, 1966 
met the requirements of the ordinances of 
Saco and the general reasonableness test. 
If so, the landowner was entitled without 
more to approval by the Board.
[5] In our view the rule against a 
buffer strip or zone was proper under the 
“general reasonableness” provision of the 
statute. The Legislature intended that 
there should be room for exercise of dis­
cretion by the Planning Board. If the ordi­
nances alone bounded the field of its au­
thority the words “general reasonableness” 
would have no meaning.
The regulation by the Planning Board 
was properly adopted as part of a compre­
hensive plan for the city of Saco. 30 M. 
R.S.A. § 4952 relating to planning boards 
reads in part:
“2. P lan s. The board shall prepare, 
adopt and may amend a comprehensive 
plan containing its recommendations for 
the development of the municipality.
A. Among other things, the plan may 
include the proposed general character, 
location, use, construction, layout, ex­
tent, size, open spaces and population 
density of all real estate, and the pro­
posed method for rehabilitating blight­
ed districts and eliminating slum areas.
Planning Board must 
exercise general 
reasonableness
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B. The board shall hold a public 
hearing on its tentative proposals, be­
fore it adopts the plan or an amend­
ment of it.
C. Once adopted by the board, the 
plan becomes a public record. It shall 
be filed in the office of the clerk.”
The Board, therefore, in May had before 
it the policy against approval of buffer 
zones found in the regulations. The test, 
however, remains one of reasonableness.
If the policy of the Board, whether by reg­
ulation or otherwise, does not lie wdthin 
the test of reasonableness, it must fail and 
cannot be used as a measure of disapproval 
by the Board.
[6] On the record before us we are un­
able to say that the exclusion of buffer 
zones as a matter of law is not reasonable. 
The reasons against the approval of buffer 
zones in subdivision plats were persuasive­
ly set forth by the Chairman of the Plan­
ning Board in the adoption of the subdivi­
sion regulation in December, 1965. He 
testified in part as follows:
‘T investigated the treatment of buffer 
strips in subdivisions and by other Plan­
ning Boards and by other planners in 
Maine. I consulted Mr. Klunder who is 
our planning consultant for the City. I 
consulted certain legal, got certain legal 
opinion about this. And in no place 
could I find where buffer strips, as such, 
were an approved device in a subdivision 
plotting. Further than this, from a point 
of view of the land involved, it meant 
that the Board, if they should approve a 
buffer strip here, would be approving a 
strip some seven hundred odd feet long 
on one side of the property, which was 
then, if you project to what is normal in 
a final disposition of subdivisions, that a 
street would then be asked to be ap­
proved by the City. And then the subdi­
vider would have to be asking the City, 
in effect, to approve half a street. That 
is, they would be approving a street 
which would only have taxable land on it 
one side, when it would be possible to
253 A.2d— 4 Vi
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have taxable land opened up to it on the 
other side, as well. So that you have the 
problem of maintenance. You have the 
problem of development which is the, for 
the best of the community, which should 
be so they could be opened up on both 
sides. I could find no technical way in 
which this could be done and still grant 
Mr. Boutet a buffer strip without just 
having removed it from the plan. We 
tried very hard, or I tried very hard, 
certainly, to find a method in which we 
could grant this. And I don’t want to 
get into areas where I am giving other 
people’s opinions. But I find it is very 
difficult to. Because, obviously, I had to 
go to * * * and in this case I was
acting for the Board—to other sources 
for our information concerning the use 
of buffer strips. The only time that I 
could find that a buffer strip was ap­
proved by planners in subdivisions, or at 
any place, is when it is used for a public 
use. This is wrhere it would be in the 
form—”
T h e C O U R T : In other words, the ad­
joining land is devoted to public pur­
poses ?
T h e W I T N E S S : * * * When it is, 
for example, in a playground or a park, 
or something similar to that, they some­
time, when it is a public use, will provide 
a buffer strip. Other than that, I could 
find no instances where buffer strips 
was an approved device to be used in a 
subdivision—excuse me—subdivision reg­
ulation, or in a subdivision approval. 
We become sophisticated in our treat­
ment, or in our consideration of these 
problems the longer that we get into 
things, and the more we have experience 
on them. We certainly, ar.d I certainly 
knowr much more about buffer strips to­
day than I did a year ago, and much 
more a year ago than I did two years 
ago. So that our information is con­
stantly, and our knowledge is constantly 
growung on these things. This is one 
reason, I think, why our subdivision reg­
ulation lay on the table so long, because
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we had had it presented to us by onr 
first comprehensive planner back in 
19-.
* * * I will say that I had several
opinions, professional opinions as re­
gards to buffer strip. None of them in­
dicated that such should be approved.
* * * The basis used for approving
plats at the present time is a subdivision 
regulation which we have adopted as of 
December 15, 1965.
Q— And you are familiar with the statu­
tory provision with regard the basis to 
be used?
A — Yes.
0 — And what is that basis?
A—That is on the basis of the compliance 
with the ordinances, and of general rea­
sonableness.
It is argued that if the buffer strip was 
reasonable in October, 1965 it therefore as 
a matter of law must be considered reason­
able in May, 1966. This argument does 
not take into consideration that after pub­
lic hearing, the Board in December, 1965 
adopted the policy against buffer strips. 
No guarantee was given or could have 
been given that a buffer strip reasonable in 
October would be reasonable in May. Un­
der the view of the landowner progress in 
the development of regulation and control 
of land subdivisions would be at a stand­
still.
[7] Furthermore, the fact that in both 
October and May the Planning Board ap­
pears to have approved a second buffer 
strip in the subdivision has no bearing 
upon the refusal to approve the strip in is­
sue. We need not determine whether the 
second buffer strip lawfully could have 
been approved. It is sufficient for our 
purpose that the plat with the buffer strip 
in issue was not approved.
If Mr. Boutet had first applied in May, 
1966 he would have been faced with a poli­
cy cast in the form of a subdivision regula­
tion against his desired two-foot buffer 
strip approximately SOD feet in length. In
effect, he is asking the Planning Board 
and the Courts on appeal that the tentative 
approval based on conditions which he met 
ripened into a final approval in May. It is 
the two-step process which he seeks to uti­
lize and which is not available to him. We 
find no error in the decision of the Superi­
or Court upholding the failure of the Plan­
ning Board to approve the subdivision plat 
on the ground that there was not compli­
ance with the “general reasonableness” 
provision of the statute.
The entry will be:
Appeal denied.
TAPLEY and MARDEN, JJ., did not 
participate.
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In the Matter of SPRING V A L L E Y  DE­
VELO PM ENT By Lakesites, Inc.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Feb. 0. 1973.
The Environmental In:; rovement Com­
mission issued order which denied sub­
divider the right to proceed with its devel­
opment of 92-acre tract along one side of 
pond until such time as the s::l,divider had 
made proper application to the Commission 
and had received the Commission’s approv­
al. The subdivider appealed. The Su­
preme Judicial Court, Weath.-rbee, J., held 
that the Site Location of Development 
Law which requires persons intending to 
construct or operate a development which 
may substantially affect local environment 
to notify, before commencing the construc­
tion or operation, the Environmental Im­
provement Commission of their intent and 
the nature and location or the development 
is a reasonable exercise of the police pow­
er, is not unconstitutionally vague and does 
not deny equal protection of the law.
Affirmed and appeal denied.
1. Statutes C=> 181(1)
In seeking legislative intent the court 
turns first to the language which the law­
makers chose to use to carry out their pur­
pose.
2. Health and Environment 0^25.5
“Commercial” within the Site Location 
of Development Law which requires per­
sons intending to construct or operate com­
mercial development which may substan­
tially affect local environment to notify the 
Environmental Improvement Commission 
before commencing the construction or op­
eration of the development, was intended 
to describe the motivation. :Lr the develop­
ment and not the type of activity to be per­
formed on the property after it is devel- 
ooed. 38 M.R.S.A. § 482.
See publication Words aiul Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions.
3. Health and Environment C=’25.5
In enacting the Site Location of De­
velopment Law the legislature intended to 
bring residential developments within the 
application of the Law and the offering 
for sale of subdivided lots constituted 
“commercial development” within provision 
which requires persons intending to con­
struct or operate development which may 
substantially affect local environment to 
notify the Environmental Improvement 
Commission before commencing the con­
struction or operation. 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 
482-485.
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions.
4. Statutes C=220
When administrative body has carried 
out reasonable and practical interpretation 
of statute and this has been called to the 
attention of the legislature, the legislature’s 
failure to act to change the interpretation 
is evidence that the legislature has ac­
quiesced in the interpretation.
5. Health and Environment C=>25.5
In enacting the Site Location of De­
velopment Law the legislature intended 
that a development with particular propen­
sity to damage the environment should not 
he located in areas where the environment 
is particularly incapable of sustaining the 
impact without public in ju r y .  3S M.R.S.A. 
§§ 481-488.
6. Health and Environment C=>25.5
The Site Location of Development 
Law encompasses residential developments 
in which the developer merely subdivides 
the land into lots and offers the lots ioi 
sale without any intention io construct 
buildings or to provide additional improve-
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7. Constitutional Law C=*8(!)
All acts of the legislature are pre­
sumed to he constitutional; this presump­
tion is of great strength.
8. Constitutional Law C=48(!)
The burden is on him who claims that 
statute is unconstitutional to snow its un­
constitutionality
9. Constitutional Law C=8I
The state is permitted to exercise the 
police power for the protection of the pub­
lic welfare, safety, order, morals and 
health.
*0. Health and Environment 0=20
Thu. .■'Irtv may act, if it acts properly, 
under the police power to conserve the 
quality of air, soil and water and to do so 
the state may justifiably limit the use 
which some owners may make of their 
property. 38 M.R.S.A. 481-488.
i I. Property C=>7
Landowner holds his property su’ Act 
a the limitation that he may not use it to 
the serious disadvantage of the public.
!2. Heaitii and Environment C=20
The limitation of use of property for
. •_ purpose of preserving from unree.v.ma­
in destruction the quality of air, soil and 
water for the' protection of the public 
"alth and welfare is within the police 
power, .18 M.R.S.A. 481—kSS.
and Environment 0=2!
The Site Location of Development 
Law which requires persons intending to 
construct or operate development which 
may substantially affec: local environment 
to notify, before commencing me construc­
tion or operation, the Environmental Im­
provement Commission of their intern and 
the nature and location of the development
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14. Constitutional Law C=8I
In order that statute may be sustained 
as exercise of police power the act and its 
application under the police power must 
have clear, real and substantial relationship 
to the purposes of the act.
15. Health and Environment 0=21
Application of the Site Location of 
Development Law to one who merely sub­
divides property is a valid exercise of the 
police power. 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488.
16. Eminent Domain C=2(l)
The application of the Site Location 
of Development I .aw to subdivider of lake- 
shore property did not constitute such v.n- 
rensona’ w burden upon the property as 
would e.,ual an uncompensated taking. LT. 
S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5; M.R.S.A.Const, 
art. 1, $ 21; 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488.
!7. Statutes C=47
The Site Location of Development 
Law, pertaining to the protection of the
environ-' .-nt, is not unconstitutionally 
vague and impossible of compliance. 38 
M.R.S.A. ^  +81-4S3.
18. Health and Environment C=2I
Requirement of Site Location of De­
velopment Law that proposed developments 
must no: he built on soil types which are 
unsuit.:' 1-.; to the nature of the undertaking 
is reasonable. 38 M.R.S.A. § 484.
19. Health and Environment C=20
The legislature runy properly derr w.d
that ah puate provision will be made for
load: nanparking and traffic movement be-
tore theEnvironmentalImprovement Corn-
mission .4-.all approve acommercial or in­
dustrial development. ks M.R.S.A. § 484.
29. Constitutional Law C=62(I0)
hr -gislature may not endow the 
Lnvir nnu-.ntal Improvement Commission
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with naked discretion. 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 
4S1-488.
21. Health and Environment C=>25.5
The effect of commercial or industrial 
development upon property values is out­
side the scope and purposes of the Site Lo­
cation of Development Law and the Envi­
ronmental Improvement Commission would 
he impermissibly applying the force of the 
state’s police power in the enforcement of 
the Act if it denied approval of a develop­
ment because of failure of proof that prop­
erty values would not be adversely affected. 
38 M.R.S.A. § 484.
22. Statutes 064(1)
The provisions of the Site Location of 
Development Law arc severable and the 
unconstitutionality of provision that prop­
erty values must not be unreasonably af­
fected by the development does not affect 
the validity of the remainder of the Act. 
38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488.
23. Statutes 0 4 7
The standards which statute sets out 
to guide the determinations of administra­
tive bodies must be sufficiently distinct so 
that the public may know what conduct is 
barred and so that the law will be adminis­
tered according to the legislative will.
24. Constitutional Law 0208(1)
The legislature may, in its judgment, 
create classifications so long as they are 
not arbitrary and are based upon actual 
differences in classes which differences 
bear substantial rational relation to the 
public purpose sought to be accomplished 
by the statute.
25. Constitutional Law 0211 
Health and Environment 0 2 1
The requirement of Site Location of 
Development Law that subdivider over 20 
acres must receive the approval of the En­
vironmental Improvement Commission is 
not denial of equal protection of the law. 
38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488.
26. Constitutional Law 0211
Health and Environment 0 2 1
The Site Location of Development 
Law did not deny equal protection of the 
law to subdivider by administratively creat­
ing piecemeal zoning with arbitrary dis­
tinctions. 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962; 3S M.R.S. 
A. §§ 481-488.
27. Constitutional Law 0211
The application of the Site Location 
of Development Law on case by case basis 
but under the guidance of the explicit cri­
teria of the statute is not in itself denial of 
equal protection. 3S M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488.
28. Appeal and Error 0 6 6
Strong policy exists against piecemeal 
appellate review. Rules of Civil Proce­
dure, rule 72(c).
29. Health and Environment 025.5
The Environmental Improvement Com­
mission is without authority to present in­
terlocutory appeal to the law court or for 
the law court to entertain direct appeals on 
piecemeal basis. 38 M.R.S.A. § 4S7; Rules 
of Civil Procedure, rules 73, 73(f).
30. Health and Environment 0>25.5
The Environmental Improvement Com­
mission acted regularly and within the 
scope of its authority when it denied per­
mission to subdivider to subdivide 92 acres 
located on one side of large pond on 
ground that the developer had failed to 
demonstrate that it had plans that would 
adequately protect the public's health, safe­
ty and general welfare. 38 M.R.S.A. 
481-488.
31. Health and Environment C=>25.5
Findings of the Environmental Im­
provement Commission that proposed sub­
division of 92 acres on one side of large 
pond would degrade the quality of ground 
water in and around the development and 
that the developer had failed to present 
plans that would adequately protect the 
public’s health, safety and general welfare
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were supported by substantial evidence. 3S 
M.R.S.A. §§ 4S1-488.
Verrill, Dana, Philbrick, Putnam & Wil­
liamson by Loyall F. Sewall, Portland, for 
Spring Valley.
E. Stephen Murray, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Augusta, for Environmental Improvement 
Comm.
Before DUPRESNE, C. J., and WEB­
BER, WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, 
WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, Jj.
WEATHERBEE, Justice.
Raymond Pond is located in the town of 
Raymond and is slightly more than one 
mile in length. Lakesites, Inc. is the own­
er of a large tract of land containing about 
92 acres located on one side of the Pond. 
Lakesites’ development of this land into a 
residential subdivision has been interrupted 
by an order of the Environmental Im­
provement Commission directing it to cease 
the operation of this development until 
Lakesites has applied for and received 'he 
Commission’s approval of its develop!: er.t.
The Commission claims to have derived 
its authority for this order from 38 M.R. 
S.A. §§ 481-48-3, Site I .ocation of Develop­
ment Law, hereinafter referred to as the 
Site Location Law. Lakesites’ appeal at­
tacks both the Commission’s interpretation I.
of the Act asincluding residentialsub
sions and the Act’s constitution a!i ty. We
conclude thatthe authority oftheCop. :rus-
sion does extend to residential: sub(.i : . r;sions
and that the sitatute representS C. 'valid. C A “
ercise of the police power. 1vYe deny■ the
appeal.
The agreed statement of facts and the
testimony presented at hearir.S ^ tore rhvCommission re:\ea! that Lakesit: ■ —extends along the shore of the jc'C a t
least 3400 feet4 Lakesites ha.s su* r\:..C 'J
this tract into90 lots rangingin size : ■ ■
20,000 square feet to 53,000 square feet 
with several other areas reserved from 
sale. It refers to this property as its 
Spring Valley Development.
Lakesites has cleared and graded por­
tions of this land, has built a road for in­
gress and egress and has surveyed the 
property, marking off the boundaries of 
the individual lots. While it contemplates 
that purchasers will build year-round or 
part-time homes on their lots it does not 
intend to construct or participate in the 
construction of the buildings or to control 
the use of the lots "except insofar as there 
are any required deed restrictions”. No 
action has beer, taken with respect to pro­
viding services for any of the lots.
Lakesites proposes that the selling of 
these lots be a profitable venture and it 
has placed their sale in the hands of li­
censed real estate brokers.
Lakesites submitted its subdivision plan 
to the Raymond Planning Board which, 
after some changes had been made, ap­
proved it as satisfying the only subdivision 
requirement then existing in the town ordi­
nance—that of lot size. The subdivision 
plan was then recorded in the Cumberland 
County Registry of Deeds.
There was in effect at this time the Site 
Location Law the constitutionality of 
which is under attack. This law required 
persons intending to construct or operate a 
development which may substantially affect 
local environment to notify, before com­
mencing the construction or operation, the 
Environmental Improvement Commission 
of their intent and the nature and location 
of the development. If the Commission 
determines it to be necessary, a hearing 
shall be held at which the developer has 
the burden of satisfying the Commission 
that the development will not substantially 
adversely affect the environment or pose a 
threat to the public’s health, safety or gen­
eral welfare. 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 483, 484.
I. The testimony and map indicate a frontage on the Pond much in excess of this figure. 
VeAeo. 3C0-3C7 A.23— 2
MSC -  3
740 Mo. 300 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES
The Legislature defir.vii developments 
which may substantially a ; fee: environ­
ment as meaning
. . [I] any commercial or in­
dustrial development which requires a li­
cense from the Environmental Improve­
ment Commission. [2] or which occupies 
a land area in excess of 2n acres, [3] or 
which contemplates drilling for or exca­
vating natural resources, excluding bor­
row pits for sand, fill or gravel, regulat­
ed by the State Highway Commission 
and pits of less than 5 acres, [4] or 
which occupies on a single parcel a 
structure or structures in excess of a 
ground area of 60,000 square feet.” 38 
M.R.S.A. § 482(2).
Although Lake-sites’ development did oc­
cupy a land area in excess cf 20 acres, it 
did not notify the Commission of its inten­
tions. However, the Commission eventual­
ly learned of Lakesites’ plans and proceeded 
at once to schedule and conduct a hearing 
as it is authorized to do by section 485. 
Notice of the hearing was given Lakesites.
2. “ 1. Lakesites. Inc. is the owner of a
lot or parcel of land locate! in Ray­
mond. Maine, on or near Raymond 
Pond, exceeding 2<> acres in size, to wit,
02 acres more or 1-ss.
2. Lakesites. Inc. has divided said 92 
acres more or less, into approximately 
90 lots ranging in size from 20,'r.K) to 
.43,OOO square feet.
3. Lakesites. Inc. has sold, is s-lling 
or is planning to s*-:l <.r otherwise trans­
fer interests in and to said lots to pur­
chasers as a commercial venture, such 
lots to be used for year round or sea­
sonal residential and/or recreational 
purposes.
4. Lakesites, Inc. has been and is op­
erating a commercial development with­
in the meaning of Title 3S M.R.S.A. $ 
482(2).
5. I>akesitcs. Inc. has mad* no ap­
plication to nor submitted any i-vid-nce 
at the hearing held by the K .I/'. for 
approval pursuant to the Site Location 
of Development Law. although it was 
given ample opportunity to do so.
<*. The record indicated that m.cr of 
the soil in the area tx-ing develop,-.i by 
Lake-sites, Inc. is of a steep slop.' and 
lias a high seasonable water tab!*-.'
Lakesites was represented at the hearing 
by its attorney who challenged the Com­
mission’s jurisdiction to regulate Lakesites' 
activity contending that the mere subdivi­
sion of land does not constitute a “com­
mercial or industrial development” within 
the scope of the Site Location Law. The 
attorney made a formal objection to all 
testimony other than that relating to juris­
diction. He elected to waive his right to 
contest as to the merits of the case al­
though he was offered full opportunity to 
do so, choosing not to offer evidence or to 
cross-examine witnesses who testified re­
garding the proposed development.
These witnesses testified at length as to 
various aspects of the environment which 
they said would be substantially adversely 
affected by the proposed development. 
Later, after consideration of the matter, 
the Commission made findings of fact2 
and held that Lakesites had failed in its 
burden to prove that its proposed develop­
ment meets the standards for approval es­
tablished by the Legislature in section 484 3 45
7. The record indicated that most of 
the soil in the area is unsuitable for 
septic tank disposal of domestic sewage.
S. The development has been subdi­
vided in such a fashion so that it will 
support housing for 90 families, all of 
whom must dispose of domestic sewage 
in some manner.
9. Since the developer. Lakesites, 
Inc., has not indicated that it has made 
any provision for collection, treatment or 
disposal of such sewage, and no munici­
pal treatment and disposal system exists 
in the vicinity of the development, the 
only alternative is underground disposal 
of such sewage by means of a septic 
tank or related system.
10. The installation of up to 90 
spetic tank disposal systems in and upon 
the said development could degrade the 
quality of ground water in and around 
the said development, such ground water 
possibly being used for a drinking water 
supply, and degrade the waters of Ray­
mond Pond.”
3. ‘ The commission shall approve a de­
velopment proposal whenever it finds 
th a t:
1. Financial capacity. The proposed 
development has the financial capacity
MSC ~ 3
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and had failed to d- 
plans that would adequately 
public’s health, safety and general welfare. 
It issued an order denying Lakesites the 
right to proceed with its development until 
such time as it has made a proper applica­
tion to the Environmental Improvement 
Commission and has received the Commis­
sion’s approval.
From this decision of the Commission, 
Lakesites has appealed to the Supreme Ju­
dicial Court sitting as the Law Court, [38 
Yf.R.S.A. § 487] raising specifically the is­
sue as to whether the offering for sale of 
subdivided lots of the type owned by Lake- 
sites is either a commercial or an industrial 
development4 subject to the provisions of 
38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488 and. secondarily, if 
the Site Location Law is applied to this 
developer, are there constitutional viola­
tions of Equal Protection and Due Process.
T h e intent o f  the L e jid a io .r e .
As to the first ’S'-ue, u e s< ck the  Leg
lature’s intent.
and technical ability to meet state air
and water pol lotion control s r indards.
has made nd- •ante p-•■ "vision fo>- solid
waste disposal , r 11 r- ci iritrol of of fimsi vc
odors, and th •• sei-ii!r:r;;' and mainte-
naive of suffii •i • nt anid hea’ idsi'n- water
supplies.
2. Traffic movement. The proposed
development li as mad- rMlapia IC prove
si on for load: ;i;t. p.i!rkin^ a Pii] traffic
movement froiu tie- ’••vdIojmd •'■ it area
onto public ro;ids.
3. So  advert;:e effe,- r on P.:. • aral cn-
vironrnent. T he proposed (!•••. •■'ojiiii--ar
has made adeij into provision f<>r fitting
itself hormonion sly into the exist51,','
natural environ merit and will not ad-
vcr.--ely affect exi.stit:v FsuS, i: ie char-
actor, natii:-.'.1 rest; \ 1•'v.s or proporty
values iii the municii-Pity or ia adjoin-ing lranicipakt ies.
-1. Soil type-V. Tim proposed deV.dop­
men t a 111 h- imilt on soil ry; es which
are suitable to rlie nature of d m under-
taking.”
The n ppelh'e no•k‘*s no claim X -r Lnlo-
sites’ projvt i~ an imim ; rial d- -lopnienr.
"See. 4 si. Fin ■ iin^s a nd purpo »•
‘'Legislative intent is the fur.dam-r.ta! 
rule in the construction or :r.tcrprvtat:on 
of statutes. . . . Such a construc­
tion ought to he put upon a statute as 
ma\ best answer the intention which the 
Legislators had in view, and when deter­
minable and ascertained, the courts must 
give effect to it. . . King Re­
sources Co. v. Environmental Improve­
ment Commission, Me., 270 A.2d 863, 869 
(1970).
In 197(.i the 104thLegislature, r.evting in
special session, enacted several pieces oi
legislation directed tovvard recucir.y the de-
struction of our natttral environrr.cm. One
of the pieces of legislation introtruccd v. ?.s
L.D. 1834 entitled ’‘AX ACT to Regu. j.vr
Site Location of Development 5u::• start: : : . 1 :y
Affecting Environrr.er.t” with -ivhich v. e
are row concerned. After am.::timer: it
was enacted as P.L,.1969. ch. 57! S 9, £ — tl * . V.i
became 38 M.R.S.A.§§ 481-4S8.
The Legislature’s concise sta::en:en: of
its Findings and Puirposc 5 makes clear to
u- th basis for it-• conclusion that d.ve
action was essentialt*> :whiirc tp.ci*; cvmrr :r-
The Legislature fin.-Is th.-.t rl.e '•'ir.OIiML*arid social wellbeing of tlm «-irtr-:*-r.s -I rtmState of Maine <!•-j- nd upon the —-trionof commercial and industrial d-w-d-with respect to tieof tlie State; rh-tt many dev-’- :-ms
hrrrui i ' >)f their s i:<■ and :>•!*>, n- --apa-li’- of causing irrej.arabR daman-people and the uivironrnent in 11-:r > -r-roundings: that the location of A  •>-vclopne-nts is too ini •joT*r:i n r r» ]>* 1•: * o i\ ivto the determination of the ow < ofsc.r-Ji dm -iopinents ; and th a r ’!s-r-rior.must vested in srcr»* ;;ur'i«*nry r.-cu-late rim h-cation of dcvelor-ra-r." ■• wI.• v substantial’;. aff-T -m:-u.m-m.Tim purpose of tic's sui--!:.apvr isp-ovi-le a flexible and p a I  rn-a.ns rywhich th- State, a-■tine r 11r- - ’ R L •v irorum-ntal Improv -tit .>sn*:i. inconsultation with a•■nrepr. »: ■-
1st- r• . i; ,k. - ■ fSratc p- control ri.-]• M .• r? 1 of --v> I-P',-'r'i -■ snh'fanirially at’:- -it-euvin-nna-nt in orb•r to in- *'•r v.;shd.-vl-i-i iT: .’its will !c it. a am:--win- will iiavc a n • :on rim natural iniin»nr:.-r." **f •irroundings.’ (E:up!nvds add—]. <
emonstrate that ic had 
protect the
Legislative intent is 
key in interpreting 
law.
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rial and industrial developments which be­
cau se  o f th eir n ature or their sice , will im­
pose unusually heavy demands v.por. the 
natural environment, shall not be located in 
areas where the environment does not have 
the capacity to withstand the impact of the 
development. But did the Legislature in­
tend to bring re siden tia l developments 
within the application of the law? If so, 
did it intend to include mere subdivisions?
[1] In seeking the legislative intent we 
turn first to the language which the law­
makers chose to use to carry out their pur­
pose.
In reference to real estate, a "develop­
ment” may be defined as "a developed 
tract of land” and "to develop” as ' .o con­
vert (as raw land) into an area suitable 
for residential or business purposes” 
''to alter raw land (into an area 
suitable for building)”. Webster’s Third 
Xew International Dictionary, 1967.
When we analyze the legislative defini­
tion of developments which may substan­
tially affect environment we find that the 
Legislature saw fit to concern itself with 
two kinds of developments— 1) those the 
operating procedures of which include the 
consumption of the natural resources them­
selves or w:hich have a propensity to dis­
charge, in the course of their processes, 
wastes and residues which lower the quali­
ty of surrounding air, soil or wrater and 2) 
those which are not inherently ecologically 
destructive but which because of their s ic e  
are likely to impose great demands upon 
the environment.
The Legislature’s concern for the first 
class is obvious. The operation of many 
industrial and some commercial develop­
ments—whether large or small—are likely 
to be direct assaults upon the environment 
itself. The ecological danger from the 
members of the second group, unlike the 
first, comes not principally from the type 
of activity to be performed on the property 
after it is developed butt rather from the 
size and concentration of such develop­
ments. The Legislature’s concern was that
larf/c developments, apart from the type of 
activity located thereon, have an inherent 
potential for over-taxing the involved land, 
air and water upon which the public de­
pends to sustain an acceptable quality of 
human living.
But the Legislature chose to apply the 
Act only to large developments which are 
industrial or commercial. The word ‘'com­
mercial” broadly means “from the point of 
view of profit” . . . "having profit
as the primary aim”. Webster’s Third 
Xew International Dictionary, 1967.
[2] We think that the use of the word 
“commercial” was intended to describe the 
m otivation for the development and not the 
type of activity to be performed on the 
property after it is developed. We consid­
er that the Legislature chose to distinguish 
between commercial and non-commercial 
developments for a sound reason— it doubt­
less concluded that a greater need for su­
pervision exists in the case of a commer­
cially motivated development where the 
dominant factor is the hope for profit than 
in a non-commercial development where 
land is being prepared for public enjoy­
ment or divided for family distribution or 
for some other purpose than profit. In 
other words, commercial residential devel­
opments have a propensity for being big, 
concentrated and exhausting to the re­
sources of the environment.
[3] It seems to us that the business of 
subdividing large tracts of land and selling 
the lots must be considered a Commercial 
venture. The Legislature doubtless so 
viewed it. Certainly, this construction best 
accords with the purpose of the statute. 
Strout v. Burgess, 144 Me. 263, 275, 68 A. 
2d 241, 250 (1949).
This interpretation finds support in the 
history of the legislation we are examining.
This legislation was originally proposed 
to the 104th Legislature in the form of L. 
D. 1782 which stated that its purpose was 
to enable the State to guide and control the 
location of com m ercial d eve lopm en ts which
Residential Develop­
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substantially affect local environment. 
Such developments were described as in­
cluding "any recreational, commercial, edu­
cational. industrial or residential develop­
ment which by reason of its size, purpose, 
manufacturing process or use or handling 
of natural resources or products may tend 
to harm or adversely affect the natural en­
vironment of a locality to a substantial de­
gree.”
The Joint Select Legislative Committee 
on Natural Resources reported the bill 
back in a new draft, as L.D. 1834 and that 
it “Ought to pass”. The new draft stated 
that its purpose was to enable the State to 
guide and control the location of commer­
cial an d  in d u str ia l developments substan­
tially affecting local environment. Such 
developments were characterized simply as 
commercial and industrial—the L.D. 1782 
"recreational”, “educational” and “residen­
tial” development language being dropped. 
The new draft as reported back also would 
have excluded from the operation of the 
Act developments intending “to locate in 
the appropriate zoned area of any munici­
pality which had adopted a municipal plan 
and zoning and sub-division ordinances 
based thereon.”
The Legislature eliminated the latter 
provision 6 thus rejecting the concept that 
local zoning is -'apable of protecting the 
public from ecological harm. The new 
draft, as amended, was then enacted and 
was the law existing at the time of the 
present problem here under consideration.'
In the 105th Legislature, two attempts 
were made to remove certa in classifica­
tions of residential developments from the 
operation of the Act passed by the pre­
vious Legislature.
L.D. 963 was introduced in the 105th 
Legislature. Jts sole purpose was to ex­
clude by amendment “permanent year- 
round housing” occupying less than 40 
acres from the operation of the Site Loca­
tion Law. L.D. 963 was defeated.
L House Amendment "A ” (II-G91).
At the same session L.D. 1061 was intro­
duced. Its sole purpose was to exclude 
from “commercial developments” all resi­
dential developments in municipalities 
which have planning b o a rd s. The State­
ment of Fact accompanying L.D. 1061 ex­
plained the purpose of the Bill as follows:
“The Environmental Improvement 
Commission has asserted authority under 
the site location law passed at the Spe­
cial Session over residential develop­
ments, even though the statute is limited 
to ‘commercial and industrial develop­
ments.’ This bill would clarify that this 
is not the intent of the law.”
This clear attempt in L.D. 1061 to re­
move some residential developments from 
the Site Location Law was also defeated.
In considering both L.D. 963 and L.D. 
1061 the Legislature had its attention spe­
cifically directed to the inclusion of resi­
dential developments. It is significant 
that, even if enacted, neither of them 
would have removed a ll residential devel­
opments from the operation of the law. 
The Legislature, with its attention specifi­
cally directed to the fact that the Commis­
sion was then construing the Act to give it 
authority over residential developments of 
over 20 acres, still refused two opportuni­
ties even to limit the Commission’s power 
to exercise this authority.
[4] It is a well accepted principle of 
statutory construction that when an admin­
istrative body has carried out a reasonable 
and practical interpretation of a statute 
and this has been called to the attention of 
the Legislature, the Legislature’s failure to 
act to change the interpretation is evidence 
that the Legislature has acquiesced in the 
interpretation. Androscoggin Savings 
Bank v. Campbell, Me., 2S2 A.2d 858 
(1971); Burrough of Matawan v. Mon­
mouth County Board of Taxation, 51 X.J. 
291, 240 A.2d S, 13 (l96Sj; 2 Sutherland, 
J. G., Statutes and Statutory Construction, 
(3rd Ed.) Frank E. Horack, Jr., § 5109.
7. P.L.19G9, - h. 571. § 2.
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The 105th Legislature also had before it 
L.D. 1257, L.D. 710 and L.D. 1790 (a new 
draft of L.D. 71d>. The significance of its 
action on those measures is obscure.
L.D. 1257 concerned itself in part with 
proposing some nine changes to the Site 
Location Law. One such change defined a 
“development which may substantially af­
fect environment" as one specifically in­
cluding municipal, educational, commercial 
or industrial developments “including real 
estate subdivisions”. The Committee on 
Natural Resources reported L.D. 1257 in a 
new draft under the same title which no 
longer made reference to the Site Location 
Law, and it thus becomes irrelevant to the 
present discussion.
L.D. 710 proposed some eleven changes 
to the Site Location Law, one of which 
was to alter the definition of “development 
which may substantially affect environ­
ment” to specifically include “any state, 
municipal, quasi-murrcipal, educational, 
commercial or industrial development, in­
cluding subdivisions”. L.D. 710 defined a 
"subdivision” as meaning a division of an 
existing parcel of land into three or more 
parcels within any 5-year period. The 
Committee on Natural Resources reported 
L.D. 710 in a new draft, L.D. 1790, under 
the same title, which contained some ten 
changes to the Site Location Law. Among 
others, it would have amended the defini­
tion of developments which may substan­
tially affect environment to read “any 
state, municipal, quasi-municipal, educa­
tional, charitable, commercial or industrial 
development, including subdivisions, but 
excluding public ways.” L.D. 1790 then 
defined a "subdivision" as meaning the di­
vision of a parcel of land into two or more 
parcels within a 5-year period. The State­
ment of Fact accompanying the new draft 
included this explanation of purpose: “(6)
8. During legislative debate on L.D. 1790 
in the House of Kepres-r.Tat ives, Repre­
sentative Marion Fuller Brown informed 
the House that residential subdivisions 
had already been a major consideration in 
the administration of the Site Location 
Law. She said that in its administration
to make it clear that subdivisions are cov­
ered by the Site Law and to define 'subdi­
visions’.” L.D. 1790 was defeated.
While the earlier actions of the Legisla­
ture in defeating the two attempts to ex­
clude some residential developments from 
the Site Location I.aw appears to indicate 
clear-cut approval of the Commission’s in­
terpretation of the Act as including such 
developments—that is, L.D. 963 and L.D. 
1061—the defeat of L.D. 1790 contributes 
little if anything to our understanding of 
legislative intent.
L.D. 963 and L.D. 1061 were specific 
attempts to remove so m e residential devel­
opments from the operation of the Act— 
tacitly recognizing the Commission’s au­
thority over residential developments—and 
both failed. L.D. 1790, on the other hand, 
not only would have made it "clear that 
subdivisions are covered” but would have 
given the word subdivisions a drastically 
wide meaning and would have worked sev­
eral other important changes in the Site 
Location Law.8
We simply cannot say what one or more 
of these proposed changes or additions may 
have motivated the Legislature to reject 
L.D. 1790.
The Legislature met in special session in 
1972 and considered L.D. 2045 which 
would amend the Site Location Law in 
several respects. One of these proposed 
changes added in section 4S2.2) after 
"commercial or industrial developments”, 
the words “including subdivisions”. The 
amendment’s statement of purposes includ­
ed “(2) to make it clear that subdivisions 
are within the coverage of the law 
. ”, The attention of the Legisla­
ture was again specifically directed to the 
fact that the Commission was interpreting 
the Act to include residential developments
of the .Site Location Law to that dan-, 
the Environmental Improvement Commis­
sion had processed 102 applications for 
approval and C>lr/ c of these bad involve.? 
subdivisions. Legislative Re>-ord—House. 
June 21. 1971. at 4397.
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(Statement of fact accompanying 
Amendment “A” to L.H. 2045) and that 
this present appeal from the Commission’s 
order, involving a determination of legisla­
tive intent, was then pending in court (Re­
marks of Representative Owen L. Han­
cock, Legislative Record-House, 105th Leg­
islature, 1st Special Session, 1972 at 799). 
The House was informed by Representa­
tive Louis J. Marstaller that the purpose of 
the bill was to make it clear that residen­
tial subdivisions arc within the application 
of the Site Location Law (Legislative 
Record-House, 105th Legislature, 1st Spe­
cial Session, 1972, at 798). Representative 
Earl H. Smith told the House in debate 
that 85% of the applications acted upon by 
the Commission in the past two years had 
been residential subdivisions (Legislative 
Record-House, 105th Legislature, 1st Spe­
cial Session, 1972, at 8 8 6;.
With this information before it, the Leg­
islature enacted the amendment.9
Wc find it significant in our assessment 
of legislative intent that the 105th Legisla­
ture, aware that the Commission was inter­
preting the Act to include residential sub­
divisions, took no affirmative action to in­
dicate a contrary intent, rejected two at­
tempts to remove som e residential subdivi­
sions from the operation of the Act and fi­
nally acted to add the specific words ‘"in­
cluding subd i v i s i m .7 ’.
In our opinion the 104th Legislature in­
tended to include commercial residential 
developments among those developments 
which may substantially affect environ­
ment. But did the Legislature intend the 
Act to affect commercial residential devel­
opments where the developer merely plots 
the tract, subdivides it into lots by plan 
and offers the lots for sale to the public?
We consider that this : . \ * s the Legisla­
ture’s intention. The basic theory of the 
Act, as disclosed by the Legislature's 
Statement of Purpose, i.- to insure that 
“such developments ivill he lo ca ted in a
9. It beeam-i P.L. 1971, 8;.e
300 A 2d— 47V’
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manner which will have a minima! adverse- 
impact on the natural environment of their 
surroundings”. (Emphasis supplied.) The 
Legislature found “that the location o' 
such developments is too important to be 
left only to the determination of the own­
ers of such developments”.
Seoi’ion 483 requires a notification to the 
Commission by any person intending to 
construct or operate such a development 
before commencing constriction or opera­
tion. The Commission is then empowered 
to ap p rov e  the location or schedule a hear­
ing thereon.
[5] The language of the Act ar.d its 
clear underlying purpose reflect the Legis­
lature’s intention that a development with 
a particu’ar propensity to damage the envi­
ronment should' not be located in areas 
where the environment is particularly inca­
pable of sustaining the impact without pub­
lic injury.
The Appellant argues to us that it was 
the. Legislature’s intention to prevent acts 
being done to the land which would harm, 
the land and that, therefore, the law is di­
rected to the person who will do the act— 
such as the builder— and not to the person 
who merely subdivides and sells the land. 
With this we cannot agree. The Legisla­
ture intended the Commission to scrutinize 
the proposals b efo re the harmful act could 
be done. The Act is a preventive measure 
and the injury sought to he avoided can 
Wm 1 • prevented as soon as plans for de­
velopment reveal the harm which will oc­
cur upon its completion. We would hardly 
expect that the Legislature intended to 
pO'tp me the determination of suitability of 
an area for a residential development until 
the lets had been sold to purchasers who 
w:;l, upon starting construction, discover 
that they are participants in— as well as 
victims of—a local environmental disaster.
Furthermore, if a subdivider has sold the 
lots to numerous individual purchasers 
each of whom, among other things, is to
Session 19711, eh. (11.4 § 2.
House
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construct his own budding, article his own 
land, build his own driveway to the street, 
ami provide for his own sanitary sewage 
disposal, there would be no one “intending 
to construct or operate a development” 
who could be held responsible under the 
statute. We do not ascribe to the Legisla­
ture an intention that legislation so impor­
tant to the public welfare would suffer 
from such inherent futility.
[6] We consider that both the legisla­
tive intent and the statutory language of 
the Act encompass residential developments 
in which the developer merely subdivides 
the land into lots and offers the lots for 
sale without any intention to construct 
buildings or to provide additions’ improve­
ments or services on the lots. We do not 
find that the Act as so interpreted and ap­
plied is constitutionally impermissible. 
The subdividing is the initial step in such a 
development.
The Commission correctly ruled as fact 
that this particular residential development 
is a commercial development which may 
substantially affect environment requiring 
compliance with the provisions of the Site 
Location Law.
C on stitu tion ality  o f  the S t a t e ’s  e x e rc ise  o f  
its  police pow er under th is / le t .
In enacting the Site Location Law-, the 
104th Legislature presented the State wdth 
a means of minimizing, through the exer­
cise of its police power, the irreparable 
damage being done to the environment. 
But the mere urgency of the action taken 
cannot override the necessity that the de­
vice which the Legislature has chosen for 
the public protection is one which is consti­
tutionally permitted. It is Lakesites’ con­
tention that the Legislature has not chosen 
such a device here.
[7, 8] In our consideration of the valid­
ity of the Legislature’s choice of legislation 
to accomplish its purpose we have in mind 
that all Acts of the Legislature are pre­
sumed to be constitutional, that this is a
presumption of great strength and that the 
burden is on him who claims that the Act 
is unconstitutional to show its unconstitu­
tionality. State v. Fantastic Fair, 158 Me. 
450, 1S6 A.2d 352 (1961).
[9, 1 0] The State is permitted, of 
course, to exercise the police power for the 
protection of the public welfare, safety, or­
der, morals and health. Prudential Insur­
ance Company of America v. Insurance 
Commissioner, Me., 293 A.2d 529 (1972); 
York Harbor Village Corporation v. Libby, 
126 Me. 537, 140 A. 3S2 (1928). It seems 
self-evident in these times of increased 
awareness of the relationship of the envi­
ronment to human health and welfare that 
the state may act— if it acts properly—to 
conserve the quality of air, soil and water.
[1 1] To do so the State may justifiably 
limit the use wrhich some owners may make 
of their property. Our law has long rec­
ognized that a landowner holds his proper­
ty subject to the limitation that he may not 
use it to the serious disadvantage of the 
public.
As early as 1835 the legislative body of 
the City of Bangor determined that the 
public safety demanded that wooden build­
ings should not he built in certain sections 
of the City and enacted an ordinance for­
bidding owners of land in these areas from 
erecting wooden buildings on their proper­
ty. This Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the ordinance saying:
‘'Police regulations may forbid such a 
use, and such modifications, of private 
property, as wrould prove injurious to the 
citizens generally. This is one of the 
benefits which men derive from associat­
ing in communities. It may sometimes 
occasion an inconvenience to an individ­
ual; but he has a compensation, in par­
ticipating in the general advantage. 
Laws of this character are unquestiona­
bly within the scope of the legislative- 
power, without impairing any constitu­
tional provision. It does not appropriate 
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merely regulates its enjoyment. 
. . . ” Wadleigh v. Gilman, .12 Me. 
403, 405 (1835).
In 1907 the very philosophy contained in 
the statement of purpose of the present 
Act was expressed hy the Justices of thD 
Court in an Opinion in which they re­
sponded to a question from the Maine Sen­
ate. The Senate inquired whether
“In order to promote the common wel­
fare of the people of Maine by prevent­
ing or diminishing injurious droughts 
and freshets, and by protecting, preserv­
ing, and maintaining the natural water 
supply of the springs, streams, ponds, 
and lakes and of the land, and by pre­
venting or diminishing injurious erosion 
of the land and the filling up of the riv­
ers, puiids, and lakes, . . . ” Ques­
tions and Answers, 103 Me. 506, 507, 69 
A. 627 (1907).
the Legislature had power under the Con­
stitution tc pass legislation which would 
prohibit the owners of wildland from un­
necessary cutting or destruction of small 
liees “to preserve or enhance the valu<‘ of 
such lands and trees thereon and protect 
and promote the interests of such owners 
and the common welfare of the people". 
While the Opinion of the Justices is not 
precedent, we find that the reasoning 
which led to their conclusions is most im­
pressive. The Justutes found that the pro­
posed legislation would not offend the con­
stitutionally guaranteed right of “acquir­
ing, possessing and defending property” or 
the provision that private property shall 
not be taken for public uses without just 
compensation. Constitution of Maine, Art. 
1, §§ 1, 21. Six of the Justices answered.10 
quoting with approval the language of 
Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. 
Alger, 7 Cush. 53 (1851) :
"‘We think it a settled principle, 
growing out of the nature of well-ordered 
civil society, that every holder of proper-
10. The to .-luwcr.
that a "solenm occasion" ! not (■> :.«t 
inasmuch as the Legislature ha 1 a 5-
M,. 7J7
ty, however absolute and unqualified 
may he his title, holds it under the im­
plied liability that his use of it may be so 
regulated that it shall not be injurious to 
the equal enjoyment of others having an 
equal right to the enjoyment of their 
property, nor injurious to the rights of 
the community. All property in this 
commonwealth, as well that in the interi­
or as that bordering on tide waters, is 
derived directly or indirectly from the 
government and held subject to those 
general regulations w'hich are necessary 
for the common good and general wel­
fare. Rights of property like all other 
social and conventional rights, are sub­
ject to such reasonable limitations in 
their enjoyment as shall prevent them 
from being injurious, and to such rea­
sonable restraints and regulations estab­
lished by law as the Legislature, under 
the go\e ruing- and controlling power 
vested in them by the Constitution, may 
think necessary and expedient.
. Questions and Answers, su­
pra. 103 Me. at 510, 69 A. at 624-629.
The Maine Justices also quoted and re­
nal . on the language of the Maryland 
fourt in Windsor v. State, 103 Md. 611. C-
\.2S- 1' - j; :
'■'Property of every kind is held sub­
ject to those regulations which are nec­
essary for the common good and general 
•welfare. And the Legislature h .s the 
power to define the mode and manner in 
which one may use his property/" 
•/notions and Answers, supra, 1-3 Me. 
at 513, 69 A. at 630.
The Tustices said :
i hce are two reasons of gre;.
we -ght for applying this strict construe
tior. of the constitutional provision t
Pr'V ••rty in iand: 1st, such property i
he result of productive labor, but 1
vi - July from the State itsGf. th
.MMn.al owner; o rii
before the question could he
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being incapable of ineivaM-. itthe own-
ers of large tracts can waste them at
will without State restriction. the State
and its people may be helplessly•mp :ver-
ished and one great purpose c: govern-
ment defeated.” Questions and An-
swers, supra, 103 Me. at 511.60 A. at
629.
In York Harbor Village Corp:>rat:on v.
Libby, supra, this Court upheld the consti­
tutionality of the statute which authorized 
village corporations to enact zoning ordi­
nances and of the ordinance enacted under 
it. The Court followed the same reasoning 
as to the susceptibility of private property 
to restrictions upon its use necessitated by 
the public interest, saying:
"It is said that police power has not 
been, and perhaps cannot be. defined 
with precision. .
It is not the offspring of constitutions. 
It is older than any written ccr.stitution. 
It is the power which the states have not 
surrendered to the nation, and which by 
the Tenth Amendment were expressly 
reserved ‘to the states, respectively, or to 
the people.’
Limitations expressed or necessarily 
implied in the Federal Constitution are 
the frontiers which the police power can­
not pass. Within those frontiers its au­
thority is recognized and respected by 
the Constitution and given effect by all 
courts.
We have seen that private zroperty is
held subject to the implied cor.tition that
it shall not be used for any pi:rpose that
injures or impairs the pub!;;c health,
morals, safety, order, or welfare. Under
the police power, statutes and :iuthorized
ordinances give this condition practical
effect by restrictions which gulate or
prohibit such uses.
1 f the use is actually and su stantially
an injury or impairment of :hcpublic in-
terest in any of its aspects a''ove enu-
merated, a regulating or re<tra:ring stat-
ute or ordinance conforming *.hereto, if
itself reasonable and not merely arbi­
trary, and not violative of any constitu­
tional limitation, is valid. It is not a 
deprivation of property which the Con­
stitution forbids, but an enforcement of 
a condition subject to which property is 
held.” York Harbor Village Corpora­
tion v. Libby, supra, 126 Me. at 54 0. 541, 
140 A. at 385, 386.
[12,13] We consider it indisputable 
that the limitation of use of property for 
the purpose of preserving from unreasona­
ble destruction the quality of air, soil and 
water for the protection of the public 
health and welfare is within the police 
power.
C o n stitu tion ality  o f  app lication  o f  the .-let 
to one 7oho only su b d iv ides.
Lakesites does not deny the power of the 
State to act properly under the police pow­
er to protect the environment but urges us 
that the application of the Act to one who 
merely subdivides is constitutionally forbid­
den. It argues that a remedial Act must 
he designed and applied rationally and rea­
sonably to achieve the purposes for which 
the Act was devised. The evil to be avoid­
ed, the appellant contends, is the damaging 
impact of the development upon the envi­
ronment and the impact occurs and the 
damage is sustained only with the con­
struction and occupation of the premises— 
not when the land is only subdivided on 
plans and the lots are sold. L’ntil such ac­
tivity creating the impact occurs on the 
land, the Appellant argues, there is no bur­
den or impact which can affect the envi­
ronment and so the application of the Act 
to a mere subdivider as a prerequisite to 
his selling his land is not directly related 
to the Act’s purpose.
[14] It is true that the Act and its ap­
plication under the police power must have 
a clear, real and substantial relation to the 
purpose of the Act..
"'In order that a statute may be sus­
tained as an exercise of the police pow­
er, the courts must be able to see that
Basis for Police
power regulation.
The Act and its 
application must 
have a connection 
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the enactment has for its object the pre­
vention of some offense or'manifest evil 
<>r the preservation of the public health.
ty. morals. or general welfare, that 
there is seme clear, real, and substantial 
connection between the assumed purpose 
of the enactment and the actual provi­
sions thereof, and that the latter do in 
some plain, appreciable, and appropriate 
manner tend toward the accomplishment 
of the object for which the power is ex­
ercised.' " State v. Union Oil Co. of 
Maine, 151 Me. 43S, 447, 120 A.2d 70S, 
712 <19561, quoting from 16 C.J.S. Con- 
st'tutional Law § 195, at 940.
the record indicates that the Act as applied 
constitutes such an unreasonable burden 
upon the property as would equal an un­
compensated taking. State v. Johnson, 
Me., 265 A.2d 711 (1970): 16 Am.Jur.2d, 
Constitutional Law, § 294. In fact, the 
record demonstrates only that the Appel­
lant's land cannot be sold for residential 
purposes while subdivided to the extent 
and in the manner Lakesites originally 
planned.
I s  the A ct u n con stitu tion ally  v ag u e  an d  im ­
p ossib le  o f  co m p lian ce?
f 151 In our opinion such a connection 
' -tween the purpose of the Act and its ap­
plication to the subdivider is clear and rea­
sonable. We have concluded earlier in this 
opinion that the Legislature intended to 
empower the Commission to prevent eco­
logical damage before it occurs rather than 
permit the occurrence of harm which 
can then be cured only at great public ex­
pense—if a: all. It is not unreasonable to 
place upon the subdivider who plans the 
number, size and location of the lots to be 
■tiered for -unle the responsibility for 
avoiding an inevitable large scale ecologi- 
c.-.l calamity. The subdividing for sale is 
the fmst step in a commercial residential 
development and the Legislature rcasona- 
!y concluded that the public welfare re­
quires that control be exercised through 
the subdivider rather than attempting it 
through Cn this case) 90 different pur­
chasers whose properties can perhaps nev­
er at that later point—because of sheer 
weight and concentration of numbers— 
avoid environmental misadventure.
■ does the A ct tak e  L a k e s ite s  lan d  zoithout 
» ‘.p en sc :i- :n ?
[16] We see no merit to the Lakesites’ 
contention that the application of the Act 
:s an unconstitutional taking of its 
and without compensation.11 Nothing in I.
[17] The Appellant also argues that its 
land is being taken from it impermissibly 
because the criteria which the Act requires 
the landowner to meet is unconstitutionally 
vague and impossible of compliance.
Section 484 requires the Commission to 
approve a development proposal whenever 
it finds that:
“1. Financial capacity. The proposed 
development has the financial capacity 
and technical ability to meet state air 
and water pollution control standards, 
has made adequate provision for solid 
waste disposal, the control of offensive 
odors, and the securing and maintenance 
of sufficient and healthful water sup­
plies.
2. Traffic movement. The proposed 
development has made adequate provi­
sion for loading, parking and traffic 
movement from the development area 
onto public roads.
3. No adverse affect on natural envi­
ronment. The proposed development has 
made adequate provision for fitting itself 
harmoniously into the existing natural 
environment and will not adversely af­
fect existing uses, scenic character, natu­
ral resources or property values in the 
municipality or in adjoining municipali­
ties.
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4. Soil tvpes. The proposed develop­
ment will be* built on soil types which 
are suitable to the nature of the under­
taking."
Lakesites protests that as it is only a 
subdivider it cannot accurately foresee the 
activity to be performed on the lots it sells 
and so cannot control the future adequacy 
of provisions relating to pollution control 
and maintenance of healthful water sup­
plies. To be sure, the Act imposes upon 
the developer—including the mere subdivi­
der— responsibilities which he has not had 
in the past. The Legislature has deter­
mined that an owner of a large tract of 
undeveloped land may no longer subdivide 
it, sell the lots and then walk away from 
the transaction indifferent to the local ca­
tastrophe that may result when construc­
tion and occupancy reveal the incapacity of 
the environment to withstand the impact of 
the development. It may be that this re­
sponsibility can more easily be met by a 
subdivider who is also a. constructor of the 
buildings but it is equally the responsibility 
of the subdivider who chooses only to sell 
the bare lots. The duty is no doubt more 
burdensome as the land is less suitable and 
it may be impossible of compliance if the 
environment is of a type incapable of sus­
taining the proposed development. In the 
latter situation the public welfare demands 
that the land be used for another purpose 
or that the impact of the same use be di­
minished. In many situations the subdivi­
der may be able to meet his burden of af­
firmatively demonstrating to the Commis­
sion that he has met the criteria through 
satisfactory conditions in his instruments 
of sale. We do not consider the burden to 
be unreasonable in view of the overriding 
public interest.
The Xew Hampshire Court expressed 
the same basic philosophy when it found 
that an ordinance which required approval 
of subdivision developments conditioned 
upon the developer’s paying for street 
gradings and surfacing, curbings, side­
walks, water mains, sewers and other im­
provements d:d not impose an unreasonable
burden upon a residential developer or 
amount to a taking of his land. The Court 
adopted the language of 2 Rathkopf. The 
Law of Zoning and Planning, c’n. 71. § 9 
(1960):
“ ‘Since the subdivision of a large 
tract of land into a number of small 
building lots and the development there­
of, either for residential or industrial 
purposes increases the value of the land 
in the aggregate to the subdivider and at 
the same time imposes new burdens upon 
the municipality and, if uncontrolled, 
upon other elements in the community, 
the validity of imposing a duty upon the 
subdivider to comply with reasonable 
conditions relating to location, site plan, 
location of and width of roads and side­
walks, the installation of necessary storm, 
drains and sewers, and to restrictions or. 
lot sizes so that the subdivision will con­
form to the local requirements for the 
safety, health and general welfare of the 
subsequent owners of the individual lots 
therein and of the community has beer, 
generally recognized.’ ’ Blevens v. City 
of Manchester, 103 X.H. 284. 170 A.2d 
121, 122 (1961).
The Court added:
"The subdivision of land has a definite 
economic impact upon the municipality 
and hence the regulation of subdivision 
activities has been sustained as a means 
by which the interests of the public ami 
the general taxpayer may be safeguarded 
and protected. Since the subdivider of 
land creates the need for local improve­
ments which are of special benefit to the 
subdivision, it is considered reasonable 
that he should bear the cost rather than, 
the municipality and the general taxpay­
er. . .
[18,19] The Appellant concedes that 
the requirement that a proposed develop­
ment must not be built on soil types wh ;h 
are unsuitable to the nature of the under­
taking is a reasonable one, and we agree 
We also feel that there can be no serim.:-
Soils must be 
suitable.
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question but that the Legislature may prop­
erly demand that adequate provision will 
lie made for loading, parking and traffic 
movement and has done so clearly.
The requirement that the Commission 
must he satisfied that there will be no ad­
verse effect upon the natural environment 
is the very substance of the Legislature’s 
efforts to reduce despoilation of the envi­
ronment to a minimum. While most such 
developments may be expected to “affect” 
the environment adversely to the extent 
that they add to the demands already made 
upon it, it is the u n reason ab le effect upon 
existing uses, scenic character and natural 
resources which the Legislature seeks to 
avoid by empowering the Commission to 
measure the nature and extent of the pro­
posed use against the environment’s capaci­
ty to tolerate the use.
[2 0] Of course, the Legislature may 
not endow the Commission with a naked 
discretion and it has here established crite­
ria to guide the Commission’s exercise of 
its power.
While the Legislature has used general 
language in requiring proof that the pro­
posed development has adequate provision 
for fitting itself harmoniously into the ex­
isting natural environment, the Legislature 
has throughout the Act pointed out the 
specific respects in which the development 
must not offend the public interest and in 
which the development would he ecologi­
cally inharmonious. The Act recognizes 
the public interest in the preservation of 
the environment because of its relationship 
to the quality of human life, and in insist­
ing that the public’s existing uses of the 
environment and its enjoyment of the sce­
nic values and natural resources receive 
consideration, the Legislature used terms 
capable of being understood in the context 
of the entire bill. The Legislature has de­
clared the public interest in preserving the 
environment from anything more than
• 2. In 1972 the Legislature, in Special Ses­
sion <!uring the pendency of this appeal.
•diminaTv*! this condition as to property
, .MOO A.L'd THti
minimal destruction to be superior to the 
owner’s rights in the use of his land and 
has given the Commission adequate stand­
ards under which to carry out the legisla­
tive purpose.
[21] For reasons not known to us the 
Act recites that p rop erty  v a lu e s also must 
not be (unreasonably) affected. In our 
opinion, the effect of developments upon 
property values is outside the scope and 
purposes of the Act and the Commission 
would be impermissibly applying the force 
of the State’s police power in the enforce­
ment of this Act if it denied approval of a 
development because of failure of proof 
that property values would not be adverse­
ly affected. We consider the addition of 
this dubious criterion constitutionally 
barred and void.
[22] There appears no reason to be­
lieve that the Legislature, with its purpose 
of ecological protection appearing so clear­
ly, would have felt that the provision as to 
property values was indispensable to the 
effectiveness of the Act. We consider the 
section to be severable and that the validity 
of the remainder of the Act is unaffected.12
The invalidity of this portion of the cri­
teria has no effect upon the Commission’s 
refusal to approve of the development. 
The Commission’s findings make clear that 
the effect of Lakesites’ development upon 
property values in Raymond, if any, did 
not influence the Commission’s decision.
[23] We have frequently held that the 
standards which a statute sets out to guide 
the determinations of administrative bodies 
must be sufficiently distinct so that the 
public may know what conduct is barred 
and so that the law will be administered 
according to the legislative will. The 
standards here are much more explicit than 
those which we found to be insufficient in 
Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals, Me.. 241 A.2d 50 (1968) and those
values from the statute. P.L. 1971,
Special Session 1972. Cli. 013, § 5 .
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of which we approved in State v. Johnson, 
Me., 265 A.2d 711 (1970_>.
We find that the standards which the 
Act imposes upon the commission and the 
applicants are clear, explicit, rationally re­
lated to the purposes of the Act and are 
adequate guides for the conduct of both 
the Commission and the applicants.
D o c s the A ct deny the deve lo per equal p ro ­
tection  o f  the laze?
[24] Finally, Lakesites argues that the 
Act denies a developer—and especially it 
— equal protection under the law. It 
argues that the subdivider of over 20 acres 
must receive the Commission’s approval 
while the subdivider of under 20 acres 
faces no such requirements, and so it con­
tends it is denied equal protection because 
size, it says, has no rational or reasonable 
correlation to the environmental impact. 
A 21 acre subdivision, it argues, may con­
tain 5 residences while one of 19 acres 
may contain 19 residences. It is elementa­
ry that the Legislature may in its judgment 
create classifications so long as they are 
not arbitrary and are based upon actual 
differences in classes which differences 
bear a substantial rational relation to the 
public purpose sought to be accomplished 
by the statute. In re Milo Water Compa­
ny, 128 Me. 551. 149 A. 299 ( 1950).
[25] The purpose, as we have said, was 
to control the locations of those commer­
cial and industrial developments which 
could substantially adversely affect the en­
vironment. The Legislature evidently con­
cluded that the size of a development has a 
distinct relationship to the amount of its 
potential adverse impact upon the environ­
ment and concluded that at this time the 
public interest could best be served by 
applying the admittedly severe restrictions 
of the new law to large developments. 
The justification of the distinction as to 
size seems most clear in such legislation as 
this. For example, in an area with no mu­
nicipal sewage disposal system, such as in 
Spring Valley Development, and where
much of the soil has a high seasonal water 
table and is unsuitable for septic tank dis­
posal of domestic sewage, the potential 
danger to the environment from the dis­
charge of sewage from 90 residences must 
be greater than the discharge from 2 or 
from 19. Drawing the line at 20 acres is 
not a denial of equal protection. Ivanho-e 
Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 
275, 78 S.Ct. 1174, 2 L.Ed.2d 1313 (1958 m 
Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin. 
293 U.S. 194, 55 S.Ct. 187, 79 L.Ed. 281 
(1934).
“A state ‘may direct its law against 
what it deems the evil as it actually ex­
ists without covering the whole field of 
possible abuses, and it may do so none 
the less that the forbidden act does no: 
differ in kind from those that are al­
lowed. . . . if a class is deemed to
present a conspicuous example of wha: 
the legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th 
Amendment allows it to be dealt with al­
though otherwise and merely logically 
not distinguishable from others not em­
braced in the law’.” Hall v. Geiger- 
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 556-557, 37 S. 
Ct. 217, 223, 61 L.Ed. 480 (1917).
“When a legal distinction is deter­
mined, as no one doubts that it may be. 
between night and day, childhood and 
maturity, or any other extremes, a point 
has to be fixed or a line has to be 
drawn, or gradually picked out by suc­
cessive decisions, to mark where the 
change takes place. Looked at by itself 
without regard to the necessity behind it 
the line or point seems arbitrary. It 
might as well or nearly as well be a little 
more to one side or the other. But whet: 
it is seen that a line or point there must 
be, and that there is no mathematical or 
logical way of fixing it precisely, the de­
cision of the Legislature must be accept­
ed unless we can say that it is very wide 
of any reasonable mark.” Louisville Gas 
& Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 LbS. 32. 
41, 48 S.Ct. 423, 426, 72 L.Ed. 770, 775 
(1927).
A law does not have 
to address all ills  or 
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i
In State v. King, 135 Me. 5, 18,3 A. 775 
(1936) ue found no constitutional violation 
in the classification of carriers which de­
manded a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity or a permit to operate as a 
contract carrier of those carriers who op­
erated beyond 15 miles of the point of re­
ceipt, quoting- the language used by the 
United States Supreme Court in dcciditig'a 
similar issue:
" 'We think that the Legislature could 
properly take these distinctions into ac­
count, and that there was a reasonable 
basis for differentiation with respect to 
that class of operations. In this view, 
the question is simply whether the fixing 
of the radius at twenty-five miles is so 
entirely arbitrary as to he unconstitu­
tional. It is obvious that the Legislature 
in setting up such a zone would have to 
draw the line somewhere, and unques­
tionably it had a broad discretion as to 
where the line should be drawn.’ ” Con­
tinental Baking Company v. Woodring, 
286 L .S. 3c2. 370-371, 52 S.CtV 595, 601, 
76 L.Ed. 1155, 1166 (1931).
We see no irrational or arbitrary dis­
crimination in the application of the Act to 
the large mere-subdivider. It is his act of 
subdividing that initially indicates the vol­
ume of the impact likely to fall upon the 
environment.
The distinction made by the Legislature 
does not appear to be unreasonable.
[26] In furtherance of its claim that it 
is denied equal protection, I.akcsites con­
tends that the statute would in effect au­
thorize the Commission to create spot 
zones, administratively. The absence of a 
requirement of a comprehensive plan such 
as was demanded by the enabling statute 
which authorized municipalities to enact 
zoning ordinances,13 Lakesitcs argues, re­
sults in piecemeal zoning with arbitrary 
distinctions.
13. 30 M.R.S.A. $ 4953, repealed P.L. 1071, 
eli. 465. <5 3. The comprehensive plan is 
now requ ire by 30 M.R.S.A. § 4002.
3 CO A 2d— ’- l
While the Site Location Law hears a re­
semblance to zoning ordinances 14 in that 
both seek to restrict the use of land to 
areas appropriate for the purpose, the basic 
purposes of the two laws are distinguisha­
ble. We have said that the Legislature has 
authorized municipalities to adopt zoning 
ordinances
. . as an integral part of a
comprehensive plan for municipal devel­
opment and promotion of the health, 
safety, and general welfare of its inhabi­
tants. The geography, the economic and 
industrial development, the residential 
necessities, the nature and extent of resi­
dential, business and industrial growth of 
one municipality may be entirely differ­
ent from those in another municipality.” 
Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 16S, 
200 A.2d 543, 545-546 (1964).
The W righ t Court said also:
”Iu considering the provisions of a 
comprehensive zoning ordinance the leg­
islative body may take into consideration 
the nature and character of the commu­
nity and of its proposed zone districts, 
the nature and trend of the growth of 
the community and that of surrounding 
municipalities, the areas of undeveloped 
property and such other factors that nec­
essarily enter into a reasonable and well- 
balanced zoning ordinance.” Wright v. 
Michaud, supra, 160 Me. at 173, 200 A.2d 
at 548.
[27] The Site Location Law on the 
other hand is not directed toward pro­
moting an orderly community growth relat­
ing one area of a community to all other 
areas. It is not concerned with where a 
development takes place in general but only 
that the development takes place in a man­
ner consistent with the needs of the public 
for a healthy environment. Jt did not 
grant the Commission the authority to de­
termine where the location of a develop-
14. King R eso u n d  Cu. v. Kin iron mental 
Improvement Commission. Me., 270 A.24 
X(i3, 80S (19701.
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t ::;nR he but rather it .! \ r \he ( Mill-
,U <!■n horny ‘o tncasnre 11 k p’-opowi]•. V c >i\:t:ion mr. : v.Vi:t ,ry -t andards
c.:. 7*_ i (\ \ •. re a •r; 1 ; ■; m? ard condi-
cor.s v. hieh the : ■■P'O-a! mrv meet in or-
let that i: i'iinV •e "loc.v .i : n a manner
tin wid l avc aminimal ad versc impact
on ■ c na* c: .•: onmeru". The.re is no
Z' ■v;tutd,r.aj ticc*.•'iity ihaLt the Com mis-
A n. ;.'c rcr:t:’red r> draw a comprehensive
p i r, *■ '• a r, 2 * ■* t " rt of tin- Mte l.ocationLaw andthe I Sa:■ ir<c ha:S not COnsiden-id one to
a ;er.ral to it- purnost here. perhaps
T rycnizir. the diiTculi'v- winch ;the prep-
■■■ r; \.:o n n\ such ;t ;i..n relax1\e to •c .logical
pr.hl;ms \•. ..Id cr Th. a puli.at.un of
*C rite '.ovation Law on a case iiy case
under .;tr dance of the explicit
erhcria ofthe sta-u'.e is not in itself a de-
of eqtml prote•t on and thereic no ev-
tde:Cc IT.itt there I:a = been :p’jrh adenial toJ •i sites.
». that the appk'c.atiort ofthe Act
..Resitct no os : offer..-i the t-revisions
Cj *either t.he stateor fodcra! constifutions.
MS'1 A strong policy against piecemeal
rip' ' ilrttC 7wiew has been manifest in the
dec:Mons <>f this Court for many years.
Hand v. Xivkerscn, 14tS Me. 46 5, 467, ‘>5 A.
2d '1 v. Si 5 1953... The principle that: only
fir d judgments arc ripe for appellate re-
.'reserved in the structure of our
Marne Civil Rides and in{cr!ocrtory review 
is authorized only when ordered by a Jus- 
rive in the Superior Court in exceptional 
STi.ations.15 The definition of final judg­
ment as one which "fully decides and dis­
poses of the whole cause leaving: no fur­
ther questions for the future consideration 
and judgment of the court" Gilpatrick v.
15. M.R.C.P.. Rule 72(e).
An excellent discussion of tli<> final, 
juusrment rule is found in Fo  ld. MeKusick 
and Wroth. >Fn?.• ^  Civil Practice. 73.1 -
73.5.
10 EPVi-rix' September 23. 1071 M.R.C.P.. 
Ride 73 wns amended b.v addins subsec­
tion tfi wl.Ieli now provides tlmt an ap-
(Hidden, N.2 Me. 2"1, 303, 10 A. I'A, 16/
HS'-M embraces our present problem.
'rite pov. rs of t'u Environmental Jm- 
provernent Commission are wholly statuto­
ry. King Resource' Company v. Environ­
mental Improvement Commission, supra. 
The authority to dispose of issues presented 
at hearing which the statute gives the En­
vironmental Improvement Commission is 
to "make findings of fact and issue an
ord’. r granting or denying permission *>
The jurisdiction of the Law Court is 
also entirely statutory. 33 M.R.S.A. § 487 
provides for an appeal direct to the Law 
Court from an o rd er of the Commission. 
The statub states:
"The cr.urt shall decide whether (he 
commission acted regularly and within 
the scope of its authority, and whether 
the order is supported by substantial evi­
dence, and on the basis of such decision 
nt.v. enter iudgment affirming or nulli­
fying such determination.” ,G
[29 j There is completely absent any 
statutory authority for the Commission to 
present an interlocutory appeal to the Law 
Court or for the Law Court to entertain 
direct appeals on a piecemeal basis.
Although I.akesites chose to confine its 
participation in the bearing to an attack on 
the Commission’s jurisdiction and waived 
the right of cross-examination and of pre­
sentation of evidence, the Commission’s or­
der fully "decides and disposes of the 
whole cause” and leaves “no further ques­
tions for the future consideration and 
judgment” of the Commission as to the de­
velopment as presently proposed by Lake- 
sites.
peal from an order of the Environmental 
Improvement Commission to the Law 
Court shall be taken “ in the same manner 
as an appeal from a judgment of the. Su­
perior Court in a civil notion” except for 
the time pc-iod within who h the appeal 
must be taken. This amendment supplies 
no authority for interlocutory review.
MSC - 3
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[30,31] We find that the Ounrin--.ion 
acted regularly and within the scope of its 
authority and that its order is supported In­
substantial evidenced*
The Commission’s 18 determination is af­
firmed and the appeal is denied.
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3. Health and Environment <£=>25.5
S T A T E  of Maine ex rel. Joseph E. BREN­
NAN, Attorney General and the Board 
of Environmental Protection
v.
R. D. R E A L T Y  CORPORATION.
Supreme Jud icial Court of Maine.
Dec. 18, 1975.
State appealed from a judgment of 
the Superior Court, Sagadahoc County, de­
nying an injunction prohibiting construc­
tion of subdivision. The Supreme Judicial 
Court, Pomeroy, J., held that where land 
had been divided and lots surveyed and 
numbered prior to September 23, 1971, sub­
division was in existence on such date and 
thus not subject to municipal subdivision 
law; and that subdivision project which 
was being developed in 1967 and 1968 was 
exempt from requirements of the site loca­
tion of development law which does not 
apply to developments under construction 
on January 1, 1970.
Appeal denied.
1. Municipal Corporations <£=43
Statute allowing municipal officers to 
act in the place of a planning board for 
purposes of approving proposed subdivi­
sions applies only if municipality has 
adopted a land subdivision ordinance; in 
the absence of a duly enacted regulation 
for subdivisions no approval by municipal 
officers is required for a subdivision. 30 
M.R.S.A. § 4956.
2. Municipal Corporations <£=43
Where land had been divided into lots 
and lots had been surveyed, marked and 
numbered before September 23, 1971, sub­
division was in existence on September 23, 
1971 and thus not subject to municipal 
subdivision law which was not applicable 
to subdivisions in actual existence on 
September 23, 1971. 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956.
349 A.2d— 13Vt
Where there was active and contin­
uous development of subdivision project 
during 1967, 1968 and 1969, project was 
exempt from the site location of develop­
ment law which does not apply to develop­
ments under construction on January 1, 
1970, relieving developer of duty to comply 
with the notification requirements of such 
law. 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481 et seq., 482, 483, 
4S8.
4. Health and Environment <£=25.5
A determination that a subdivision de­
velopment is subject to regulation by the 
Environmental Improvement Commission 
or exempt therefrom by the grandfather 
clause should be made preliminarily by 
Commission itself; judicial intervention in 
the controversy should take place prior to 
any administrative determination only in 
rare instances where issue is solely one of 
law or where relief sought is beyond ca­
pacity of administrative agency to give or 
where injunctive relief is sought to main­
tain status quo pending hearing and order. 
38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488.
5. Administrative Law and Procedure
<£=228, 229
“Primary jurisdiction” and “exhaus­
tion of administrative remedies” are both 
closely allied in basic function and concept 
for each rests on premise that an agency 
has primary authority to make certain 
decisions deemed relevant to determination 
of controversv.
6. Administrative Law and Procedure <£=>229
“Exhaustion” is a defense to judicial 
review of administrative action not as yet 
deemed complete.
7. Administrative Law and Procedure <£=>228
“Primary jurisdiction” determines 
whether the court or agency should make 
initial decision.
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8. Administrative Law and Procedure C='228
The ‘doctrine of primary jurisdiction” 
is not an attempt to allocate power between 
courts and administrative agencies.
9. Administrative Law and Procedure C=|228
As a matter of judicial policy, court 
will generally not decide an issue concern­
ing which an administrative agency has 
decision capacity until after agency has 
considered the issue.
202 Me.
Cabanne Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Au­
gusta, for plantiff.
Marshall, Raymond & Beliveau by John 
G. Marshall, Lewiston, for defendant.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEA- 
THERBEE, POMEROY, WERXICK, 
ARCHIBALD and DELAHANTY, JJ.
POMEROY, Justice.
The jurisdiction of the Maine Board of 
Environmental Protection to issue or deny 
approval of a development under the Site 
Location of Development statute, 38 
M.R.S.A. § 481 et seq., is in issue in this 
case as a result of the denial of a perma­
nent injunction.
That appellee, R. D. Realty Corporation 
is creating a subdivision within the mean­
ing of 38 M.R.S.A. § 482(5) is not de­
nied.
Also agreed is that appellee did not 
‘notify the commission in writing of his 
[sic] intent and of the nature and location 
of such development” before commencing 
its construction. 38 M.R.S.A. § 483.
The complaint for injunction was denied 
as the result of a finding by the Court that 
the claim asserted by appellee that it was 
exempt from the provisions of the Act
I. "This Article shall not apply to any de­
velopment in existence or in possession of ap-
under the provisions of 38 M.R.S.A. § 4SS 1 
was valid.
This appeal by the State was seasonably 
entered following the denial of a complaint 
for injunction.
We deny the appeal.
The facts are not in dispute. In late 1966 
or early 1967, the property in question was 
acquired by the Dube family. A corpora­
tion was subsequently formed with family 
members as sole stockholders with the in­
tention of developing the area sufficiently 
to permit the sale of lots.
In 1967 a contractor was hired to clear 
5 miles of rough roads to enable prospec­
tive purchasers to be shown the property 
during periods of favorable weathe-.
In that same year a cottage was built on 
the property. The cottage was used as an 
office and occasionally as an overnight 
dwelling. Electricity was connected to the 
cottage. A small area was cleared and 
made suitable for use as a small airplane 
landing area.
In 1968 an engineer was employed to 
prepare a rough plan of the area and to 
cause the lot sketched on the plan to be 
generally indicated on the surface of the 
earth. This work was completed during 
that year.
Many thousands of dollars have been 
expended by the developer in preparation 
of the development for the sale of lots.
All these facts were found as fact by 
the presiding Justice.
The complaint for injunction was in two 
Counts.
Count I of the complaint alleged a vio­
lation of the Site Location of Development 
law, 38 M.R.S.A. § 481 et seq.
Count II alleged violation of the munici­
pal subdivision law, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956.
plicable state or local licenses to operate or un­
der construction on January 1, 1970 . . . .”
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In ruling as he did the presiding Justice At all times material hereto the Town 
based his conclusion that there was no of Phippsburg had no regulation control-
violation of law on Sec. 488 of 38 M.R.S.A. ling the subdivision of land. The State
and Sec. 4956 of 30 M.R.S.A. points to subsection B of Section 1, 30
■ M.R.S.A. § 4956, which reads, in part, as
Sec. 488 provides that: follows:
“This Article shall not apply to any de­
velopment in existence or in possession 
of applicable state or local license to 
operate or under construction on Jan­
uary 1, 1970.”
The conclusion which the Justice below 
reached was:
“I find that this development was ‘under 
construction’ on January 1, 1970, and 
therefore is exempted by section 48S 
from application of the Site Location of 
Development Law.”
As to Count II of the complaint, the 
Justice referred to 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956, 
paragraph 5, which reads as follows:
‘This section shall not apply to proposed 
subdivisions approved by the planning 
board or the municipal officials prior to 
September 23, 1971 in accordance with 
laws then in effect nor shall they apply 
to subdivisions as defined by this section 
in actual existence on September 23, 
1971 that did not require approval under 
prLr law . . . .”
He then concluded as follows:
‘I find that the area under considera­
tion was subdivided prior to September 
23, 1971 and that the lots were actually 
surveyed and marked either by steel pins 
or regular markers and numbered at a 
time when no approval was required by 
the municipality under prior law and 
therefore was exempted by the terms of 
30 M.R.S.A. Section 4956.”
The “prior law” was the municipal sub­
division law as it read in 1964. This sec­
tion provided, among other things, “A 
municipality may regulate the subdivision 
of land.”
“In a municipality which does not have 
a planning board, the municipal officers 
shall act in its stead for the purposes of 
this section.”
This, the appellant says, requires that 
the municipal officers give approval to a 
proposed subdivision before it can be law­
fully made, even though the municipality 
has no planning board and has adopted no 
regulations for subdivisions.
With this argument we cannot agree.
30 M.R.S.A. § 4956 came into being as 
a result of Public Laws of Maine, 1957, 
Chapter 405. This Chapter was entitled 
“An Act Revising the General Laws Relat­
ing to Municipalities.” Section 1 amended 
the Revised Statutes by adding thereto a 
new chapter, which it numbered 90-A.
Section 61 of Chapter 90-A (of which 
subdivision of land is a part), provides:
“A municipality m ay act for the purpose 
of municipal development according to 
the following provisions.” (Emphasis 
supplied)
Among those provisions is that with 
which we are presently concerned: “A 
municipality m ay regulate the subdivision 
of land.”
This was merely an Enabling Act.
Certainly it cannot be argued that the 
Selectmen of the Town of Phippsburg had 
authority to regulate the subdivision of 
land in the absence of any ordinance enact­
ed pursuant to this Enabling Act. Since 
the Town of Phippsburg did not see fit to 
adopt a subdivision ordinance until long 
after the subdivision was commenced in 
1967, we think it apparent there was no
Discussion of the 
fact that prior to 
1971, the Sub­
division Law was 
merely an enabling 
Act.
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requirement of municipal approval for the 
subdivision at that time.
[1] We read the section to which ap­
pellant refers, i. e.,
“In a municipality which does not have a
planning board, the municipal officers
shall act in its stead for the purposes of
this section.”
to mean that in any municipality which had 
adopted a land subdivision ordinance or 
regulation (which Phippsburg had not) if 
there was no planning board in the munici­
pality which could approve the plat of a 
proposed subdivision, the municipal offi­
cers were directed to act in the stead of a 
planning board for the purpose of giving 
approval.
In the absence of a duly enacted regula­
tion for subdivisions no municipal officer’s 
approval was required for a subdivision 
under the statute as it read at the time this 
subdivision was undertaken.
We hold the presiding Justice was cor­
rect in his conclusion that the subdivision 
in this case was made at a time when no 
approval was required by the municipality. 
30 M.R.S.A. § 4956.
Appellant directs attention to 30 
M.R.S.A. § 4956 and observes that to be 
free of the application of the municipal 
subdivision law, the subdivision must have 
been “in actual existence” on September 
23, 1971.
The Legislature’s intention, the appellant 
says to quote from its brief, is clear “that 
in the case of projects for which municipal 
approval was not required only those ac­
tually completed by September 23, 1971, 
would qualify for grandfather’s rights.”
Again we must disagree.
The statute uses the words “in actual 
existence” and not the words “actually 
completed.”
What was “in actual existence?”
The answer is: “Subdivision as defined 
by this section.”
What section?
The answer is: “Section 9456, para­
graph 5, of 30 M.R.S.A.”
A subdivision was defined by the Act in 
effect at all times material to this case as 
“A division into three or more lots in 
urban areas or four or more lots in 
rural areas . . . . ”
There is no dispute in this case but that 
there had been a division of the total par­
cel of land into many lots and as the pre­
siding Justice found: “these lots were 
actually surveyed and marked by steel pins 
or regular markers and numbered” before 
September 23, 1971, the critical date under 
the statute.
[2] We are satisfied then that the pre­
siding Justice was correct in his finding 
that the subdivision was “in actual exist­
ence” within the meaning of the applicable 
statute.
[3] We likewise conclude the presiding 
Justice was correct in his finding that 38 
M.R.S.A. § 48S exempted this development 
from the application of the Site Location 
of Development law because “the develop­
ment was under construction on January 1, 
1970.”
The appellant argues that the appellee 
had abandoned whatever “grandfather” 
rights which existed because, it says, 
nothing was done to prosecute the develop­
ment for a period of five years.
The presiding Justice found as fact 
based on believable evidence that there was 
active and continuous development of the 
project during the years 1967, 1968 and 
1969.
In view of this finding which is support­
ed by credible evidence, it becomes un­
necessary to discuss what period of in­
activity will justify a conclusion there has 
been an abandonment of the subdivision.
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That the Superior Court had jurisdiction 38 M.R.S.A. § 485 contains, among other 
of the subject matter and the parties is things, provision that the Environmental 
undoubted. Improvement Commission
That this Court had jurisdiction to con­
sider and decide the appeal from the denial 
of the injunction by the Superior Court 
Justice is likewise apparent.
We have, therefore, reviewed this record 
and have concluded that the complaint for 
an injunction was properly denied. This 
is our decision in the case.
However, we do have another concern. 
This is a matter which was not raised by 
the parties, either in their briefs or at oral 
argument, but which we choose to discuss 
in some detail.
The complaint for injunction recites that 
‘the plaintiff, Attorney General of the 
State of Maine, is acting for himself and 
on behalf of the Board of Environmental 
Protection.”
Two separate and distinct statutes, he 
alleges, are authority for the action taken: 
to wit, 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-4882 and 30 
M.R.S.A. 4956.
58 M.R.S.A. § 486 provides as follows:
“All orders issued by the commission 
under this subchapter shall be enforced 
by the Attorney General. 'If compliance 
with any order of the commission is not 
had within the time period, therein speci- 
f’.ed, the commission shall immediately 
notify the Attorney General of this fact. 
\\ ithin 30 days thereafter the Attorney 
General shall bring an appropriate civil 
action designed to secure compliance with 
such order.”
30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(5) provides in part
that:
“The Attorney General, the municipal­
ly or the appropriate municipal officers 
may institute proceedings to enjoin the 
violation of this section.”
“may at any time with respect to any 
person who has commenced construction 
or operation of any development without 
having first notified the commission 
pursuant to section 483, schedule and 
conduct a public hearing in the manner 
provided by section 484 with respect to 
such development.”
The following paragraph in Section 485 
provides that the Commission
“may request the Attorney General to 
enjoin any person, who has commenced 
construction or operation of any develop­
ment without first having notified the 
commission pursuant to section 483, 
from further construction or operation 
pending such hearing and order.”
It thus becames clear that the statutory 
scheme envisions that ordinarily the En­
vironmental Improvement Commission will 
make the determination that a development 
is or is not exempt from regulation by the 
Environmental Improvement Commission, 
in the first instance. The scheme con­
templates judicial participation in deter­
mining the question in issue only after such 
issue is preliminarily resolved by the Com­
mission after hearing, unless
(a) it clearly appears the issue is only 
one of law, or
(b) harm will result before the Commis­
sion can act if it is ultimately found 
the development is not exempt from 
regulation by the Commission, (in 
which case the status quo is main­
tained “pending such hearing and 
order” (under 38 M.R.S.A. § 485)).
The judicial participation is usually ini­
tiated either by appeal from the Commis- 
ion’s Order under the provisions of 38 
M.R.S.A. § 487 in which case appeal is to
2. Provision for judicial review of any order of the Board of Environmental Protection is 
found in 38 M.R.S.A. § 487.
Vs.Rep. 344-351 A.2d— 13
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the Supreme Judicial Court sitting as a 
Law Court 3 or by invoking 38 M.R.S.A. § 
486, in which case “appropriate civil ac­
tion” (i. e., complaint for injunction), is 
initiated in the Superior Court.
In In  R e  S p r in g  V alley  D evelopm en t, 
Me., 300 A.2d 736 (1973), one of the issues 
was, as here, whether or not the action of 
the developer was subject to regulation by 
the Environmental Improvement Commis­
sion or exempt therefrom by the “grand­
father clause.”
There, as here, the Commission learned 
of the developer’s activity, even though it 
had given no notice to the Commission of 
its intended development.
Upon learning of the developer’s activi­
ties the Commission gave notice of hearing 
as provided by 3S M.R.S.A. § 483 and pro­
ceeded to adjudicate the issue.
When that issue was decided adversely 
to the developer, appeal was taken to the 
Supreme Judicial Court sitting as the Law 
Court pursuant to 38 M.R.S.A. § 487.
When judicial participation in the con­
troversy was invoked there had already 
been a preliminary resolution of the issues 
by the Commission, which determination 
was made after hearing pursuant to Section 
483.
nation only in those rare instances where 
the issue is solely one of law or where the 
relief sought is beyond the capacity of the 
administrative agency to give, or where 
injunctive relief is sought under 38 
M.R.S.A. § 485 to maintain the status quo 
“pending such hearing and order.” 4
We see “the doctrine of primary juris­
diction” as the occasion for this rule.5
In S ta n to n  v . T ru s te e s  o f  S t .  Jo se p h ’s 
C o lle ge , Me., 233 A.2d 718 (1967), we 
accepted the “doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies” as a general prin­
ciple.
We recognize that the “doctrine of pri­
mary jurisdiction” is somewhat different 
from the “doctrine of exhaustion of ad­
ministrative remedies” and of “ripeness.”
Nevertheless, they are closely akin. 
P u b lic  U tilit ie s  C om m ission  v . U nited  
S ta te s , 355 U.S. 534, 78 S.Ct. 446, 2 L.Ed. 
2d 470 (1958).
[5] “Primary jurisdiction” and “ex­
haustion of administrative remedies” are 
both closely allied in basic function and 
concept. Each rests on the premise that 
an agency has the primary authority to 
make certain decisions deemed relevant to 
the determination of the controversy.
[4] We decide that in all future cases 
determination that a development is sub­
ject to regulation by the Environmental 
Improvement Commission, or exempt 
therefrom by the “grandfather clause” (38 
M.R.S.A. § 488), should be made prelimi­
narily by the Commission itself. Judicial 
intervention in the controversy will take 
place prior to any administrative determi-
[6] “Exhaustion” emerges as a defense 
to judicial review of an administrative ac­
tion not as yet deemed complete.
[7] “Primary jurisdiction” determines 
whether the Court or the agency should 
make the initial decision. U n ited  S t a te s : 
W estern  P a c . R . C o., 352 U.S. 59, 77 S.Ct 
161, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956).
Discussion of 
primary jurisd iction  
exhaustion of 
remedies.
3. See: K i n g  R e s o u r c e s  C o .  v .  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
I m p r o v e m e n t  C o m m i s s i o n ,  Me., 270 A.2d S63 
(3970).
4. We can envision the situation in which
a developer may go on the site of a develop­
ment with large earth-moving equipment and 
in a matter of hours make irreparable chang­
es in the contour of the earth. In a case such 
as this, for example, a petition by the Com­
mission for injunctive relief ought be enter­
tained.
5. See: A t c h i s o n ,  T o p e k a  <£- S a n t a  F e ' R a i h c a y  
C o m p a n y  v .  W i c h i t a  B o a r d  o f  T r a d e ,  412 
U.S. 800, 93 S.Ct. 2367, 37 L.Ed.2d 3o0 
(1973) ; see also N e w  E n g l a n d  T e l e p h o n e  4 
T e l e g r a p h  C o .  v. P u b l i c  U t i l i t i e s  C o m m i s ­
s i o n ,  Me., 329 A.2d 792, SOI (1973).
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[8] The “doctrine of primary jurisdic­
tion” is not an attempt to allocate power 
between the courts and the administrative 
agencies. Authorities agree "the doctrine 
of primary jurisdiction” was established in 
T e x a s  &  P a c . R a ilw ay  v . A b ilen e C otton  
O il C o., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L. 
Ed. 553 (1907). While in that decision 
there was no explicit reliance on Commis­
sion expertise as the controlling considera­
tion, later cases rationalized the application 
of the rule on that basis.
[9] As a matter of ju d ic ia l  p o licy we 
will generally not decide an issue concern­
ing which an administrative agency has de­
cision capacity until after the agency has 
considered the issue.
One of the obvious results of the crea­
tion of the Maine Board of Environmental 
Protection is that an agency has been creat­
ed which has developed an expertise in re­
solving the special problems with which it 
is, by law, required to become concerned. 
Merest prudence suggests that the courts 
ought to have the benefit of the Commis­
sion's prior expert evaluation of contro­
verted facts, before it intervenes in a con­
troversy over which the Commission has 
jurisdiction, (except to use legal processes 
to maintain the status quo pending hearing 
and decision of the issue in controversy by 
the C om m ission .)
An example of the application of this 
rationale by this Court is L e w isto n , G reen e  
&  M . T . Co. v . N e w  E n g la n d  T . &  T . Co., 
Me, 299 A.2d 895 (1973). There this 
Court was concerned with 35 M.R.S.A.
§ 305. That section provides, in part:
“ . . . [I]n all cases in which the just­
ness or reasonableness of a rate, toll or 
charge by any public utility or the consti­
tutionality of any ruling or order of the 
commission is in issue, the law court 
shall have jurisdiction upon a complaint 
to review, modify, amend or annul any 
ruling or order of the commission, but 
only to the extent of the unlawfulness of 
such ruling or order. If in such com-
S49 A.2d 201
plaint it is alleged that confiscation of 
property or other violation of constitu­
tional right results from such ruling or 
order, the law court shall exercise its 
own independent judgment as to both 
law and facts.”
Even though the statute by its express 
terms directed that the Law Court exercise 
its own independent judgment, both as to 
law and facts, we ordered that
“ . . . [T]he Public Utilities Com­
mission is herewith directed promptly to 
take out evidence, in accordance with the 
foregoing delineations, from New Eng­
land and any other of the parties who 
might wish to present evidence.
“After it has heard and taken such ad­
dition evidence the Commission, as it 
deems appropriate by reason thereof, is 
authorized, in accordance with Section 
305, to modify its original findings, con­
clusions and Order, or to make new find­
ings and conclusions and a new Order.
“The Commission shall report all the 
additional evidence which it has taken to 
the Law Court promptly and in manner 
such that, as required by Section 305,
“*. . . the proof may be brought as
nearly as possible down to the date of its 
report thereof to the court.’
“If the Commission has modified its orig­
inal findings of fact or made new find­
ings of fact, or modified its original Or­
der, or made a new Order, it shall file 
with the Law Court such modified find­
ings of fact or Order or such new find­
ings of fact or Order, if any.”
This Court had earlier established the 
principle that even where independent judg­
ment as to facts is mandated, the Law 
Court
“ . . . may nonetheless exercise the
prescribed ‘independent judgment’ as to 
facts and yet in that very process be 
‘informed and aided’ by findings of the 
Public Utilities Commission.” C en tra l
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M ain e  P o w er C om pan y v . P u b lic  U tili­
ties C om m ission , 156 Me. 295, 304, 163 A.
2d 762, 768 (1960).
In the ease now before us the Board 
of Environmental Protection has capacity 
to determine the mixed question of law 
and fact as to whether the development be­
ing operated by the defendant is or is not 
exempt from the requirements of 38 M. 
R.S.A. § 4S1 et seq.
As to all cases arising subsequent to this 
date, determination of all issues within 
its legal capacity should be made by the 
administrative tribunal before judicial in­
208 Me.
tervention will be invoked, except in those 
instances earlier described.
In this case the factual basis for the de­
nial of injunctive relief has been thorough­
ly developed before the Justice of the Su­
perior Court. The issues of law have been 
ably presented by both counsel. Under the 
circumstances we consider it appropriate 
to decide this case.
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1. Zoning @=*5
Municipalities taking advantage of zon­
ing powers granted by statute are bound by 
legislative definitions.
TOWN OF ARUNDEL 
v.
Morrill and Frances SWAIN.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
June 8, 1977.
Town brought action to enjoin land- 
owners from violation of local subdivision 
ordinance. The Superior Court, York Coun­
ty, entered judgment for the landowners 
and the town appealed. The Supreme Judi­
cial Court, Delahanty, J., held that: (1) 
town was bound by legislative definition of 
subdivision in enabling statute; (2) creation 
of a campground was not within the statu­
tory definition of a subdivision into lots, 
and (3) town had no jurisdiction over cre­
ation of campgrounds.
Appeal denied.
9. We do not read Carey v. Mackey, 82 Me. 516, 
20 A. 84 (1890) as inconsistent with our analy­
sis here.
In Carey this Court interpreted a silent Flori­
da divorce decree as leaving intact a previous 
separation agreement. Several factors, how­
ever, diminish the relevance of Carey for 
present purposes. First, while the Court held 
the agreement untouched by the Florida decree, 
it modified the agreement itself by crediting 
amounts paid under the decree to amounts due
2. Zoning <3=>278
Creation of specified number of camp­
sites did not constitute a division into lots 
contemplated by statute empowering mu­
nicipalities to make zoning laws respecting 
approval of a “subdivision.” 30 M.R.S.A. 
§ 4956.
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions.
3. Statutes 181(1)
That construction should be placed on 
statute as may best answer intention which 
legislators had in view, and when determi­
nable and ascertained, courts must give ef­
fect to it.
4. Municipal Corporations «=>43
Statute relating to approval of subdivi­
sions by municipalities and speaking of a 
“division” into lots contemplates the split­
ting off of an interest in land and creation, 
by means of one of various disposition mod­
es recited in statute, of an interest in anoth­
er.
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions.
5. Statutes o=> 188
Words are to be given their plain and 
natural meaning and are to be construed 
according to their natural import in com­
mon and approved usage.
under the contract. Second, Florida apparently 
did not then recognize separation agreements 
as valid, so the Florida divorce court could not 
have modified what was to it an illegal con­
tract. Third, for the same reason there was no 
Florida statutory equivalent of § 61.14 to clari­
fy the issues raised in Carey. Fourth, it could 
be argued that the lump sum awarded by the 
decree was not inconsistent with the contractu­
al provision of periodic payments.
MSC - 5
318 Me 374 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES
6. Municipal Corporations <@=►43
Campground was not composed of req­
uisite “lots” referred to in statute relating 
to municipality’s approval of a subdivision 
defined as a division into “lots.” 30 M.R.
S.A. § 4956.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.
7. Statutes 181(2), 184, 208
Absent legislative definition terms 
must be given meaning consistent with 
overall statutory context and must be con­
strued in light of subject matter, purpose of 
statute, occasion and necessity for law, and 
consequences of particular interpretation.
Smith, Elliott, Wood & Nelson, P.A. by 
Alan S. Nelson, Saco, for plaintiff.
Reagan, Ayer & Adams by Wayne T. 
Adams, Kennebunk, for defendants.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and POMER­
OY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELA- 
HANTY and GODFREY, JJ.
DELAHANTY, Justice.
By its complaint, the Town of Arundel 
(the Town) sought to enjoin defendants, 
Morrill and Frances Swain (the Swains), 
from violation of a local subdivision ordi­
nance. From judgment entered for defend­
ants, the Town appeals. We deny the ap­
peal.
Pursuant to 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956,1 the 
Town enacted a subdivision ordinance on 
March 17, 1972 which required local approv­
al of subdivision developments. Although 
they believed that their proposed camp­
ground was not a subdivision and that, 
therefore, the Arundel Planning Board (the 
Board) had no jurisdiction over their en­
deavor, the Swains nevertheless submitted 
their plan to the Board on January 25, 1975. 
Under their preliminary plan, they sought 
permission to construct a campground, con­
taining 101 campsites, with an operating 12
1. 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956 provides in pertinent part:
2. Municipal review and regulation.
season extending from Memorial Day to 
Labor Day. A camper would pay a fee to 
the Swains in return for the right to occupy 
a campsite for “a period of one day, several 
days or a longer period.” Each campsite 
would have its own electrical, water, and 
sewer outlets and, in addition, all campers 
would have access to certain common facili­
ties including toilets, showers and washing 
machines.
The Swains’ plan was approved on May 5, 
1975. But then on May 27, 1975 that ap­
proval was rescinded, allegedly in order to 
hold an additional public hearing as re­
quired by the Town subdivision ordinance. 
On June 9, 1975 the Town filed a complaint 
alleging that the respondents had willfully' 
disregarded the rescission and had proceed­
ed with the construction of roads and build­
ings for the campground without the requi­
site approval. Averring that irreparable 
injury would be suffered if the subdivision 
ordinance were permitted to be so openly 
violated, plaintiff asked that the Swains be 
enjoined from continuing with their en­
deavor.
On October 28, 1975 the defendants, pur­
suant to the camping area licensing provi­
sions contained in 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 2491 et 
seq., were granted a license from the State 
Department of Health and Welfare to oper­
ate a campground of seventy-five sites. 
The license provided that an additional 
twenty-six sites could be requested if an 
adequate water supply were established. 
On December 2, 1975, the Swains submitted 
to the Board a revised plan for 101 sites, 
although they specifically stated therein 
that they were not recognizing Board juris­
diction over the proposed campground.
Approximately two months later, on Feb­
ruary 3, 1976, the Board granted approval 
for seventy-five campsites, but it limited its 
approval to only twenty-five campsites in 
the first year, with construction of an addi­
tional twenty-five sites in the second year 
and twenty-five in the third year being 
dependent upon certain factors such as the
A. Reviewing authority. All requests for 
subdivision approval shall be reviewed by the 
municipal planning board
MSC - 5
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impact of the campground on road condi­
tions and traffic safety.
On May 26, 1976 the Town moved to 
amend its original complaint, inserting a 
claim that the respondents had begun de­
velopment of and intended to operate more 
than twenty-five campsites in the first 
year. Plaintiff asked that an order be is­
sued requiring the Swains to comply with 
the Board conditions of February 3, 1976.
The presiding Justice issued an order de­
nying the Town’s motion, finding that the 
Town had failed to show a “sufficient juris­
dictional basis for the granting of such ex­
traordinary relief” and that “there has been 
no showing of irreparable harm.” In re­
sponse to plaintiff's motion for findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, the court filed 
a decree in which it said:
The Court concludes as a matter of law 
that a campground is not a “subdivision” 
within the meaning of Title 30 M.R.S.A. 
Section 4956 as amended and, therefore 
that Petitioner lacks jurisdiction over the 
proposed development of a campground 
by respondents.
A final judgment was entered on May 10, 
1977.2
[1] The sole question to be resolved in 
this case is whether the proposed camp­
ground is a “subdivision” within the mean­
ing of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956. If it is a subdivi­
sion, then the local ordinance enacted pur­
suant to § 4956 is applicable and the Town 
has jurisdiction over the proposed use.3
[2] A “subdivision” is defined in the
statute as “ . . . the division of a
2. For clarification purposes, we note that the 
presiding Justice ordered the Town’s motion 
for a temporary and permanent injunction de­
nied on June 23, 1976. Judgment was entered 
accordingly. However, no order affirmatively 
granted relief for defendants until May 10, 1977 
when, upon stipulation of counsel at oral argu­
ment and by leave of Court, a judgment of July 
23, 1976 was finally filed. That judgment not 
only denied petitioner’s motion but also direct­
ed that “final judgment upon the Complaint is 
ordered for the Defendants.”
3. The local subdivision ordinance enacted by 
the Town has not been made a part of the 
record on appeal. However, since we are in 
accord with those jurisdictions which have held
tract or parcel of land into three or more 
lots within any five-year period whether 
accomplished by sale, lease, development, 
building or otherwise . . We do
not believe that the creation of a specified 
number of campsites is the type of “divi­
sion” into “lots” which was contemplated by 
the legislature when it enacted § 4956. Al­
though we intend to intimate no opinion on 
the issue, we recognize that a campground 
might fall within the scope of the phrase 
“development, building or otherwise.” 
However, since we find lacking the pre­
scribed “division” into “lots,” we remain 
convinced that a campground does not qual­
ify as a “subdivision” within the purview of 
§ 4956.
[3] In construing the statute, we must 
bear in mind the fundamental rule that 
[s]uch a construction ought be put upon a 
statute as may best answer the intention 
which the Legislators had in view, and 
when determinable and ascertained, the 
courts must give effect to it. In re 
Spring Valley Development, Me., 300 
A.2d 736, 741 citing King Resources Co. v. 
Environmental Improvement Commission, 
Me., 270 A.2d 863,869(1970).
See also Natale v. Kennebunkport Board o f 
Zoning Appeals, Me., 363 A.2d 1372 (1976); 
Emple Knitting Mills v. City o f Bangor, 155 
Me. 270, 153 A.2d 118 (1959). In Blier v. 
Inhabitants o f Town o f Fort Kent, Me., 273 
A.2d 732 (1971) we said:
Legislative expression must be read in 
the light of the lawmakers’ purpose as
that the definition in the enabling statute con­
trols, we can safely assume that the definition 
of subdivision is identical in both the ordinance 
and the enabling statute, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956. 
See The Peninsula Corp. v. Planning & Zoning 
Comm’n, 149 Conn. 627, 183 A.2d 271 (1962); 
Pratt v. Adams, 229 Cal.App.2d 602, 40 Cal. 
Rept. 505 (1964); Stoker v. Town of Irvington, 
71 N.J.Super. 370, 177 A.2d 61 (1961); see 
generally 3 A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning 
and Planning § 4 (3d ed. 1972). We fully agree 
with the principle that “[mjunicipalities taking 
advantage of the powers granted by the statute 
are bound by the legislative definition.” Stok­
er, supra, 71 N.J.Super. at 378, 177 A.2d at 66.
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the object the statute designs to accom­
plish oftentimes furnishes the right key 
to the true meaning of any statutory 
clause or provision. Id. at 734 citing Mid­
dleton’s Case, 136 Me. 108, 3 A.2d 434 
(1939).
Ofttimes cited as a fundamental purpose 
of subdivision legislation is the protection of 
the purchaser or lessee of land from unscru­
pulous developers. See, e. g., 3 A. Rath- 
kopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning § 2 
(3d ed. 1972). This goal is obviously only 
relevant when land is purchased or leased 
from a developer.4
Some enlightenment as to the lawmakers’ 
intent can be gleaned from a reading of the 
enforcement section, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956, 
which provides that a fine shall be charged 
against
[a]ny person, firm, corporation or other 
• legal entity who sells, leases, or conveys 
for consideration, offers or agrees to sell, 
lease or convey for consideration any land 
in a subdivision which has not been ap­
proved as required by this section . 
(emphasis added).
Since the sanctions are aimed at those who 
sell, lease or convey for consideration (or 
those who offer or agree to do so), it may 
reasonably be inferred that the legislature 
intended to protect only purchasers, lessees, 
or those receiving land for consideration.
[4] Accordingly, it is our judgment that 
when the statute speaks of a “division,” it 
contemplates the splitting off of an interest 
in land and the creation, by means of one of 
the various disposition modes recited in 
§ 4956, of an interest in another. This does
4. Specifically speaking of Maine’s subdivision 
law, one commentator has noted that the state 
and municipality are interested in
accurate surveying, monumenting and legal 
description of properties to prevent fraud, to 
facilitate the marketing and conveyancing of 
and to enable accurate tax assessment and 
collection[,]
considerations relevant only when land is 
bought and sold. O. Delogu, “Suggested Revi­
sions in Maine’s Planning and Land Use Con­
trol Legislation Part II,” 21 Maine L.Rev. 151, 
158 (1969).
5. Although, in our estimation, a campground is 
not divided into “lots” within the meaning of 
§ 4956, this conclusion is not based upon our
not happen when a camper temporarily oc­
cupies a campsite.
[5,6] We also believe that a campy- 
ground is not composed of the requisite 
“lots” prescribed in the statute. Words are 
to be given their “plain and natural mean­
ing” and are to be construed according to 
their “natural import in common and ap­
proved usage.” Moyer v. Board o f Zoning 
Appeals, Me., 233 A.2d 311, 317 (1967) citing  
1 E. Yokley, Zoning Law & Practice § 184 
(2d ed. 1953). A “lot” has been defined as 
“a measured parcel of land having fixed 
boundaries.” Webster’s Third New Inter­
national Dictionary 1338 (1971). Nowhere 
in the stipulated facts before us is it stated 
that the campsites have clearly delineated 
or fixed boundaries, and we cannot assume 
that they are so precisely measured off.5 
Pelletier v. Dwyer, Me, 334 A.2d 867 (1975); 
Trafton v. Hill, 80 Me. 503, 15 A. 64 (1888).
Here, a single tract of land is involved, 
whether before or after its use as a camp­
ground. The situation is akin to the rent­
ing or occupying of space in an exhibition 
hall, a parking lot, or a drive-in theater. Of 
course, in all of these situations, land is 
somewhat parceled off, each customer be­
ing given a certain space to occupy for a 
certain period of time. But in our opinion 
this is not the type of “division” into “lots” 
which the legislature intended to regulate 
when it enacted § 4956.
[7] In our analysis we attempt to imple­
ment the sound principle of construction 
that
holding in Robinson v. Board o f Appeals, Me., 
356 A.2d 196 (1976), a case strongly relied 
upon by defendants. According to the Swains, 
Robinson held that “the application of lot size 
requirements to campgrounds is absurd.” It is 
important to point out that our decision not to 
apply lot size requirements there was bottomed 
on an initial finding that a campground was not 
a “dwelling” to which the local zoning law 
would be applicable. Our holding today that a 
campground is not divided into “lots" is based 
solely on what we consider to be the common 
and natural meaning of the word. Defendants’ 
reliance on Robinson is misplaced.
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[ajbsent a legislative definition, the terms 
[“divide” and “lot”] must be given a 
meaning consistent with the overall stat­
utory context, and be construed in the 
light of the subject matter, the purpose 
of the statute, the occasion and necessity 
for the law, and the consequences of a 
particular interpretation. Finks v. Maine 
State Highway, Me., 328 A.2d 791, 798 
(1974) citing Grudnosky v. Bislow, 251 
Minn. 496, 88 N.W.2d 847 (1958).
Having found the inherent policies of the 
subdivision law heavily directed toward pro­
tection of one taking an interest in land (as 
well as promotion of planned regulation of 
community growth), we conclude that a 
campground is not a subdivision within the 
scope of § 4956 and that therefore the 
Arundel Planning Board has no jurisdiction 
over the Swains’ proposed endeavor.
The entry must be 
Appeal denied.
All Justices concur.
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RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
R U L E  80B. R E V IE W  O F  G O V E R N M E N T A L  A C T IO N
( a )  M ode of R ev iew . W h en  rev iew  b y  th e  S u p e r io r  C o u rt, 
w h e th e r  b y  ap p ea l o r  o th e rw ise , of a n y  ac tio n  o r  fa i lu re  o r  r e ­
fu sa l to  a c t  b y  a  g o v e rn m e n ta l agency , in c lu d in g  a n y  d e p a r t­
m en t, b o a rd , co m m issio n , o r  o fficer, is p ro v id ed  by  s ta tu te  o r  is 
o th e rw ise  av a ila b le  b y  law , p ro ceed in g s  fo r  su ch  re v ie w  sh a ll, e x ­
c e p t a s  o th e rw ise  p ro v id ed  b y  s ta tu te ,  be gov ern ed  b y  th e s e  R u les  
o f C iv il P ro c e d u re  a s  m o d ified  by  th is  ru le . T he c o m p la in t an d  
su m m o n s sh a ll b e  se rv ed  u p o n  th e  ag en cy  a n d  all p a r t ie s  in  a c ­
co rd an ce  w ith  th e  p ro v is io n s  o f R u le  4 . T h e  co m p la in t sh a ll in ­
c lude  a  concise  s ta te m e n t  o f th e  g ro u n d s  upon  w h ich  th e  p la in ­
t i f f  co n ten d s  h e  is e n tit le d  to  re lie f, an d  sh a ll d em an d  th e  re lie f  
to  w h ich  h e  believes h im se lf  en title d . N o re sp o n siv e  p lead in g  
n eed  be filed  u n less  re q u ire d  by  s ta tu te  o r  by  o rd e r  o f th e  co u rt, 
b u t  in  a n y  e v e n t a n y  p a r ty  n am ed  as  a  d e fe n d a n t sh a ll f ile  a  
w r i t te n  a p p e a ra n c e  w ith in  th e  t im e  fo r  se rv in g  an  a n s w e r  u n d e r  
R u le  1 2 ( a ) .  A m en d ed  eff. A p ril 15 , 1975 .
(b )  T im e L im its ; S ta y . T h e  tim e  w ith in  w h ich  re v ie w  m a y  be 
so u g h t sh a ll be a s  p ro v id ed  b y  s ta tu te ,  ex cep t th a t  if  no  t im e  lim it 
is  spec ified  b y  s ta tu te ,  th e  co m p la in t sh a ll be filed  w ith in  30  d ay s  
a f te r  n o tice  o f a n y  a c tio n  o r  re fu sa l to  a c t  o f w h ich  re v ie w  is 
so u g h t un less  th e  c o u r t  e n la rg e s  th e  tim e  in  a c c o rd a n c e  w ith  
R u le  6 ( b ) ,  an d , in  th e  e v e n t of a  fa ilu re  to  ac t, w ith in  s ix  m o n th s  
a f te r  e x p ira tio n  o f th e  t im e  in  w h ich  ac tio n  sh o u ld  re a so n a b ly  
h av e  o ccu rred . E x c e p t a s  o th e rw ise  p rov ided  by  s ta tu te ,  th e  f i l ­
in g  o f th e  co m p la in t does n o t  s ta y  a n y  ac tio n  o f w h ich  rev iew  is 
so u g h t, b u t  th e  c o u r t  m a y  o rd e r  a  s ta y  upon  su c h  te rm s  a s  i t  
deem s p ro p e r.
(c )  T ria l  o r  H e a rin g ; J u d g m e n t. A n y  t r ia l  o f th e  f a c ts  w h e re  
p ro v id ed  b y  s ta tu te  o r  o th e rw ise  sh a ll be w ith o u t ju r y  u n less  th e  
C o n s titu tio n  o f th e  S ta te  o f  M aine  o r  a  s ta tu te  g iv es  th e  r ig h t  to  
t r ia l  b y  ju ry .  T he ju d g m e n t o f th e  c o u rt m ay  a f f irm , re v e rse , 
o r  m o d ify  th e  dec is io n  u n d e r  rev iew  o r  m a y  re m a n d  th e  ca se  to  
th e  g o v e rn m e n ta l a g e n c y  fo r  f u r th e r  p roceed ings. A m en d e d  eff. 
A p ril 15 , 1975 .
(d) R ev iew  b y  th e  L a w  C o u rt. U nless b y  s ta tu te  o r  o th e rw ise  
th e  d ec ision  o f th e  S u p e r io r  C o u r t is  fina l, rev iew  by  th e  L a w . 
C o u rt sh a ll be by  a p p e a l o r  r e p o r t  in  acco rd an ce  w ith  th e s e  R u les  
o f C iv il P ro ce d u re , a n d  no  o th e r  m e th o d  o f a p p e lla te  re v ie w  sh a ll 
be p e rm itte d .
E n t i r e  ru le  am en d e d  eff. D ec. 31 , 1967 .
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FROM : Rich Rothe
RE:
Regional Planning Commissions, Extension Agents
•irV
Phippsburg Decision
The enclosed Superior Court decision, which has relevance for planning boards throughout 
the State, was sent to us by Brian Chernack for distribution to the other RPC 's. According 
to Hank Sturm, SMCRPC, this decision resolves one of two suits brought against the 
Phippsburg Planning Board by Freeman Linscott. Th is one sought damages from the Town 
and from two of the Board members for "unduly influencing the other members." The other 
su it, which is s till pending, seeks to overturn the decision of the Planning Board denying 
the p la in tiff subdivision approval. Our interpretation of the highlights of the decision, 
which deals favorably with the issue of planning board lia b ility , are as follows:
1 . "The (Planning) Board members individually are not liable to individual suits
even i f  they exercise their functions . . .  in bad faith . . .  To permit such 
suits would bring the matters of government in this state to an absolute halt.
If people can only accept government office involving Judgemental functions 
in some aspects at the peril of their goods and estates, and the lia b ility  to be 
(fined) in damages for every real or fancied error in judgement, the govern­
ment would be brought to its knees. Under these circumstances, public policy 
dictates that C iv il remedies of suit are not available" (extracts, page 8).
The remedy for dealing with a Board member who acts in bad faith is to remove him 
from his office. The Justification for such a broad immunity is that i t  would be 
impossible to determine "bad fa ith" without submitting all accused o ffic ia ls to 
the burden of a tria l and the danger of its outcome. Such prospects would discourage 
most people from serving (see discussion of Richard V . E llis , page 9).
2 . In discharging its responsibilities under the Subdivision Act, a planning board is 
acting in a judicial, or quasi-judicial capacity, not merely an administrative or 
ministerial capacity. Such a capacity requires that human judgement, reason, 
and subjective evaluation be employed in evaluating the environmental and other 
impacts of a proposal, and in prescribing specific means to accomplish the necessary 
ends. Environmental matters are simply too complex to be reduced in simple, rig id , 
guidelines and criteria which can be followed by the subdivider or developer without 
some intrepretation by the reviewing authority. (Interpretation of discussion on 
pages 5 - 7).
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3. The burden of proof lies on the one who would economically benefit from the proposal 
( i .e . ,  the subdivider or developer). (Taken from page 6 , and T it le  30, § 4956, 1 2 .)
4 . Planning Boards have a consumer protection responsibility under the Subdivision Act 
which compels the Board to consider the effects of the proposal on the potential 
purchasers of that property (see page 7, and State Planning O ffice memo "Subdivision 
Review Procedures - Water Supply," 4 -2 -7 4 , for more on this).
5. "These functions (subdivision review) are not discretionary. They are mandatory 
upon the town and as such are a delegated governmental function and (sic) in 
the performance of which obviously the town cannot be lia b le ." (page?9 -  10).
W hile this language applies to the administration of the Subdivision Act, a parallel 
could be drawn to the Mandatory Shore land Zoning and Subdivision Control Act, 
which is also mandatory. We are s till awaiting a reply from the Attorney General's 
O ffice regarding Planning Board lia b ility . However, this decision should be of 
immediate interest and some comfort to planning boards concerned with this particular 
issue.
6. Th is case is dismissed with prejudice, which means that the P la in tiff cannot bring 
suit again, even i f  additional facts come to light.
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FREEMAN C. LINSCOTT, ET ALS.
PLAINTIFFS
vs. FINDINGS OF FACT, RULINGS
OF LAW AND DECREE OF COURT
TOWN OF PHIPPSBURGH, ET ALS. ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO
DEFENDANTS DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE
A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF MAY 
BE GRANTED
This is an oppressive in terrorem action of tort by a would- 
be developer against the Town of Phippsburg and the members of its 
Planning Board individually for the recovery of damages as for 
negligence in their failure to approve a plan of land development 
proposed by the plaintiff, and in which he seeks to recover as 
compensatory damages the five hundred-odd per cent profit of 
$586,000 expected to be recovered from his development, together 
with punitive damages of $20,000 against two of the members of 
said Planning Board for mala fide in arriving at their judgment 
in refusing approval of his scheme for the development of said 
land.
The gravamen of the action is an alleged captious failure 
to comply with the provisions of Section 4956 of Title 30, M.R.S.A., 
and particularly Subsection 3 of said section and more definitively
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the failure on the part of the Planning Board to specifically 
adjudicate on each of the Subsections A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I, J,
K, and L of said Subsection 3. This particular statute provides, 
in essence, that before a tract of land may be subdivided into 
three or more lots, the plan of the developer or subdivider shall 
be first approved by nthe municipal planning board, agency, or 
office, or if none, by the municipal officers” . . . therein called
a municipal reviewing authority.
Said reviewing authority, subject to satisfying the burden
of proof by the developer, shall determine that the development
will not result in undue water or air pollution; that there is
sufficient water available for reasonable foreseeable needs of
it
the subdivision;that/wiii not cause an unreasonable burden on an 
existing public water supply if one is to be utilized; that it 
will not cause unreasonable soil erosion or reduce the capacity 
of the land to hold water so that a dangerous or unhealthy condi­
tion may result; that it will not cause unreasonable highway or 
public road congestion or unsafe conditions with respect to the 
use of highways or public roads existing or proposed; will provide 
for adequate sewerage waste disposal; will not cause an unreason­
able burden on the ability of the municipality to dispose of solid 
waste and sewerage if municipal services must be utilized; will 
not have an undue adverse effect on the scenic or natural beauty 
of the area, aest.hetics, historic sites or rare and irreplaceable
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natural areas; is in conformance with duly adopted subdivision 
regulations or ordinances, comprehensive plans, development plans 
or land use plan, if any; the subdivider has adequate financial 
and technical capacity to meet the above stated standards and, if 
situated in whole or in part within 250 feet of any pond, lake, 
river, or tidal waters will not adversely affect the quality of 
such body of water or unreasonably affect the shoreline of such 
body of water.
This particular piece of legislation shows the same philo­
sophic approach as is found in M.R.S.A. Title 38, Subsections 482, 
483, and 484 in which the Environmental Improvement Commission is 
required to concern itself with developments of twenty acres or more 
in extent. These sections were the subject of recent litigation in 
the Courts of this state and were found constitutionally viable 
in the matter of In Re Spring Valley Development By Lakesites, Inc., 
300 A. 2d. 736. This law again withstood constitutional attack 
in the matter of In Re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A. 2d. 736.
The defendants are at that grinding interface where the colli­
sions of will and interest between aggressive land developers and 
those who would protect the quality of life in the state of Maine 
are at their bitterest. The problem is complex. The plaintiff 
claims that the legislation in question is also an unconstitutional 
deprivation of property and there is a failure of due process by 
the people charged with its enforcement who have not complied with 
the mandatory requirements of the statute in their findings. As
these failures are willful, they subject the Board members to
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punitive damages. The plaintiff's theory is that in these determina-
an
tions the Planning Board is acting in/administrative or ministerial 
capacity as distinguished from a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.
In analyzing the contentions of the litigants, it is neces­
sary that we turn to the purposes of the legislation in issue.
What is- intended to be accomplished; indeed what must be accomplished? 
Our Court has said in Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Im­
provement Commission, et als., 307 A. 2d. 1.
"in the period from about 1960 to 1973 
peoples throughout the world have 
wakened to the awful truth that if 
man continues random destruction of 
his natural environment, his natural 
environment will ultimately destroy 
h im.
This destruction of the environment 
is not confined to the land alone, 
or the sea alone or the air alone.
Inspired by this sudden conscious­
ness of the perils of pollution, 
legislative bodies everywhere have 
passed legislation designed to dimin­
ish pollution of our environment.
Our Maine Legislature has been in the 
forefront of those seeking to control, 
and where necessary abate, threats of 
environment destruction."
It is clearly within the realm of common knowledge that Maine 
does not want to get into the same situation as the unfortunate in­
habitants of Long Island, New York, who find themselves pumping from 
their water wells the non-biodegradabLe constituents of the effluent 
of their own septic tanks and those of their neighbors, and more 
unfortunately, will continue to do so for an indefinite period in
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the future. This extreme example of the consequences of a degraded 
subterranean environment is not so farfetched when one considers 
the geology of this state. Shaped in surface configuration and the 
composition mixture aid texture of its soils by the grinding blades 
of prehistoric glaciation, the chemistry, physical characteristics, 
and depth of the soil covering the basal ledge in the state of 
Maine not only varies from mile to mile but often from rod to rod 
or even in some instances from yard to yard.
Those who would develop land in the state of Maine are con­
fronted continually with this rapid transition in oven short dis­
tances from one type of soil to another, from one soil percolation 
rate to another, and with wide variations in depth of soil cover 
over the basic rock. Given this physical fact, the formulation of 
definitive guide lines to accomplish the absolute expedient protec­
tion of a particular environment encounters so many independent 
variables as to virtually defy simplistic solutions. The means in 
each case must be adapted to the ends to be accomplished, and the 
formulation of rigid guidelines or rigid criteria for installations 
to cope or deal with these variable factors either requires too 
much or not enough, and the intervention of human judgment and 
reason must be employed to accomplish the legislative mandate 
within the limits of economic feasibility. In some instances 
the ends required by the legislature to be accomplished simply 
cannot be met, and the land is simply unsuitable for residential
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development and sometimes even for industrial development. The 
tolerance of our ecology for change is a factor which requires 
individual evaluation in each case, and the legislature has seen 
fit to place the burden of persuasion that these ends can and 
will be accomplished upon the would-be developer. The means 
required to accomplish these ends and persuade the licensing 
authorities is cast upon the one who would be economically bene- 
fitted by the development proposed. In fine, it is public policy 
that the cost of development shall include those measures necessary 
to the protection of the environment of this state and this has 
already been determined by our Courts to be within the proper 
limits of the police power.
The question then becomes "is the function of a Planning 
Board operating under this section purely ministerial or does it 
involve discretions and a weighing and balancing of interests and 
thus more a judicial than a mere ministerial function?" In many 
situations of zoning and planning encountered by the Courts of 
this state, definitive areas of land use have been assigned, and 
zoning boards have been charged with seeing that the uses defined 
have been confined to the areas chosen and this, of course, being 
specific uses, permits more or less mechanical application of 
regulation to the proposed use. In this there is little occasion 
for the exercise of either judgment or discretion for the weighing 
of facts and so forth. On the other hand the objectives of this 
statute are so broad as to require subjective evaluation of the
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means chosen to accomplish the required ends and to in fact chcfie 
perhaps between alternative means of accomplishing those require­
ments to see that they will be satisfactorily met not only in the 
first instance but for the long haul. The intent of the legislature 
is obviously to protect our state from permitting the development 
of housing accommodations which have degenerated in some of our 
cities to the revolting expedient of mere survival shelter, and 
which are chosen only by those whose socio-economic condition 
gives them no choice at all. The legislature of this state has 
decided, and wisely, that the developer is not permitted to sell 
his dreams and leave his purchasers as "participants in--as well 
as victims of--a local environmental disaster." Spring Valley, 
supra. Under these circumstances the Planning Board must evaluate 
and strike down unreasonable incursions. Since no encroachment 
upon the environment can be accomplished without degradation to 
some degree, they must determine whether the unavoidable part of 
that degradation is unreasonable and whether other means will 
better avoid it. Man's development of his land areas and his uses 
of energy have come to the point now where a balancing of competing 
interests is a sine qua non of survival. What man must pay for 
what he gets has become a judgmental choice. To hold that the 
Board charged with the discharge of such responsibility is merely 
administrative or ministerial is to belittle the problem, and the 
resolution of questions such as those delegated to it by this 
section of the statute is judicial or quasi-judicial.
sc -  2
- 8 -
The Board members individually are not liable to individual 
suits even if they exercise their functions captiously or in bad 
faith under the decided cases,and the remedy is either through 
criminal action or impeachment or removal. To permit such suits 
would bring the matters of government in this state to an absolute 
halt. If people can only accept government office involving judg­
mental functions in some aspects at the peril of their goods and 
estates, and the liability to be mulcted in damages for every real 
or fancied error in judgment, the government would be brought to 
its knees. Under these circumstances, public policy dictates that 
civil remedies of suit are not available.
The Court noted in Richards v. Ellis, 233 A. 2d. 37:
"Every informed citizen is constantly 
aware of the expanding use of boards 
and commissions with judicial or near 
judicial powers in the administration 
of government at all levels.
The licensing board and the school 
committee as we know have long his­
tories. The Zoning Board is rela­
tively a newcomer. Commissions such 
as the Industrial Accident, Public 
Utilities, Employment and Water Im­
provement come readily to mind.
These examples could be multiplied."
And in the same case at page 38:
"The law has long recognized that the 
public good is best served by freeing 
the judge from the possibility of 
threat of civil liability for an er­
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roneous decision however evil, the 
motives of the judge may have been.
The judge who violates the trust 
placed in him by the State is answer- 
able at the criminal dock and is sub­
ject to impeachment or other removal 
process."
And in Rodway v. Wiswall, 267 A. 2d., 375:
"Richards was clearly a decision based 
upon public policy and which admittedly 
overruled prior case law which had ap­
plied the "good faith" test. It was 
deemed to be in the public interest 
to permit public officials and members 
of boards and commissions "with judicial 
or near judicial powers" to operate in 
an atmosphere immunized from the re­
straint and possible intimidation which 
might flow from the threat of vexatious 
personal suits. We see no occasion to 
depart from this position and therefore 
decline to overrule Richards.
The justification for extending so broad an immunity is:
"That it is impossible to know whether the 
claim is well founded until, the case has 
been tried, and that to submit all offi­
cials, the innocent as well as the guilty 
to the burden of a trial and to the in­
evitable danger of its outcome, would 
damper the ardor of all but the most reso­
lute, or the most irresponsible, in the 
unflinching discharge of their duties."
Judge Learned Hand in Oregoire v. Biddle 
(CA 2) 177 F. 2d. 579, 581, quoted with 
approval in Richards v. Ellis, supra, at 
39.
The duties under this particular section are mandated not 
only of this Planning Board but are mandated of all towns and.failing 
possession of a Planning Board, the municipal officers or selectmen 
themselves must undertake these judgmental functions. These functions
sc -  2
- 1 0 -
are not discretionary. They are mandatory upon the town and as 
such are a delegated governmental function and in the performance 
of which obviously the town cannot be liable.
In fine, the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted both as to the individual defendants, the 
members of the Planning Board, and as to the Town of Phippsburg 
itself.
Case dismissed with prejudice.
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The Subdivision Law and copies of recent 
amendments to it in reverse chronological 
order
Subdivision Law
T it le  30
i  4956. Land subdivisions
1. Defined. A subdivision is the division of a tract or parcel of land into 3 or more 
lots w ith in  any 5-year period, which period begins after September 22, 1971, whether 
accomplished by sale, lease, development, buildings or otherwise, provided that a division 
accomplished by devise, condemnation, order of court, g ift to a person related to the donor 
by blood, marriage or adoption, unless the intent of such g ift is to avoid the objectives of 
this section, or by transfer of any interest in land to the owner of land abutting thereon, 
shall not be considered to create a lot or lots for the purposes of this section.
In determining whether a tract or parcel of land is divided into 3 or more lots, the firs t divid­
ing of such tract or parcel, unless otherwise exempted herein, shall be considered to create 
the firs t 2 lots and the next dividing of either of said firs t 2 lots, by whomever accomplished, 
unless otherwise exempted herein, shall be considered to create a 3rd lo t, unless both such 
dividings are accomplished by a subdivider who shall have retained one of such lots for his 
own use as a single family residence for a period of at least 5 years prior to such 2nd dividing. 
Lots o f 40 or more acres shall not be counted as lots.
For the purposes of this section, a tract or parcel of land is defined as all contiguous land in 
the same ownership, provided that lands located on opposite sides of a public or private road 
shall be considered each a separate tract or parcel of land unless such road was established 
by the owner of land on both sides thereof.
2 . Municipal review and regulation
A . Reviewing authority. A ll requests for subdivision approval shall be reviewed by the 
municipal planning board, agency or o ffice , or i f  none, by the municipal o fficers, herein­
after called the municipal reviewing authority.
B. Regulations. The municipal reviewing authority may, after a public hearing, adopt 
additional reasonable regulations governing subdivisions which shall control until amended, 
repealed or replaced by regulations adopted by the municipal legislative body. The municipal 
reviewing authority shall give at least 7 days' notice of such hearing.
C . Record. On all matters concerning subdivision review, the municipal reviewing 
authority shall maintain a permanent record of all its meetings, proceedings and correspondence.
C - l . Upon receiving an application, the municipal reviewing authority shall issue to the 
applicant a dated receipt. W ith in  30 days from receipt of an application, the municipal re­
viewing authority shall notify the applicant in w riting either that the application is a complete 
application or, i f  the application is incomplete, the specific additional material needed to 
make a complete application. A fter the municipal reviewing authority has determined that a 
complete application has been file d , i t  shall notify the applicant and begin its fu ll evaluation 
of the proposed subdivision.
D . Hearing; order. In the event that the municipal reviewing authority determines to 
hold a public hearing on an application for subdivision approval, i t  shall hold such hearing 
within 30 days o f receipt by it  of a completed application, and shall cause notice of the 
date, time and place of such hearing to be given to the person making the application and 
to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality in which the sub­
division is proposed to be located, at least 2 times, the date of the firs t publication to be 
at least 7 days prior to the hearing.
The municipal reviewing authority sha ll, w ith in  30 days of a public hearing or w ithin  
60 days of receiving a completed application, i f  no hearing is held, or w ith in such other time 
lim it as may be otherwise mutually agreed to, issue an order denying or granting approval 
of the proposed subdivision or granting approval upon such terms and conditions as i t  may 
deem advisable to satisfy the criteria listed in subsection 3 and to satisfy any other regulations 
adopted by the reviewing authority, and to protect and preserve the public's health, safety 
and general welfare. In all instances, the burden of proof shall be upon the persons propos­
ing the subdivision. In issuing its decision, the reviewing authority shall make findings of fact 
establishing that the proposed subdivision does or does not meet the foregoing c rite ria .
3. G uidelines. When promulgating any subdivision regulations and when reviewing any 
subdivision for approval, the planning board, agency or o ffice, or the municipal officers, 
shall consider the following criteria and before granting approval shall determine that the 
proposed subdivision:
A . W ill  not result in undue water o*- air po llution. In making this determination i t  shall 
at least consider: The elevation of land above sea level and its relation to the floodplains, 
the nature of soils and subsoils and their ab ility  to adequately support waste disposal; the 
slope of the land and its effect on effluents; the availability of streams for disposal of effluents; 
and the applicable state and local health and water resources regulations;
B. Has suffic ient water available for the reasonably foreseeable needs of the subdivision;
C. W ill  not cause an unreasonable burden on an existing water supply, i f  one is to be 
utilized ;
D . W ill not cause unreasonable soil erosion or reduction in the capacity o f the land to 
hold water so that a dangerous or unhealthy condition may result;
E . W ill  not cause unreasonable highway or public road congestion or unsafe conditions 
with respect to use of the highways or public roads existing or proposed;
F . W ill provide for adequate sewage waste disposal;
G . W ill  not cause an unreasonable burden on the ability  of a municipality to dispose 
of solid waste and sewage i f  municipal services are to be utilized ; I.
I . W ill  not have an undue adverse effect on the scenic or natural beauty of the area, 
aesthetics, historic sites or rare and irreplaceable natural areas;
J . Is in conformance w ith a duly adopted subdivision regulation or ordinance, compre­
hensive plan, development plan, or land use plan, i f  any; and
K . The subdivider has adequate financial and technical capacity to meet the above stated 
standards.
L .  Whenever situated in whole or in part, w ithin 250 feet of any pond, lake, river or 
tidal waters, w ill not adversely affect the quality of such body of wafer or unreasonably affect 
the shoreline of such body of water.
4 . Enforcement. No person, firm , corporation or other legal entity may se ll, lease, 
develop, build upon or convey for consideration, offer or agree to se ll, lease, develop, build 
upon or convey for consideration any land in a subdivision which has not been approved by the 
municipal reviewing authority of the municipality where the subdivision is located and recorded 
in the proper registry of deeds, nor shall such person, firm , corporation or other legal entity  
sell or convey any land in such approved subdivision unless at least one permanent marker is 
set at one lot corner of the lot sold or conveyed. The term "permanent marker" includes but
is not limited to the following: A granite monument, a concrete monument, an iron pin or a 
d rill hole in ledge. No subdivision plat or plan shall be recorded by any register of deeds which 
has not been approved as required. Approval for the purpose of recording shall appear in w rit­
ing on the plat or plan. No public u t ility , water d istric t, sanitary district or any u tility  com­
pany of any kind shall install services to any lot in a subdivision for which a plan has not been 
approved.
Any person, firm , corporation or other legal entity who se lls, leases, develops, builds 
upon, or conveys for consideration, offers or agrees to se ll, lease, develop, build upon or con­
vey for consideration any land in a subdivision which has not been approved as required by 
this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 for each such occurrence.
The Attorney General, the municipality, the planning board of any municipality or the appro­
priate municipal officers may institute proceedings to enjoin the violations of this section and 
i f  a violation is found by the court, the municipality, municipal planning board or the appro­
priate municipal officers may be allowed attorney fees.
5 . Exemptions. This section shall not apply to proposed subdivisions approved by the 
planning board or the municipal offic ia ls prior to September 23, 1971 in accordance with laws 
then in effect nor shall i t  apply to subdivisions as defined by this section in actual existence 
on September 23, 1971 that did not require approval under prior law or to a subdivision as 
defined by this section, a plan of which had been legally recorded in the proper registry of 
deeds prior to September 23, 1971. The division of a tract or parcel as defined by this section 
into 3 or more lots and upon all of which lots permanent dwellings structures legally existed 
prior to September 23, 1971 is not a subdivision.
The dividing of a tract or parcel o f land and the lot or lots so made, which dividing or 
lots when made are not subject to this section, shall not become subject to this section by the 
subsequent dividing of said tract or parcel of land or any portion thereof, however, the municipal 
reviewing authority shall consider the existence of such previously created lot or lots in review­
ing a proposed subdivision created by such subsequent dividing.
PUBLIC LAWS, 1971
Chapter 454
AN A C T  R e la tin g  to  M unicipal R egu la tion  of L a n d  Subdiv isions.
B e i t  en a c ted  b y  th e  P eo p le  o f  th e  S ta te  o f  M a in e , as  fo llow s:
R. S., T . 30, § 4956, rep ea led  an d  rep laced . Section  4956 of T itle  30 of the 
R evised S ta tu te s , as am ended , is repealed  and  th e  fo llow ing  enacted  in place 
th e re o f :
§ 4956. L an d  subd iv isions
1. Defined. A  sub d iv isio n  shall be the  d iv ision  of a  tr a c t  o r  parcel of land 
in to  3 or m ore lo ts  fo r th e  p u rp o se  of sale, deve lopm ent o r bu ild ing .
2. L ocal reg u la tio n . W h e n  a m un ic ipality  h as  e s tab lish ed  a planning 
board , agency  o r office, such  board , agency  o r office m ay  ad o p t regulations 
govern ing  subd iv isions w h ich  shall con tro l u n til  su p ersed ed  by  provisions 
adop ted  by  the  leg isla tive  bod y  of the  m un ic ipality . W h e re  a m unicipality  has 
n o t estab lished  a p lan n in g  board , agency  or office, th e  m u n ic ip a l officers may 
ad o p t subdiv ision  re g u la tio n s  w hich  shall con tro l u n til  su perseded  by pr0* 
v isions adop ted  by  th e  leg is la tiv e  body  of th e  m un ic ip a lity .
3. G uidelines. W h e n  p ro m u lg a tin g  any  subd iv ision  re g u la tio n s  and  w hen 
rev iew ing  any  su bd iv ision  for approval, th e  p lann ing  board , agen cy  o r office, 
o r th e  m unicipal officers, shall consider th e  follow ing c r ite r ia  a n d  before g ra n t­
in g  approval shall d e te rm in e  th a t  th e  proposed su b d iv isio n :
A. W ill no t re su lt in  u n d u e  w a te r  or a ir po llu tion . In  m ak in g  th is  d e te r­
m in a tio n  it  shall a t leas t co n s id e r: T h e  elevation  of land  above sea level and  
its  re la tio n  to  th e  flood plains, th e  n a tu re  of soils and  subso ils  and  th e ir  
ab ility  to  ad e q u a te ly  su p p o rt w a ste  d isposal; th e  slope of th e  lan d  and  
its  effect on effluen ts; th e  av a ilab ility  of stream s fo r d isposal of effluen ts; 
and  the  applicab le s ta te  and  local h ea lth  and w a te r  re so u rces  re g u la t io n s ;
B. H as  sufficient w a te r  ava ilab le  for th e  reaso n ab ly  fo reseeab le  needs of 
th e  su bd iv ision ;
C. W ill no t cause an  u n reaso n ab le  burden  on an  ex is tin g  w a te r  supp ly , if 
one is to  be u ti l iz e d ;
D. W ill no t cause u n reaso n ab le  soil erosion  o r re d u c tio n  in  th e  cap ac ity  
of th e  land  to  hold  w a te r  so th a t  a d angerous o r u n h e a lth y  co nd ition  m ay  
r e s u l t ;
E . W ill no t cause u n reaso n ab le  h ig h w ay  or public road  co n g estio n  o r u n ­
safe cond itions w ith  re sp ec t to  use of th e  h ighw ays o r public ro ad s  ex is tin g  
o r p ro p o sed ;
F . W ill p rovide fo r ad e q u a te  solid  and  sew age w a ste  d isp o sa l;
G. W ill no t cause an  u n reaso n ab le  b u rden  on the  ab ility  of a  m u n ic ip a lity  
to  dispose of solid w a ste  and  sew age if m unicipal serv ices are  to  be u ti l iz e d ;
H . W ill n o t place an  u n reaso n ab le  b u rden  on the  ab ility  of th e  local g o v ­
ern m en ts  to  p rov ide  m u n ic ip al o r g o vernm en ta l se rv ices ; I.
I . W ill no t have an  u n d u e  adverse  effect on the scenic o r n a tu ra l b e a u ty  
of th e  area, aesth e tic s , h is to ric  s ites  or ra re  and  irrep laceab le  n a tu ra l  a r e a s ;
J. Is  in  conform ance w ith  a du ly  ado p ted  subd iv ision  reg u la tio n  o r o rd i­
nance, com prehensive p lan , deve lopm en t p lan , o r land  use plan , if a n y ;  and
K. T h e  subd iv id er has ad eq u a te  financial and  technical capacity  to  m eet 
th e  above s ta te d  s tan d ard s .
L . W h en ev er s itu a ted , in w hole o r in *)art, w ith in  250 feet of any  pond, 
lake, riv e r o r tida l w a te rs , w ill no t adverse ly  affect the  quality  of such  body  
of w a te r  o r u n reaso n ab ly  affect th e  shore line of such  body of w ater.
T h e  p lan n in g  board  agency  o r office, o r if none, the m unicipal officers, shall 
issue an  o rd e r deny ing  or g ra n tin g  app roval of the proposed subd iv ision  or 
g ra n tin g  app roval upon  such  te rm s and  cond itions as it m ay  deem  ad v isab le  
to  sa tis fy  th e  c rite ria  lis ted  in th is  subsec tion , and to  p ro tec t and  p re se rv e  
the  pub lic’s h ea lth , safe ty  and  general w elfare . In  all instances the b u rd en  
of proof shall be upon  the  person p roposing  th e  subdivisions.
4. E n fo rcem en t. N o person , firm , co rp o ra tio n  or o th er legal e n tity  m ay  
convey, offer o r ag ree  to  convey any  land  in  a subd iv ision  w hich  has n o t been  
app roved  by  th e  p lan n in g  board , ag ency  o r office, o r if none ex ists, by  th e  m u ­
nicipal officers in the  m u n ic ip a lity  w h ere  th e  subd iv ision  is located , an d  re ­
corded  in th e  p ro p e r re g is try  of deeds. N o subd iv ision  p la t o r p lan  sh a ll be 
reco rded  by  an y  re g is te r  of deeds w h ich  h as  n o t been  approved  as re q u ired . 
A pprova l for th e  purpose of reco rd in g  sh a ll ap p ear in w ritin g  on th e  p la t 
o r p lan . N o public u tility , w a te r  d is tr ic t, s a n ita ry  d is tric t o r any  u ti l i ty  co m ­
p an y  of an y  k ind  shall serve an y  lo t in a su bd iv ision  fo r w hich  a p lan  h as  n o t 
been  approved .
A n y  person , firm , co rp o ra tio n  o r o th e r  legal e n tity  w ho  conveys, o ffers o r 
ag rees  to  convey  an y  land  in  a su b d iv isio n  w h ich  h as no t been  ap p ro v ed  as 
re q u ired  by  th is  sec tion  shall be p u n ish ed  b y  a fine of no t m ore th a n  $1,000 
for each  such  conveyance, o ffering  o r ag reem en t. T h e  A tto rn e y  G eneral, th e  
m u n ic ip a lity  or th e  ap p ro p ria te  m u n ic ip a l officers m ay  in s titu te  p ro ceed in g s  
to  en jo in  th e  v io la tion  of th is  sec tion .
PUBLIC LAWS, 1973
A N  A C T  to  A m end  M unicipal R eg u la tio n  of L a n d  S ubd iv ision  Law .
Be i t  en a c te d  b y  the  P eop le  o f  th e  S ta te  o f  M a in e , as fo llow s:
Sec. i .  R . S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§§ 1 and  2, rep ea led  an d  rep laced . Sub­
sec tions 1 an d  2 of section  4956 of T itle  30 of th e  R ev ised  S ta tu te s , as repealed 
and  rep laced  by  ch a p te r 454 of the public law s of 1971, are  repealed  and the 
fo llow ing  enac ted  in p lace th e re o f :
1. D efined. A  subdiv ision  is th e  d iv ision  of a  tra c t  o r parcel of land  into 
3 or m ore lo ts  w ith in  any  5-year period, w h e th e r accom plished  by  sale, lease, 
deve lopm en t, b u ild ing  o r o therw ise , excep t w hen  th e  d iv ision  is accom ­
p lished  by  inh eritan ce , o rd e r of c o u rt o r g ift to  a re la tiv e , un less th e  in ten t 
of such  g ift is to  avoid th e  ob jectives of th is  sec tion .
In  d e te rm in in g  w h e th e r a parcel of land  is d iv ided  in to  3 o r m ore lo ts, land 
re ta in ed  by  th e  subd iv id er fo r h is ow n use as a sing le  fam ily  residence for a 
period  of a t le a s t 5 years shall no t be included.
N o  sale or lease  of any  lo t o r parcel shall be considered  as be in g  a p a r t of a 
su bd iv ision  if such  a lo t o r parcel is 40 acres o r m ore in  size, excep t w here the 
in te n t of such  sale or lease is to  avoid  th e  ob jectives of th is  s ta tu te .
2. M un ic ipal rev iew  and  regu la tion .
A . R ev iew in g  au th o rity . A ll req u ests  for subd iv ision  app ro v a l shall be 
rev iew ed  b y  th e  m unicipal p lan n in g  board , ag ency  o r office, o r if none, by 
th e  m u n ic ip al officers, h e re in a fte r called th e  m u n ic ip al rev iew in g  au thority .
B . R eg u la tio n s. T h e  m unicipal rev iew ing  a u th o rity  m ay, a fte r a public 
h ea rin g , a d o p t add itional reasonab le  reg u la tio n s  g o v ern in g  subdivisions 
w h ich  shall con tro l u n til am ended, repealed  o r rep laced  by  regulations 
ad o p ted  b y  th e  m unicipal leg isla tive body. T h e  m un ic ipal rev iew ing  au­
th o r ity  shall give a t le a s t 7 d ay s’ no tice of such  h ea rin g .
C. R ecord . O n  all m a tte rs  concern ing  subd iv ision  rev iew , th e  m unicipal 
rev iew in g  a u th o rity  shall m ain ta in  a p erm an en t reco rd  of all its  m eetings, 
p roceed ings and  correspondence.
D . H e a r in g ; o rder. In  the  even t th a t  the  m un ic ipal rev iew in g  au thority  
dete rm in es to  ho ld  a public h ea rin g  on an  ap p lica tio n  fo r subdiv ision  ap­
p roval, i t  sha ll ho ld  such h ea rin g  w ith in  30 days of rece ip t b y  i t  of a com­
p leted  app lica tion , and shall cause no tice of th e  date , tim e and  place of such 
h ea rin g  to  be g iven  to  the  person  m aking  th e  ap p lica tio n  an d  to  be pub­
lished  in a n ew sp ap er of genera l c ircu la tion  in  th e m u n ic ip a lity  in which 
the sub d iv isio n  is p roposed  to  be located , a t le a s t 2 tim es, th e  d ate  of the 
first p u b lica tio n  to  be a t  le a s t 7 days p rio r to  th e  h ea rin g .
The m u n ic ip a l rev iew in g  a u th o rity  shall, w ith in  30 days of a public hearing  
or w ith in  60 d ay s of receiv ing  a com pleted  app lica tion , if no h ea rin g  is held, 
or w ith in  such  o th e r tim e lim it as m ay  be o th erw ise  m u tu a lly  ag reed  to , issue 
an o rder d en y in g  or g ra n tin g  approval of th e  p roposed  subd iv ision  o r g ra n tin g  
approval u p o n  su ch  te rm s  and  cond itions as it m ay  deem  adv isab le  to  sa tisfy  
the c r ite ria  lis ted  in  subsec tion  3 and  to  sa tis fy  any  o th e r reg u la tio n s  adopted  
by the  rev iew in g  a u th o rity , and  to  p ro tec t and  p reserv e  th e  pub lic’s health , 
safety and  g en e ra l w elfare . I n  all in stan ces  the  b u rd en  of p roof shall be upon  
the persons p ro p o sin g  th e  subdiv isions. In  issu ing  its  decision, th e  rev iew ing  
au tho rity  shall m ake findings of fac t es tab lish in g  th a t  th e  p roposed  subdiv i-
CHAPTER 465
Sec. 2. R. S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§ 3, F , amended. P aragraph  F  of sub­
section 3 of section 4956 of T itle 30 of the Revised S ta tu tes, as repealed and 
replaced by chapter 454 of the public laws of 1971, is am ended to read as 
follows:
F. W ill provide for adequate soltd sewage waste d isposal;
Sec. 3. R. S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§ 3, ft H , repealed. P aragraph  H of sub­
section 3 of section 4956 of T itle 30 of the Revised S tatu tes, as repealed and 
replaced by chapter 454 of the public laws of 1971, is repealed.
Sec. 4. R. S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§ 3, amended. The last paragraph of su b ­
section 3 of section 4956 of T itle 30 of the Revised S tatu tes, as repealed and 
replaced by chapter 454 of the public laws of 1971, is repealed.
Sec. 5. R. S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§ 4, am ended. Subsection 4 of section 4956 
of Title 30 of the Revised S tatutes, as repealed and replaced by chapter 454 
of the public laws of 1971, is am ended to read as follows:
4. E n fo rcem en t. No person, firm, corporation or o ther legal en tity  may 
sell, lease, o r convey fo r co nsidera tion , offer or agree to sell, lease or convey 
for consid era tio n  any land in a subdivision which has not been approved by 
the p lan n in g  board , agetrey  of office, of irt no ne  exk-t-j. by m unicipal 
officers in  m unicipal rev iew in g  a u th o rity  of the m unicipality where the sub­
division is located, and recorded in the proper reg istry  of deeds. No sub­
division plat or plan shall be recorded by any register of deeds w hich has not 
been approved as required. Approval for the purpose of recording shall 
appear in w riting  on the plat or plan. No public utility , w ater d istrict, sani­
tary district or any u tility  com pany of any kind shall se r■re in sta ll serv ices to  
any lot in a subdivision for which a plan has not been approved.
Sec. 6. R. S., T . 30, § 4956, amended. The last paragraph of section 4956 
of T itle 30 of the Revised S tatu tes, as repealed and replaced by chapter 454 
of the public laws of 1971, is am ended to read as follows:
Any person, firm, corporation or other legal entity  who sells, leases, or 
conveys for co n sid era tio n , offers or agrees to sell, lease or convey fo r con­
sidera tion  any land in a subdivision which has not been approved as required 
by this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $ 1,000 for each 
such sale, lease or conveyance for consideration, offering or agreem ent. The 
A ttorney General, the m unicipality or the appropriate municipal officers may 
institute proceedings to enjoin the violation of this section.
Sec. 7. R. S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§ 5, additional. Section 4956 of T itle 30 
of the Revised S tatu tes, as repealed and replaced by chapter 454 of the public 
laws of 1971, is am ended by adding a new subsection 5, to read as follows:
5. E xem ptions. T h is  sec tion  shall n o t app ly  to  p roposed  subdiv isions 
approved  by  th e  p lan n in g  b o ard  or th e  m unicipal officials p rio r to  S ep tem ber 
23, 1971 in  accordance w ith  law s th en  in effect nor shall th ey  ap p ly  to  su b ­
d iv isions as defined b y  th is  sec tion  in  ac tu a l ex istence on S ep tem b er 23, 1971 
th a t  d id n o t req u ire  ap p ro v a l u n d er p rio r law . T h e  d iv ision  of a  tr a c t  or 
parcel b y  sale, g ift, in h e ritan ce , lease o r o rder of co u rt in to  3 or m o re  lo ts  and 
upo n  w hich  lo ts  p e rm a n en t dw elling  s tru c tu re s  legally  ex isted  p rio r  to  Sep­
tem b er 23, 1971 is n o t a  subdiv ision .
sion does or does not m eet the foregoing criteria.
Effective October 3, 1973
PUBLIC LAWS, 1973
A N  A C T  to  C larify  th e  R eal E s ta te  Subdiv ision  L aw .
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine, as follows:
Sec. i .  R . S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§ 1, am ended. T he first paragraph of sub ­
section 1 of section 4956 of T itle 30 of the Revised S tatu tes, as last repealed 
and replaced by section 1 of chapter 465 of the public laws of 1973, is am ended 
by adding a t the end a new sentence to read as fo llow s:
For th e  p u rp o ses  of th is  sec tion , a  lo t  shall no t include a tra n s fe r  of an  in te r ­
est in lan d  to  an  ab u ttin g  lan d o w n er, h o w ev er accom plished.
Sec. 2. R . S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§  5, amended. Subsection 5 of section 4956 
of Title 30 of the Revised S ta tu tes, as enacted by section 7 of chapter 465 of 
the public laws of 1973, is am ended by adding a t the end a new paragraph to  
read as follows :
T he ow ner of a  lo t w hich, a t  th e  tim e  of its  c rea tion , w as no t p a r t  of a su b ­
division, sh a ll n o t be req u ired  to  secu re  th e  app roval of the  m unicipal rev iew ­
ing a u th o rity  fo r such  lo t in  th e  ev en t th a t  th e  subseq u en t ac tions of a  p rio r  
owner, o r h is  successor in in te re s t, o f th e  lo t c rea tes  a  subd iv ision  of w h ich  
the lo t is a  p a r t, how ever, th e  m u n ic ip a l rev iew ing  au th o rity  shall co n sid er 
the ex istence  of such  a p rev iously  c rea ted  lo t in  p assing  upon  th e  app lica tion  
of any p rio r  ow ner, o r h is successor in  in te re st, of th e  lo t for app roval of a  
proposed subdiv ision .
CHAPTER 700
Effective June 28, 1974
PUBLIC LAWS, 1975
CHAPTER 468
A N  A C T  to  A m end  th e  S ubdiv ision  L a w  to  P ro v id e  fo r M ore H o u sin g
in  th e  S ta te .
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine, as follows:
Sec. i .  12 M R SA  § 4813, first ft, as la s t rep ea led  and rep laced  b y  P L  1973, 
c. 564, § 5, is am ended  b y  add ing  a  new  sen ten ce  a t  th e  end to  r e a d :
T h e  D e p a rtm e n t of E n v iro n m en ta l P ro te c tio n  an d  th e  M aine  L a n d  U se  R eg­
u la tio n  C om m ission  sh a ll w ith  re sp ec t to  th ese  sh o re lan d  a reas  ad o p t said 
su itab le  o rd inance  b y  Ja n u a ry  1, 1976.
Sec. 2. 30 M R S A  § 4956, sub-§ 2, ft C -i is en ac ted  to  re a d :
C -i. U p o n  receiv ing  an  app lica tion , th e  m un ic ipal rev iew ing  au th o rity  
shall issue  to  th e  app lican t a d a ted  rece ip t. W ith in  30 days from  receip t of 
an  app lica tion , th e  m unicipal rev iew in g  a u th o r ity  shall n o tify  th e  applicant 
in w ritin g  e ith e r th a t the app lica tion  is a com plete  app lica tion  or, if the 
ap p lica tio n  is incom plete, th e  specific ad d itio n a l m a te ria l needed  to  m ake a 
com plete  app lica tion . A fte r th e  m u n ic ip al rev iew in g  a u th o rity  h as deter­
m ined  th a t  a  com plete app lica tion  h as b een  filed, it  shall n o tify  th e  applicant 
and  beg in  its  fu ll eva lua tion  of th e  p ro p o sed  subdiv ision .
Effective October 1, 1975
PUBLIC  LAWS, 1975
CHAPTER 475
A N  A C T  to  C larify  th e  M unicipal R egu la tion  of L an d  S ubd iv ision  L aw . 
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine, as follows:
Sec. i .  30 M R SA  § 4956, sub-§ 1, as last am ended  by P L  1973, c. 700. § 1, 
is repealed  and  the  fo llow ing  enacted  in place th e reo f:
1. D efined. A  subd iv ision  is th e  d iv ision of a tra c t  o r parce l of lan d  in to  
3 o r m ore lo ts  w ith in  an y  5 -year period, w hich  period b eg ins  a f te r  S ep tem ber 
22, 1971, w h e th e r accom plished  by  sale, lease, developm ent, b u ild in g s o r o th e r­
w ise, p rov ided  th a t  a d iv ision  accom plished  by  devise, condem n atio n , o rd e r 
o f cou rt, g ift to  a perso n  re la ted  to  th e  donor b y  blood, m arr ia g e  o r adop tion , 
u n less  th e  in te n t of such  g ift is to  avoid  the  ob jectives of th is  sec tion , o r  b y  
tra n s fe r  of an y  in te re s t in lan d  to  th e  ow ner of lan d  a b u ttin g  th ereo n , shall 
n o t be considered  to  c rea te  a lo t o r lo ts  for th e  purposes of th is  section .
I n  d e te rm in in g  w h e th e r a tr a c t  o r parcel of land  is d iv ided in to  3 o r m ore 
lo ts , th e  f irs t d iv id ing  of su ch  tra c t  o r parcel, un less o th e rw ise  exem pted  
herein , shall be considered  to  c rea te  th e  first 2 lo ts and  th e  n e x t d iv id ing  of 
e ith e r  of said  first 2 lo ts , b y  w hom ever accom plished, un less  o th e rw ise  ex­
em p ted  herein , shall be considered  to  crea te  a 3rd lot, u n less b o th  such  di- 
v id ings are  accom plished  by  a subd iv ider w ho shall have re ta in ed  one of such  
lo ts  fo r h is ow n use as a sing le  fam ily  residence for a period  of a t  le a s t  5 y ea rs  
p rio r to  such  2nd div id ing . L o ts  of 40 o r m ore acres shall n o t be co u n ted  as 
lo ts.
F o r  th e  p u rposes of th is  section , a tra c t  or parcel of lan d  is defined as all 
co n tig u o u s land  in  th e  sam e ow nersh ip , provided th a t  lan d s  lo ca ted  on  op­
posite  sides of a public o r p riv a te  road  shall be considered  each  a sep a ra te  
tra c t  o r parcel of land  un less such  ro ad  w as estab lished  by  th e  o w n er of lan d  
bn  b o th  sides thereof.
Sec. 2. 30 M R SA  § 4956, sub-§ 4, first sentence, as la s t am ended  b y  P L  
1973, c- 4^5» § 5. is fu r th e r  am ended  to  read  :
N o person , firm , co rpo ra tion  or o th e r  legal e n tity  m ay sell, lease o r convey  
for consideration , offer o r ag ree  to  sell, lease o r convey for consid era tio n  any  
lan d  in a  subdiv ision  w h ioh u n less  th e  subdiv ision  has been app ro v ed  by  
th e  m unicipal rev iew ing  a u th o rity  of th e  m unicipality  w here  the  subd iv ision  
is located , and  un less a  su rv ey  p lan  th e reo f show ing  p e rm an en t m ark e rs  se t 
a t  all lo t co rners has been  recorded  in th e  p roper reg is try  of deeds. T h e  te rm  
“p erm a n en t m ark e r” includes b u t is no t lim ited  to  th e  fo llo w in g : A  g ra n ite  
m onum ent, a concrete  m o num en t, an  iron  p in  o r a drill ho le in  ledge.
Sec. 3. 30 M R SA  § 4956, sub-§ 5, first p arag raph , as enacted  by  P L  1973, 
c. 465, § 7, is am ended  to  read  :
T h is  section  shall no t app ly  to  p roposed  subdivisions approved  by th e  p lan ­
n in g  board  or the m unicipal officials p rio r to  Septem ber 23, 1971 in accordance 
w ith  law s then  in effect n o r shall 4-bey it apply  to  subd iv isions as defined by 
th is  section  in ac tua l ex istence on S ep tem ber 23, 1971 th a t  did n o t req u ire  
app roval u n d er p rio r law  or to  a subd iv ision  as defined by  th is  sec tion , a  p lan
PUBLIC LAWS, 1975
of w hich  had  been legally  recorded  in th e  p roper re g is try  of deeds p rio r to  
S ep tem ber 23, 1971. T h e  d ivi•:■■■»■«: -4  e  by  se+e, in h e rita n ce,
^  oourt in to  ^
dwe-ling st-rnet-nfeo tegaUv r eined prior 4# Sep c^mbce 53. +974- is « stth- 
dw ioion T h e  div ision  of a  tra c t o r parcel as defined by  th is  sec tion  in to  3 or 
m ore lo ts  and  upo n  all of w hich  lo ts  p e rm a n en t dw elling  s tru c tu re s  leg a lly  
ex is ted  p rio r to  S ep tem ber 23, 1971 is n o t a subdiv ision .
Sec. 4. 30 M R SA  § 4956, sub-§  5, second  p a rag rap h , as enacted  by  P L  
1973. c. 700, § 2, is repealed  and  the following enacted  in place th e re o f :
T h e  d iv id ing  of a tra c t  o r  parcel of land  and  th e  lo t o r lo ts  so m ade, w h ich  
d iv id ing  o r lo ts  w h en  m ade a re  no t su b jec t to  th is  section , shall n o t becom e 
su b jec t to  th is  sec tion  b y  the su b seq u en t d iv id ing  of said  tra c t o r parce l of 
lan d  o r an y  p o rtio n  thereof, how ever, th e  m unicipal rev iew ing  au th o rity  sh a ll 
co n sice r th e  ex istence of such  p rev iously  crea ted  lo t o r lo ts  in  rev iew in g  a 
p roposed  subd iv ision  c rea ted  b y  such  su b seq u en t d iv id ing .
Effective October 1, 1975
1976 F IR ST  SPEC IA L SESSIO N  Ch. 703
SUBDIVISIONS—PERMANENT MARKERS— 
ATTORNEY FEES
CH A PTER 703
S.P. 717— L.D. 2268
An Act to Revise Requirements for Permanent Markers under the Land Sub* 
division Law.
Be i t  enacted by the People of the S ta te  of Maine, as follows:
Sec. I. 30 MRSA § 4956, sub-§ 4, first sentence, as last amended by PL  
1975, c. 475, § 2, is repealed and the follow ing enacted in place thereof:
No person, firm, corporation or other legal entity may sell, lease or convey 
for consideration, offer or agree to sell, lease or convey for consideration any 
land in a subdivision which has not been approved by the municipal reviewing 
authority o f the municipality where the subdivision is located and recorded in 
the proper registry of deeds.
Sec. 2. 30 MRSA § 4956, sub-§ 5, 3rd fl, last sentence, is  amended to read: 
The Attorney General, the municipality, the planning board of any munici­
pality or the appropriate municipal officers may institute proceedings to en­
join the violations of this gection and if  a violation is found by the court, the  
municipality, municipal planning board or the appropriate municipal officers 
may be allowed attorney fees.
Approved Apr. 1, 1976.
APPROVED CHAPTER
JUN1577





IN  THE YEAR OF OUR LORD NINETEEN HUNDRED 
SEVENTY-SEVEN
H. P. 832 — L. D. 1005
A N  A C T  R equ iring  P erm an en t M arkers P r io r  to  th e  Sale or 
C onveyance of L and  in an  A pproved  Subdivision.
B e  i t  enac ted  by  th e  People  o f  the  S ta te  o f  M aine ,  as follows:
30 M R SA  § 4956, sub-§ 4, 1st sentence, as repealed and replaced by P L
1975. c- 7°3, § 1, is amended to read :
No person, firm, corporation or other legal entity may sell, lease or convey 
for consideration, ofler or agree to sell, lease or convey for consideration any 
land in a subdivision which has not been approved by the municipal reviewing 
authority of the municipality where the subdivision is located and recorded in 
the proper registry of deeds, nor shall such person, firm, co rpo ra tion  or o ther 
legal en tity  sell or convey any  land in such  approved  subdiv ision  unless a t 
least one p erm an en t m ark er is set a t one lo t corner of the  lo t sold or conveyed.
I n H o u s e  o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , ................................................................... 1977
Read twice and passed to be enacted.
S p e a k e r
I n S e n a t e , ................................... , .............................1977
Read twice and passed to be enacted.
P r e s id e n t
Approved 19 77




IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD NINETEEN HUNDRED 
SEVENTY-SEVEN
^ i U C  tAVIT.
EFFEC TIVE DATE 
O ct. 24, 1977
S. P. 590 — L. D. 1896
A N  A C T  to Make Additional Corrections of Errors and Inconsistencies in
the Laws of Maine.
Emergency preamble. Whereas, Acts of the Legislature do not become 
effective until 9 0 days after adjournment unless enacted as emergencies; and
Whereas, Acts of this and previous Legislatures have resulted in certain technical errors and inconsistencies in the laws of Maine; and
Whereas, these errors and inconsistencies have created uncertainties and confusion in interpreting legislative intent; and
Whereas, it is vitally necessary to resolve such uncertainties and confusion to prevent anv injustice or hardship on the people of Maine; and
Whereas, in the judgment of the Legislature, these facts create an emer­
gency within the meaning of the Constitution of Maine and require the following legislation as immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety; now, therefore.
Be it evaded by the  People  of the  S la te  o f  M aine ,  as follows:
Sec. i. 1 MRSA § 12, last sentence, is amended to read :
If compensation for land is not agreed upon, the estate may be taken for the intended purpose by payment of a fair compensation, to be ascertained and determined in the same manner as and by proceedings similar to those pro­vided for ascertaining damages in locating highways, in Title 2 3, chapters 
201 to «©9 207.
Sec. 2. 3 MRSA § 2, as repealed and replaced by PL 1975, c. 750, § t, is
amended by adding a new paragraph at the end to read :
T h e expenses of members of the Legislature traveling outside the State 
shall be reimbursed for their actual expenses provided that the expense 
vouchers are approved by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the 
H ouse of Representatives.
Sec. 3. 3 MRSA § 3, as last amended by PL 1 9 7 3, c. 5 9 0, § 2, is repealed.
Sec. 4. 3 MRSA § 22, 1st jj, last sentence, as repealed and replaced by P L  
1975, c. 604, § t. is repealed and the following enacted in its place:
H e shall receive a salary of $400 per week for all official services performed 
by  him  during a regular or special session of the Legislature.
Sec. 5. Effective date. Section 4 of this Act shall be retroactive to Janu­
ary 5, 1977-
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Lands shall enter into new leasehold agreements with such persons, .and shall 
thereafter renew such leases on what may from time to time be reasonable 
terms and conditions, so long as the lessee complies with the terms and 
conditions of such leases and with all applicable laws and regulations of the 
State.
Sec. 116-A. 30 M R SA  § 4552, sub-§ 18, 1st sentence, as enacted by PL
1975, c. 625, § 4. is amended to re a d :
“ Mortgage loan’’ shall mean an interest-bearing obligation secured by a 
mortgage or note constituting a first lien on land and improvements in the 
State constituting mve-fam ky  eH= m ulf i-frtm ily  horns i-n-g tm k o, e  hotiomg 
p re fec t , umf residen tia l housing or a housing  pro ject, including, b u t no t 
lim ited  to, such improvements located on an Indian reservation in this State.
Sec. 117. 30 M R SA  § 4602, sub-§ 2, f[ C, n ex t to  la s t sentence, as enacted  
by P L  1969, c. 470, § 8, is amended to re a d :
The rate and amount of compensation of the director shall be established by 
the Governor w k-h th e  advice tmk conaef»t e f  fk e  -La ec u t ive Co uncil.
Sec. 118. 30 M R SA  § 4602, sub-§ 2, D, 1st nex t to la s t sentence, as
repealed and replaced by PL  1975, c. 770, § 175, is amended to read:
Each advisory board member and commissioner shall continue to hold office 
after the expiration of his term until his successor shall have been appointed 
k* eaoe of eo m mlosicmeeo, eofkl-rmed by  -tko hbtee-ufivc Co unek .
Sec. 118-A. 30 M R SA  § 4756, 1st sen tence, as amended by PL 1973, c.
625, § 205, is further amended to re a d :
The state authority shall have the power to purchase or to make commit­
ments to purchase from banks, life insurance companies, savings and loan 
associations, the Federal Government and other financial institutions law­
fully doing business in the State of Maine, the interest bearing obligations 
secured by mortgages and notes which are .a first lien on land and improve­
ments in Maine constituting ofto w* m ikti-famlly tm k o residen tia l
housing  or a housing  project, except that an obligation shall not be eligible 
for purchase by the state housing authority if the date of said obligation is 
prior to October 1, 1969.
Sec. 118-B. 30 M R SA  § 4756, la s t % 1st sen tence, as enacted by PL  1975,
c. 625, § 19, is amended to read :
Improvements constituting erne fam ily m u l ti-fam ily u n its  residentia l
housing  o r a housing  pro jec t shall include but not be limited to h o u sin g 
p ro jec ts  improvements located on an Indian reservation in this State.
Sec. 118-C. 30 M R SA  § 4760, 1st sen tence, as amended by PL 1973. c.
517, § 3, is further amended to re a d :
The state authority may authorize the issuance of revenue bonds of the 
authority in the manner and as provided in section 475 r for any of its au­
thorized purposes including the purchase of first mortgage loans or evidences 
thereof, for residential housing or a housing  p ro jec t in the State of Maine 
from the financial institutions and other agencies specified in section 4756.
Sec. 118-D. 30 M R SA  § 4956, sub-§ 4, 1st sen tence, as amended by PL
1977, c. 315, is further amended to read :
No person, firm, corporation or cither legal entity may sell, lease, develop, 
bu ild  upo n  or convey for consideration, offer or agree to sell, lease, develop,
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build upon or convey for consideration any land in a subdivision which has 
not been approved by the municipal reviewing' authority of the municipality 
where the subdivision is located and recorded in the proper registry of deeds, 
nor shall such person, firm, corporation or other legal entity sell or convey 
any land in such approved subdivision unless at least one permanent marker 
is set at one lot corner of the lot sold or conveyed.
Sec. 118-E. 3 0 MRSA § 4 9 5 6, last f[, 1st sentence, as last amended by
P L  1973, e. 465, § (>, is repealed and the following enacted in its place:
Any person, firm, corporation or other legal entity who sells, leases, de­
velops, builds upon, or conveys for consideration, offers or agrees to sell, 
lease, develop, build upon or convey for consideration any land in a sub­
division which has not been approved as required by this section shall be 
punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 for each such occurrence.
Sec. 118-F. 32 MRSA § 202, sub-§ 2, as repealed and replaced by ML 1977,
c. 404, is repealed.
Sec. 118-G. 32 MRSA § 211, 2nd ff, 3rd sentence, as enacted by PL 1977,
c. 463. § 3. is amended to read :
Landscape architect members shall initially he appointed, one for a 2-year 
term and one for a 3-year term; the initially appointed members shall be 
eligible to be qualified for admission to the examination to practice landscape 
architecture and the Governor shall make a written finding to that effect.
Sec. n8-H . 7 2 MRSA § 2 1 5, as enacted by PL 1977. c. 4 6 3, § 3. is re­
pealed and the foil wing enacted in its place :
§ 215. Removal of m em ber; vacancies
The Governor may by due process of law remove any member of the board 
for misconduct, incompetency, neglect of duty or for any malfeasance in 
office. Any vacancy in the board caused by death, resignation or for any 
other cause, except completion of a fu1! term of service, shall be filled in a 
like manner as an original appointment for a full term but with the new 
member to hold office only during the unexpired term of a member whose 
place he fills.
Sec. 118-I. 32 MRSA § 220, sub-§ 1, ff B, sub-f[ (2), as enacted by PL 1977.
c. 463, § 3, is repealed and the following enacted in its place:
(2) No corporation as such shall be registered to practice architecture 
in this State, but it shall be lawful for a corporation to practice archi­
tecture providing at least l/$  of the directors, if a corporation, or of 
the partners, if a partnership, are licensed under the laws of any state to 
practice architecture and the person having the practice of architecture 
in his charge is himself a director, if a corporation, or a partner, if a 
partnership, and licensed to practice architecture under this chapter and 
all drawings, plans, specifications and administration of construction or 
alterations of buildings or projects by such corporation are under the 
personal direction of such registered architect. One-third of the directors 
or partners shall be licensed under the laws of any state to practice engi­
neering, architecture, landscape architecture or planning. In cases where 
the number of directors or partners is not divisible by 3 the number of 
directors or partners shall be the number that results from rounding up 
or rounding down to the nearest number.
Sec. 118-J. 32 MRSA § 220, sub-§ 2, B, sub-jf (2), as enacted by PL  1977,
c. 463, § 3, is repealed and the following enacted in its place :
(2) No corporation as such shall be registered to practice landscape 
architecture in this State, but it shall be lawful for a corporation to prac-
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